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MAINTENANCE, ALIMONY, AND THE
REHABILITATION OF FAMILY CARE
ANN LAQUER ESTIN*
With the shift from fault-based to no-fault divorce, courts
and commentators have struggled to find new rationales for ali-
mony. Professor Ann Laquer Estin argues that the value offam-
ily care has been lost in this shift. She documents how the law of
alimony and maintenance takes little account of the support
claims of those parents who have devoted substantial time to di-
rect care for young children. Although there has been a trend in
the law towards greater protection for older displaced homemak-
ers and for spouses who assist their partners' education or profes-
sional training, younger caregivers have not benefitted from these
shifts in doctrine and practice After exploring the legal
frameworks of alimony and maintenance law and the mecha-
nisms by which caregivers' claims are excluded, Professor Estin
argues that younger divorced caregivers are subject to a set of
new legal and social norms. She concludes that the law of ali-
mony and maintenance must rehabilitate family care values in a
manner that adequately recognizes the shifting and multiple re-
alities offamily life.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary divorce laws have relegated family values to a minor
role. Within the law, there is a remarkable disregard for caregiving-the
norms of nurturance, altruism, and mutual responsibility that are usually
thought to characterize family life. Although the history of caregiving in
a family may have some significance in the determination of contested
custody cases, it is almost entirely irrelevant when courts resolve the fi-
nancial incidents of divorce, even where it has produced substantial long-
term economic effects for family members.
At the doctrinal level, the courts' failure to value caregiving is sur-
prising. Many contemporary spousal support statutes provide expressly
for caregiver support after divorce. Similarly, recent developments in the
statutory and case law allow courts to compensate partners for unequal
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. A.B. 1979; Dartmouth College;
J.D. 1983, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I owe thanks to many of my friends and
colleagues for their support in this project, in particular Homer Clark, Richard Delgado,
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contributions in their marriages, and these new principles could be use-
fully applied to caregivers. In practice, however, these doctrines have
been highly ineffective where the claims of caregivers are concerned.
At a deeper level, the disappearance of caregiving values from the
law of divorce may be less surprising. Along with the nationwide shift in
the grounds for divorce over the past generation has come a tendency for
judges, legislators, and lawyers to divide the universe of families into two
legally distinct classes. Traditional norms of mutual aid and reliance are
still given effect in those families formed before the changes in divorce
rules, but younger families are subject to new and different norms of fam-
ily life in which self-sufficiency and autonomy are of primary importance.
This Article begins with a review of the two areas of maintenance
law in which caregiving should be important. The first area involves reg-
ular spousal support, which could facilitate postdivorce caregiving in sit-
uations where the parties have young children. The second area involves
maintenance as compensation, which could reimburse the financial losses
incurred because of the obligations of caregiving. I argue that as courts
have focused greater attention on the goal of financial independence,
caregiving values have disappeared. My concern in this Article is not
primarily doctrinal, however, but rather to explore why it is that family
care has disappeared from the practice of family law, and to argue for its
rehabilitation as an important value worthy of greater recognition in the
economic management of divorce.
A general summary of current approaches to alimony or mainte-
nance awards may be a useful starting point. Over the past two decades,
as the law in all jurisdictions has shifted toward "no-fault" divorce
grounds, it has also shifted to new financial policies and norms.1 Once,
courts listened to debates of marital fault and obligation, premised on the
assumption that innocent wives were entitled to their husbands' perma-
nent support. This rule protected, at least in theory, partners who had
become financially dependent as a result of their commitment to family
1. These changes are well described in the legal literature. See generally MARY ANN
GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND FAMILY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 227-33 (1989) (discussing contemporary rules con-
cerning the disposition of property, maintenance, and child support); HERBERT JACOB, SI-
LENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
116-25 (1988) (discussing "Reform and Rise of Marital Property Provisions"); Herma Hill
Kay, Equality and Difference! A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1, 7-12 (1987) (summarizing the changes in the financial aspects of divorce). The
"no-fault" label seems to have been borrowed from automobile accident and workmen's com-
pensation insurance. See JACOB, supra, at 46-47, 52-53. In the divorce context, the term refers
to statutes that permit the dissolution of marriages without proof of traditional grounds, such
as adultery, cruelty, or desertion.
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care rather than to employment.2 Today, courts apply a formally gen-
der-neutral ideal of adult autonomy, which gives priority to financial self-
reliance.
A significant group of modem divorce statutes, including those
based on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA"), embody
the new self-reliance norm by requiring that spouses seeking support
awards establish need, dependence, or incapacitation.3 This type of stat-
ute permits the court to enter an order for support only if this threshold
is crossed. The question of a spouse's financial need must therefore be
the trial court's first and paramount consideration.'
2. The data suggest that only small percentages of divorces included provision for ali-
mony, however. Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a The-
ory, 23 NEw ENG. L. Rlv. 437 n.1 (1988).
3. See, eg., UNiF. MARRIAGE AND DvORCE ACT § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 347-48 (1987)
[hereinafter "UMDA"]. The UMDA requires that a spouse seeking maintenance establish
both that the spouse lacks sufficient property to provide for the spouse's reasonable needs, id.
§ 308(a)(1), and that the spouse is "unable to support himself through appropriate employ-
ment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that
the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home." Id. § 308(a)(2). This is
discussed below as the "threshold requirement" for maintenance under the UMDA. As has
been noted by Professor Kay, one of the reporters of the UMDA, this language is jurisdic-
tional. Kay, supra note 1, at 48 & n.234.
Seven of the eight UMDA states have adopted the threshold provision. In Washington,
although this language was omitted from the statute, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090
(West Supp. 1992), the state's case law already reflected a similar policy. In some UMDA
jurisdictions, the original threshold language has been revised. See, ag., Am. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 25-319.A. (1991) (modified in 1987 to state the test disjunctively and to add two fur-
ther grounds for maintenance eligibility) (reviewed in Schroeder v. Schroeder, 161 Ariz. 316,
317-18, 778 P.2d 1212, 1213-14 (1989)); see also infra note 4 (discussing amendments to the
Minnesota statute); infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (reviewing other amendments to
other alimony and maintenance statutes).
A number of non UMDA states have borrowed the threshold concept from the Act. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(b)(2), (3) (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 32-705.1. (Supp.
1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 I (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 752(a)
(1989). Pennsylvania enacted a UMDA-type threshold test in its initial divorce reform legisla-
tion in 1980, but abandoned it in 1988. See generally Bold v. Bold, 524 Pa. 487, 491 n.4, 574
A.2d 552, 554 n.4 (1990) (describing change in statute).
Other statutory formulations that achieve a similar result are the requirement that a
spouse seeking maintenance be found "dependent," see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(b)(1)
(Supp. 1990) (test of dependence), or incapacitated, see IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11.(e) (Supp.
1991) (maintenance available only to "incapacitated" spouse).
The terms "alimony," "maintenance," and "spousal support" are all in active use in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. In this Article, the terms are used interchangeably, unless the context
refers to the particular practice of a given jurisdiction, in which case the specific term is ap-
plied. For debates regarding terminology, see generally HOMER H. CLARM, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 620 (Student Ed. 1988) (discussing the terms
"alimony" and "maintenance") & Ira M. Ellman, The Theory ofAlimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1,
10 n.20 (1989) (discussing debate regarding terms and explaining his choice to use the term
"alimony").
4. "Need," however, is a flexible concept, varying with the parties' expectations and ex-
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Once need is established, the law in most jurisdictions permits the
trial judge to enter an order for support in any amount and for any dura-
tion the court deems just. The statutes and case law typically direct the
court to consider a variety of factors, such as the length of the marriage,
the age and physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking main-
tenance, and the parties' standard of living during the marriage.' The
law offers little guidance as to how these factors should be evaluated or
how they should be balanced when different factors suggest conflicting
results. The flexibility of these factors, combined with an extremely def-
erential standard of review, gives the trial judge a very high level of dis-
cretion in determining support awards.6
perience during the marriage. Courts applying the UMDA's threshold test, see supra note 3,
achieve flexibility through broad interpretations of the terms "reasonable needs" and "appro-
priate employment." In one early decision, Kentucky's highest court described the statute's
reference to "appropriate employment" as meaning appropriate according to the "standard of
living established during the marriage," and went on to comment that "[t]he statute, as did the
law before, simply recognizes that what might be ample for a scullery maid is not necessarily
sufficient for one accustomed to the lifestyle of a duchess." Casper v. Casper, 510 S.W.2d 253,
255 (Ky. 1974).
See also In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1987), in which the Colorado
Supreme Court rejected the trial court's interpretation of the threshold test, which it character-
ized as "a high threshold requiring a spouse to establish that he or she lacks the minimum
resources to sustain human life." Id at 681. The Colorado court instead took the position
that "[t]he phrases 'reasonable needs' and 'appropriate employment' need not be viewed so
narrowly." Id
In some jurisdictions statutory language has been amended to achieve the same result.
See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.552 (West 1990) (revised in 1985 to add the words "consid-
ering the standard of living established during the marriage" to both prongs of the test and
stating the threshold disjunctively). But see In re Marriage of Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22
(Minn. 1989) (spouse receiving property division award of $3.6 million not entitled to mainte-
nance award despite changes in the statute). Another illustration is the 1988 amendment to
the Pennsylvania statute. See'supra note 3.
5. Eg., UMDA § 308(b).
6. As Mary Ann Glendon has observed, "Family law ... is characterized by more [judi-
cial] discretion than any other field of private law. This fact is typically explained by a per-
ceived need to tailor legal resolutions to the unique circumstances of each individual and
family." Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and
Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1165, 1167 (1986); see also RICHARD NEELY, THE DIVORCE
DECISION: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF ENDING A MARRIAGE 9 (1984)
(describing discretionary nature of divorce decisiomaking).
There has been a trend in family law in recent years toward combatting this problem by
creating fixed rules governing the financial aspects of divorce. For example, in some states
there is a mandatory or presumptive ratio for marital property division. See, e.g., WIs. STAT.
§ 247.255 (1977) (discussed in Eahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 82, 318 N.W.2d 391, 397 (1982)).
The child support "guidelines" adopted in each state in compliance with federal law are an-
other illustration of the move toward clear and predictable rules. See 42 U.S.C. § 667 (1988).
See generally Charles Brackney, Battling Inconsistency and Inadequacy: Child Support Guide-
lines in the States, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 197, 206 (1988) (stating that good child support
guidelines will make awards more consistent); Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discre-
tionary Justice in Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 209, 234
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The notion that all adults should be autonomous and self-supporting
became quickly and deeply entrenched in domestic relations law.7 In
service of this ideal, those who are not currently self-supporting are ex-
pected to "rehabilitate" themselves quickly and move into the world of
full-time paid employment. As a result, most maintenance awards are
now entered for short periods of rehabilitation.' Although a court may
deem a spouse incapable of rehabilitation, making permanent support ap-
propriate, this conclusion is rare.' Appellate courts reinforce this prac-
tice by reversing trial court awards that appear to violate the self-reliance
(1991) (explaining that fixed rules have led to greater predictability and have increased the
number of settled child support cases); Robert G. Williams, Should There Be Child Support
and Alimony Guidelines?, in ALIMONY: NEW STRATEGIES FOR PURSurr AND DEFENSE 161,
163 (Section of Family Law, American Bar Association, 1988) [hereinafter "NEw STRATE-
GIES"] (explaining that the guidelines must "express a quantitative formula rather than simply
list the factors that are taken into consideration").
The area of alimony and maintenance has not seen the same level of legislative or judicial
attention to rule-creating as have these other two areas. There is, however, some interest in
developing alimony guidelines similar to those currently used in some counties of California
for purposes of pendente lite or temporary alimony. See generally George Norton, The Future
ofAlimony: A Proposal for Guidelines, in NEw STRATEGIES, supra, at 176, 184 (describing the
California guidelines).
7. The widespread belief that virtually all women can "build new lives for themselves"
with a few years of training is well-documented. LENORE J. WErrzMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 143-83 (1985) (describing results of an empirical study of chang-
ing alimony awards). One author has described the conceptual basis of alimony as a "Self-
Sufficiency Standard." Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Lim-
ited Duration Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573, 581-83 (1988).
8. Until recently a rehabilitative approach was required by statute in some states. Two
examples are Delaware, which until 1988 limited maintenance awards to two years unless the
marriage had lasted more than twenty years, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(a)(3) (1981),
and New Hampshire, which imposed a three-year maximum on maintenance awards in disso-
lutions of marriages in which there were no minor children at the time of the divorce, see N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1983). The current statutes, see supra note 3, afford the courts
more latitude in making "equitable" awards.
In some states, there is a legislatively imposed ten-year limit on maintenance awards,
reflecting the view that every dependent spouse should be rehabilitated within that time. See,
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(2) (Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.412(2) (1991).
The Kansas statute allows a spouse receiving maintenance to petition for reinstatement of the
award at the end of ten years.
9. In some jurisdictions an older conception of alimony survives, as an exception to the
newer approach, for marital dissolutions accompanied by egregious fault of one of the parties.
See, eg., cases cited in CLARK, supra note 3, at 652-53 n.6 to 12. The situation of an older
housewife is also treated as an exceptional situation, in which the usual rules cannot be ap-
plied. See infra notes 54-75 and accompanying text. The harshest rules, however, are in Indi-
ana, where rehabilitative maintenance is limited to two years and permanent maintenance is
only available to an "incapacitated" spouse, see IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11.(e) (Supp. 1991),
cited supra note 3, and Texas, where the courts have no authority to order alimony or mainte-
nance payments at all, see CLARK, supra note 3, at 620 n.14.
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norm.'
0
Within this framework, caregivers can assert two distinct types of
maintenance claims. One is that maintenance should be awarded as sup-
port for a parent who has been a full or part-time caregiver and who
wants to continue in that role until the children reach a specified age. In
effect, this argument is that the interests of young children justify a pe-
riod of spousal financial dependence, which may extend beyond the end
of a marriage. In fact, this type of award is explicitly authorized by
many existing divorce statutes.1
The second claim is that a caregiver who has put her career on hold
or on a slow track should receive financial compensation for her contri-
butions to the family and the resulting economic losses. A caregiver
making this argument can draw upon a body of statutory and case law
addressing the compensatory purposes of divorce financial orders, as well
as upon a significant body of favorable academic commentary. 2
Part II of this Article discusses the argument for financial support
for family care after divorce, and Part III addresses the claim for mainte-
nance awards as compensation for a caregiver's contributions. Part IV
considers the reasons why family care has been disappearing as a value
recognized in the law of divorce, and Part V argues for bringing family
care back into family law, as a significant consideration in entering di-
vorce financial orders.
10. In many jurisdictions, maintenance awards are reversed if the appellate court con-
cludes that the dependent wife is capable of providing her own support at some moderate level.
E.g., Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 326, 657 P.2d 1169, 1175 (1983); see also cases cited infra
note 125 (rejecting an "income equalization" approach to maintenance).
One appellate court described the unusual nature of permanent awards in this way:
"Awards of permanent maintenance should be limited to cases where there is an older, depen-
dent spouse in a lengthy 'traditional' marriage with little likelihood that the spouse will be-
come self-sufficient." In re Marriage of Ryan, 383 N.W.2d 371, 373 (Minn. Ct. App, 1986)
(citing Arundel v. Arundel, 281 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. 1979), and Abuzzahab v. Abuz-
zahab, 359 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Minn. 1984)). See also In re Marriage of Mirise, 673 P.2d 803,
804-05 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) ("Maintenance, unlike its predecessor, alimony, is primarily
concerned with insuring that, after dissolution, the basic needs of a disadvantaged spouse are
met.... [It] imposes a duty on the other spouse only if there is no other feasible source from
which the needs can be met.").
This judicial stance toward alimony awards is apparent even where there is no statutory
threshold for eligibility. See, e.g., Louise v. Louise, 156 A.D.2d 937, 938, 549 N.Y.S.2d 238,
239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 120-25. See generally
Louise B. Raggio, Don't Men Have Rights Too?-Or Lifetime Alimony, An Idea Whose Time
Has Come and Gone, in NEw STRATEGIES, supra note 6, at 33 (arguing that permanent ali-
mony should be abolished in favor of other remedies and expanding women's employment
opportunities).
11. See infra notes 13-53 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 98-133 and accompanying text.
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II. FINANcIAL SUPPORT FOR ONGOING FAMILY CARE
At one time, the importance of providing financial support for
caregivers was widely accepted. In the 1968 edition of his treatise on
domestic relations, Homer H. Clark, Jr. stated that "[t]he first and most
important of all the functions of alimony relates to the care of chil-
dren."13 On the surface of the law, this policy is still clear. Professor
Clark repeated this point in the edition of his book published twenty
years later and noted that this function of alimony is explicitly identified
in the UMDA and a number of other divorce statutes.
14
The UMDA reflects the policy of providing support for caregivers in
the threshold test for maintenance eligibility. A spouse seeking mainte-
nance must establish either that he "is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment" or that he is the custodian of a child "whose
condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.""5 In at least ten states,
16
alimony or maintenance statutes utilize this formulation. Professor
Clark is not the only scholar to view this language as reflecting a statu-
tory policy in favor of support for a custodial parent; one text describes
the statute as "making the custodial parent of young children presump-
tively eligible for maintenance."1' 7
In another substantial group of states, alimony or maintenance stat-
utes include a parent's custodial obligations among the factors pertinent
13. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMEsTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 441 (1968).
14. CLARK, supra note 3, at 641-42.
15. UMDA § 308(a)(2), 9A U.L.A. 347, 348 (1987) (emphasis added). This language,
which will be referred to here as the "custodial exception" to the usual requirement of self-
support, exists in both the 1971 and 1973 versions of the UMDA.
16. The seven UMDA states with the maintenance threshold provision include the custo-
dial exception. See ARuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-319.A.2 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
114(l)(b) (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(a)(2) (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.200.(1)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); MwNN. STAT. § 518.552.1(b) (1990); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 452.335.1.(2) (Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203(1)(b) (1991).
In addition, a number of UMDA-influenced state statutes contain a comparable excep-
tion. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(b)(3) (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11.(e)(2)
(Supp. 1991) (exception applies to custodian of a child "whose physical or mental incapacity
requires the custodian to forego employment"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 I.C. (Supp.
1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 752(a)(2) (1989).
In Washington, and in some UMDA-infiuenced states such as Idaho, the UMDA thresh-
old language has been omitted or it has been adopted without the language regarding custody.
See IDAHO CODE § 32-705.1 (Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.090 (West Supp.
1992).
17. IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 282 (1986); see
WEr'ZMAN, supra note 7, at 149.
19931
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to setting spousal support awards."8 Many of these statutes follow the
language of the California no-fault divorce law, which requires that a
court consider whether a spouse seeking ongoing support can be em-
ployed "without interfering with the interests" of any minor or depen-
dent children in her care. 9 Both the UMDA and the California-type
provisions require that the trial court consider a spouse's custodial obli-
gations in evaluating the central questions in a maintenance case:
whether she has the ability to be self-supporting through employment,
and the likely extent and duration of her financial need. By including the
issue of custody in the provisions governing spousal support, these stat-
utes reflect a clear intention to limit the application of the more general
self-reliance norms in cases where there are young children in need of
care. In practice, however, these criteria are rarely utilized.
A. The Tension Between Family Care and Self-Reliance
Looking beyond the language of these statutes, the evidence of pub-
lished alimony and maintenance cases from around the country suggests
that maintenance awarded to facilitate the care of children is unusual.2 °
18. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(5) (West 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-82
(West 1986) ("in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been
awarded, the desirability of such parent's securing employment"); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.21(3)(e) (West Supp. 1992) ("[tlhe earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance,
including... responsibilities for children under either an award of custody or physical care");
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 112(A)(2)(d) (West Supp. 1992) ("(t]he effect of custody of children
of the marriage upon the spouse's earning capacity"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1988) ("the
ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the
interests of any minor children in the custody of such party"); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 236[B][6][a][6] (McKinney 1986) ("the presence of children of the marriage in the respective
homes of the parties"); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(C)(l)(f) (Anderson Supp. 1991)
("(t]he extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because he will be custodian of a
minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the home"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.105(1)(d)(F), (G) (1991) ("[tjhe extent to which the present and future earning capacity
of a party is impaired due to the party's extended absence from the job market to perform the
role of homemaker") ("provisions of the decree relating to custody of the children"); 23 PA.
CoNs. STAT. § 3701(b)(7) (1991) ("[tlhe extent to which the earning power, expenses or finan-
cial obligations of a party will be affected by reason of serving as the custodian of a minor
child"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (C)(9) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (custodian of a child whose
"conditions or circumstances render it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek
employment outside the home"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(d)(5) (1991) ("[tjhe extent to
which it would be undesirable for a party to seek employment outside the home because such
party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage"); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-16(b)(4), (13)
(1992) ("[tlhe income earning abilities of each of the parties, based upon such factors as...
custodial responsibilities for children"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26(5) (West 1981) ("custodial
responsibilities for children").
19. See, eg., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(a)(5) (West 1983).
20. For examples of cases decided under UMDA-model statutes, cited supra note 16, see
In re Marriage of Lincoln, 155 Ariz. 272, 275, 746 P.2d 13, 16 (Ariz. Ct. App.), rev. denied
(1987); Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer, 22 Ariz. App. 238, 242, 526 P.2d 762, 766 (1974); In re
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In the more than twenty states that have statutes incorporating caregiver
maintenance provisions, the record of appellate court decisions indicates
that only in a few jurisdictions do courts regularly apply a policy favor-
ing caregiver support. In most states, the self-reliance norms now over-
ride the policies of caregiving.
Published appellate decisions are a very limited sample of the mil-
lions of divorce cases filed or tried in the lower courts each year. These
cases are influential, however, in forming the shape of domestic relations
practice by suggesting to lawyers and judges the claims and factors that
are important.21 In this area of maintenance law there are relatively few
reported cases, and the opinions that exist offer little guidance to lower
courts or encouragement to caregivers pursuing support.
Caregiver maintenance cases at the appellate level appear regularly
only in Missouri, where a version of the UMDA is in effect. Applying
that statute, the Missouri Court of Appeals has issued more than a dozen
Marriage of Hensley, 210 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1048-49, 569 N.E.2d 1097, 1100, appeal denied,
141 Ill. 2d 541, 580 N.E.2d 114 (1991); In re Marriage of De Bat, 127 Ill. App. 3d 463, 470,
468 N.E.2d 1348, 1353 (1984); In re Marriage of Lukas, 83 Ill. App. 3d 606, 618, 404 N.E.2d
545, 554 (1980); Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134, 135-36 (Ky. 1973); Richie v. Richie,
596 S.W.2d 32, 33-34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Siciliani v. Siciliani, 552 So. 2d 560 (La. Ct. App.
1989), writ denied by 566 So.2d 40 (La. 1991); Brossette v. Brossette, 396 So. 2d 369, 371 (La.
Ct. App. 1981); In re Marriage of Justis, 384 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied
(1986); In re Marriage of Riley, 369 N.W.2d 40, 44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re Marriage of
Manus, 225 Mont. 457, 463, 733 P.2d 1275, 1279 (1987); In re Marriage of Nicholson, 17
Wash. App. 110, 119-20, 561 P.2d 1116, 1119-20 (1977). See also infra note 22 (discussing
Missouri cases).
For examples of cases decided under the statutes cited supra note 18, see Palazzo v.
Palazzo, 9 Conn. App. 486, 487, 519 A.2d 1230, 1231 (1987) (listing inter alia wife's "full care
and responsibility [for] a child who was two years old at the time of the dissolution" as a factor
making wife's "employment prospects bleak"); Morris v. Morris, 201 Neb. 479, 483, 268
N.W.2d 431, 434 (1978); McNenney v. McNenney, 159 A.D.2d 440, 441, 553 N.Y.S.2d 667,
668 (App. Div. 1990) (parties' child was 2 1/2 years old at time of decree; maintenance
awarded for one year only "at which time [wife] is to resume full-time employment"); Sim-
monds v. Simmonds, 140 A.D.2d 934, 934, 529 N.Y.S.2d 615, 616 (App. Div. 1988) (holding
that trial court erred in denying maintenance; wife had not been able to find employment and
"[a]dditionally, the court failed to consider defendant's physical custody of the parties' two
daughters, aged three and seven"); Sutliffv. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. 523, 556, 489 A.2d 764, 780
(1984) (approving limited working hours of emergency room physician responsible for care of
older children), afl'd and remanded, 515 Pa. 393, 528 A.2d 1318 (1987); Wyant v. Wyant, 184
W. Va. 434, 439, 400 S.E.2d 869, 874 (1990) (reversing three-year maintenance award for wife
who was primary caretaker for children ages 5 and 18 months; "lower court failed to assess the
impact that custody of the children would have on her ability to become financially self-sup-
porting"); Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 65, 306 N.W.2d 16, 21 (1981), discussed infra
notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
21. To use the phrase introduced by Mnookin and Korahauser, these opinions cast "the
shadow of the law" over bargaining and allow lawyers to attempt to predict what range of
judicial outcome a party could expect in the absence of a negotiated agreement. Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
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opinions discussing caregiver maintenance.22 Many of these decisions
simply sustain maintenance awards as within the discretion of the lower
court. In P.A.A. v. S.TA.,23 however, the court of appeals ruled as a
matter of law that it is inappropriate for the lower courts to deny mainte-
nance, thereby forcing the wife to seek employment, where there are chil-
dren "of tender years" in her custody.24  The court's language is
extremely strong:
[The wife's] place is in the home with the children. Her alleged
earning capacity, under such circumstances, is an illusionary
financial resource, at best, and is entitled to little, if any, weight
by the trial court at this time. The circumstances (two children
under five who need the love, care and guidance of their mother
on a day-to-day basis during their formative years) make it ap-
propriate that she not be required to seek employment outside
of the home at this time in order to pay her expenses as custo-
dian of the children.25
Although the P.A.A. case was decided in 1979, the Missouri Court
of Appeals has reiterated this policy in more than a dozen decisions from
different districts of the state extending over more than decade. In the
later cases, although the court continued to sustain substantial mainte-
nance awards for caregivers, the policies were described in far more mod-
erate language. In 1988, the court stated in Newport v. Newport :26
When the parties have adopted a lifestyle in which the husband
works and the wife has stayed at home to care for small chil-
dren, and, where it is economically feasible for the wife to con-
tinue to do so after the dissolution, it is appropriate that she not
22. See, eg., In re Marriage of Stuart, 805 S.W.2d 309, 313-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Babe
v. Babe, 784 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Gaston v. Gaston, 776 S.W.2d 465, 466
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Boiling v. Boiling, 768 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Newport v.
Newport, 759 S.W.2d 630, 634-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Witwicky v. Witwicky, 728 S.W.2d
313, 315 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Corey v. Corey, 712 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
Mastin v. Mastin, 709 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Sarandos v. Sarandos, 643
S.W.2d 854, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); P.A.A. v. S.T.A., 592 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); Goffv. Goff, 557 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d
249, 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 243 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976); see also Butler v. Butler, 562 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (husband conceded
that wife should not be required to work until children reached school age); cf In re Marriage
of Tune, 716 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (denying maintenance to wife who had not
been a full-time caregiver). See generally Joan M. Krauskopf, Maintenance: A Decade of De-
velopment, 50 Mo. L. REV. 259, 281-83 (1985) (reviewing Missouri case law).
23. 592 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
24. Id. at 504.
25. Id. The court found that the trial court's denial of maintenance was an abuse of
discretion because it was based on the trial court's improper conclusion that the wife's "emo-
tional disturbance" amounted to marital fault barring her from a maintenance award. Id.
26. 759 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
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be required to seek employment outside the home.27
In both P.A.A. and Newport, the wives had a clear ability to be self-
supporting. Each was college-educated and had worked during the mar-
riage, although not since giving birth to the parties' children. In many
jurisdictions, these facts lead to the almost automatic conclusion that the
mother should return to the labor force, either immediately or within a
year or two of the divorce. Yet in the Missouri cases, the maintenance
awards were "permanent," subject to modification only if the paying
party demonstrated a significant change of circumstances in the future.28
Because the objective of this type of maintenance is to facilitate child
care, it is not surprising that the age of the parties' children is a signifi-
cant factor in the Missouri cases. The Missouri Court of Appeals is espe-
cially solicitous of the custodians of preschool-age children, and
sometimes describes elementary school-age children as being "of tender
years" as well. 9 In cases involving somewhat older children, however, it
is harder to predict whether child care will be viewed as an obstacle to
employment. By the time children reach high school age, however, the
Missouri courts apparently assume that they no longer need a caregiver
at home.30
Outside the body of Missouri decisions, maintenance to facilitate
child care appears only sporadically in the case law. A few appellate
27. Id. at 634-35.
28. Section 316 of the UMDA provides for modification of a prior maintenance award
upon a showing of changed circumstances "so substantial and continuing as to make the terms
[of the prior award] unconscionable." UMDA § 316, 9A U.L.A. 34.7, 489-90 (1987).
"Changed circumstances" can include an increase in the recipient's income or the recipient's
failure to make a good faith effort to seek employment. The burden of establishing a change of
circumstances is on the party seeking the modification; in these cases, the payor would typi-
cally bear the burden of proof for termination. In Witwicky v. Witwicky, 728 S.W.2d 313
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987), the court held that the fact that the children were 15 months older than
at the time the decree was entered (at which time they were 9, 10, and 13) was not a sufficient
change of circumstances to enable the wife to seek employment. Id at 315.
29. In both Newport and P.A.A., the children were five or younger. In Vanet the children
were 5, 9, and 11, and in Mastin they were "of elementary school age." Mastin v. Martin, 709
S.W.2d 545, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); see also Goff v. Goff, 557 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977) (children 6, 7, and 15); Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(preschool-age children).
30. For example, in In re Marriage of K.B and R.B., 648 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983), the children had reached the ages of 15, 18, and 20, and the court stated that no child
required the wife's presence at home. The outcome was the same in Metts v. Metts, 625
$.W.2d 896, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), with children ages 12 and 16, and Gaston v. Gaston,
776 $.W.2d 465, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), with 12 and 15 year old children. But in Sarandos
v. Sarandos, 643 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), custody of a 13 year old was sufficient to
trigger the custodial exception, perhaps because the wife had been a full time mother for 24
years: "She was always at home raising the two older boys, who turned out well. She desired
to continue to give the youngest son the same nurture and caring." Ii at 857.
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opinions in other jurisdictions echo the strong language in favor of
caregiver maintenance found in the early Missouri decisions. For exam-
ple, applying a California-type statutory maintenance provision, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court held in 1978 in Morris v. Morris that employment
by the mother would interfere with her children's interests: "It cannot
be realistically doubted that raising four small children is a full-time
task."31 That court noted with evident approval "the desire of the wife
to continue to care for [the children] properly. 32
The Wisconsin Supreme Court provided another strong judicial
statement in favor of support for caregivers in Hartung v. Hartung,33
which reversed a trial court's award of only short-term maintenance.34
In Hartung, the caregiver had been out of the labor force for the duration
of the parties' thirteen-year marriage and wished "to remain at home to
take care of the children while they [were] small."3 The supreme court's
intervention apparently was provoked by the trial court's cavalier atti-
tude toward caregiving, reflected in this statement made by the trial
judge: "I don't think she would want to sit around the rest of her life.
My God, she will turn into a vegetable if she did that anyhow. So she
ought to start thinking about some kind of a retraining program."36 The
supreme court's response was emphatic:
We see nothing in the record that would support the trial
court's conclusion that mothers of small children who remain
at home and care for them will turn into vegetables. While this
court recognizes equality of opportunity of the sexes and recog-
nizes the right of women to exercise their abilities in whatever
line of work they choose, basically this is a recognition of the
right to make a choice; and if the circumstances dictate to a
woman that the appropriate choice for her is to remain at home
to care for small children, that choice, like a career choice, will
be respected by this court. The trial court's pronouncement,
lacking any basis in the record, cannot be deemed to be a ra-
tional determination.37
31. Morris v. Morris, 201 Neb. 479, 483, 268 N.W.2d 431, 434 (1978) (affirming trial
court's award). The case involved four children ranging from 5 to 9 years old.
32. Id.
33. 102 Wis. 2d 58, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).
34. Id. at 68-69, 306 N.W.2d at 22.
35. Id. at 61, 306 N.W.2d at 18. The initial maintenance order was just $200 per month
for a period of 18 months. Id at 60, 306 N.W.2d at 17-18. In this case the children were 3, 7,
and 9 years old. Id at 61, 306 N.W.2d at 18.
36. Id. at 67, 306 N.W.2d at 19.
37. Id. at 67-68, 306 N.W.2d at 21. In an earlier Wisconsin case, Johnson v. Johnson, 78
Wis. 2d 137, 254 N.W.2d 198 (1977), the supreme court approved an alimony award of $650
per month until the parties' children, ages 12, 13, and 15, reached majority. Id. at 140, 146,
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For the most part, caregiver maintenance decisions in states outside
Missouri balance the interest in caregiving against the self-support poli-
cies of the law. For example, courts in Kentucky and New York have
approved caregiver alimony awards, but have required that payments
terminate automatically at a point when it is anticipated that the
caregiver will be able to begin working outside the home.38 In many
states, statutory caregiving policies are never treated directly in the case
law; at best, a parent's custodial obligations may be recited as one factor
that, along with others, justifies a maintenance award to a mother of
young or school-aged children.39
One reasonable conclusion from this body of case law is that the
existence of a statute on point (or the nature of the statutory provision)
254 N.W.2d at 200, 202. The trial court in that case believed that the wife could find employ-
ment, and encouraged her to do so, "so as not to further depreciate her opportunities." Id. at
146, 254 N.W.2d at 203. In sustaining the award, the supreme court also quoted this finding
of the trial court: "An important consideration is that she should be free to give primary
attention to her responsibilities as a mother. The children are old enough that perhaps part-
time employment is indicated." Id. at 145, 254 N.W.2d at 202.
38. E.g., Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134, 135-36 (Ky. 1973) (holding that because
trial court granted maintenance on grounds that appellee, as custodian of asthmatic 6 year-old
child, was prevented from seeking outside employment, order must also provide that payments
cease on death or emancipation of the child or for any other reason relieving appellee of the
care of the child); Richie v. Richie, 596 S.W.2d 32, 33-34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) ('We believe the
appellee can, with necessary training, work outside her home and still care for her daughter,
especially as her daughter will have entered first grade by this time."). This rule reverses the
burden of proof, see supra note 28, requiring the recipient to establish a change of circum-
stances before maintenance can continue. The same concern appears in a pair of Illinois cases,
approving fixed-term maintenance awards for caregivers with young children. In re Marriage
of Hensley, 210 MI1. App. 3d 1043, 1049-62, 569 N.E.2d 1097, 1100-03, appeal denied, 141 Ill.
2d 541, 580 N.E.2d 114 (1991) (approving maintenance extending until children's emancipa-
tion; court may approve a caregiver's decision to work part-time in order to be "more of a
homemaker" to her children); In re Marriage of De Bat, 127 11. App. 3d 463, 466,468-70,468
N.E.2d 1348, 1350, 1352-53 (1984) (approving maintenance ordered to continue until parties'
child completed eighth grade, and noting caregiver's testimony regarding "time constraints she
was under due to child care responsibilities"); cf In re Marriage of Lukas, 83 Ill. App. 3d 606,
616-18, 404 N.E.2d 545, 554 (1980) (finding award of permanent alimony appropriate, but
noting that the court in the future could modify the award if either spouse's circumstances
changed). But see Gleason v. Gleason, 218 Neb. 629, 634, 357 N.W.2d 465, 468 (1984) (indi-
cating that employment by the wife would not interfere with the interest of the parties' teenage
daughter); Lemczak v. Lemczak, 105 A.D.2d 1157, 1158, 482 N.Y.S.2d 590, 590 (1984) ("In
view of the age of the children, full-time employment would not involve child care costs.").
39. Courts take this approach even in jurisdictions with statutes modeled on the UMDA,
in which custodial obligations represent part of the statutory threshold determination rather
than one of the factors to be weighed in setting the amount or duration of an award. E.g.,
Riley v. Riley, 369 N.W.2d 40, 44-45 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), appeal following remand, 385
N.W.2d 883, 884-88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing trial court's denial of maintenance; case
combined a number of strong justifications for short-term support, including fact that the wife
was custodial parent of the parties' preschool-age children, but also noting that the husband
had a substantial income, and that wife had not worked full-time for almost 20 years).
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has no practical significance. Where such statutes exist, they are only
erratically applied. Where the statutes are silent on caregiver mainte-
nance, the same policy nevertheless can be implemented by the courts
without statutory direction; indeed there are appellate decisions affirming
caregiver maintenance awards in jurisdictions without explicit caregiver
maintenance provisions.'
For a variety of reasons, the appellate decisions in caregiver support
cases are not very useful as precedent for other caregivers seeking sup-
port. In particular, those decisions resting on multiple grounds are hard
to interpret: Because the cases do not make clear the independent signifi-
cance of custodial obligations, they can easily be distinguished in a pure
caregiver case. The situation is worse, however, in those states in which
explicit statutory provisions have never been recognized or discussed by
the appellate courts. The appellate courts' silence may indicate that the
caregiver support statutes are rarely given effect at the trial level.4 Even
40. For examples of cases approving caregiver maintenance from jurisdictions with no
statutory provision on point, see Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 474 So. 2d 104, 105 (Ala, Civ.
App. 1985), and Kaufman v. Kaufnan, 7 Va. App. 488, 493-94, 375 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1988).
See also infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (discussing Florida cases).
41. In Colorado, which has utilized the original UMDA maintenance provision since
1972, the custodial exception has not yet been relied upon in a reported maintenance case.
Occasionally, unreported cases refer to the care of children along with other compelling cir-
cumstances in sustaining awards. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Katona, No. 88CA1905 (Colo.
Ct. App. Feb. 15, 1990); In re Marriage of Bryan, No. 86CA1026 (Colo. Ct. App. Oct 17,
1985).
The argument might be made that the language incorporated in the UMDA was not
intended to apply to all custodians of very young children, but only those whose children had
special medical or emotional needs. See infra note 52. But this reading should be rejected. As
an initial matter, this is not what the statute says, and such a meaning could have been stated
explicitly. This point is emphasized in one of the Missouri cases:
Mark reminds us that this emphasis in the law encourages self-sufficiency. He argues
that there is nothing special about the condition and circumstances of these children
which requires Vicki's presence at home, that there are many capable childcare alter-
natives available, and that any agreement which may have been reached by the par-
ties that Vicki stay in the family home while the children were young does not
demonstrate that "the condition or circumstance of the child requires the presence of
the custodian in the home." This, of course, is a misstatement of the statutory stan-
dard. The statutory standard is met if the "condition or circumstances make it ap-
propriate" that the custodian remain in the home.
Newport v. Newport, 759 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). For further discussion of the
Newport case, see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
The Missouri court's analysis is supported by the history of the UMDA provision. In a
monograph prepared in 1969 by Robert J. Levy, Co-Reporter for the Act, Levy stated his view
that where a mother was caring for the young children of the family, child support awards
should be computed to "explicitly recognize that a mother who has custody of young children
requires support to be a proper custodian." ROBERT J. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYsIs 145 (1969). Levy continued: "Just as
children need a roof over their heads, they need a mother-custodian who is fed and clothed."
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those decisions affirming the trial court's discretion to award caregiver
support have relatively weak precedential value in other cases. The opin-
ions indicate that awards to caregivers are sometimes made and are per-
missible. Where caregiver maintenance provisions exist in the support
statutes, however, this adds nothing to the inquiry. Because such opin-
ions fail to limit the wide-open, discretionary approach to support
awards, they exert very little influence on the judges and lawyers who
consider and resolve maintenance cases.
The handful of decisions from around the country that take a
stronger stand on caregiver issues have the potential to shift the practice
of lawyers and the lower courts. Rulings that have mandated alimony
against the inclinations of the trial court operate to limit the courts' dis-
cretion.42 But even in states in which such reversals have occurred, a
judge who appears to balance the various statutory maintenance factors
(and avoids gratuitous comments likening caregivers to vegetables) is not
likely to be reversed.43 The net effect of these practices is that where the
self-reliance and caregiving policies are in tension, the choice of which to
implement is left to the virtually unreviewable discretion of a trial court
judge.
This situation is demonstrated by two contrasting opinions issued in
a single case by a Florida District Court of Appeal and the Florida
Supreme Court. On a number of occasions, Florida's District Courts of
Appeal have approved trial court awards of alimony, extending until
emancipation of children, for custodial parents who were "willing to re-
Id Levy's preference to support a caretaking parent in this fashion was apparently strategic;
he thought it might "neutralize" the resentment many husbands feel about paying alimony.
Id. As eventually adopted, the UMDA allows a court to provide for a custodial parent's needs
either through a more generous provision of child support, as Levy preferred, or by means of a
maintenance award utilizing the custodial exception. The maintenance statute reflects the pos-
sibility that caregiver support may be included in child support: one of the factors a court is to
consider in setting an appropriate maintenance award is "the extent to which a provision for
support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian." UMDA
§ 308(b)(1), 9A U.L.A. 347, 348 (1987).
42. Of the 23 jurisdictions with statutes on point, see supra notes 16 and 18, the only ones
in which caregiver maintenance awards have been reversed as insufficient are Minnesota, see
Riley v. Riley, 369 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), appeal following remand, 385 N.W.2d
883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), discussed supra note 39; Missouri, see P.A.A. v. S.T.A., 592
S.W.2d 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), discussed supra at notes 23-25 and accompanying text; New
York, see Simmonds v. Simmonds, 140 A.D.2d 934, 529 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. Div. 1988), dis-
cussed supra note 20; and Wisconsin, see Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 306 N.W.2d 16
(1981), discussed supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. Except for H1artung, each of these
cases relies upon significant grounds for reversal in addition to the caregiver issue.
43. Even in the Missouri opinions the appellate courts give great deference to the trial
judge. As Joan Krauskopf notes, "Ironically, in none of these cases was the amount of mainte-
nance and child support sufficient to support fully the custodian at a standard of living compa-
rable to that during the marriage." Krauskopf, supra note 22, at 281-82.
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main in the home and make a home for children of tender years, ex-
tending by precept and example the guidance so vitally needed in the
early and teen years of their lives." 44 In 1982, however, in Kuvin v.'
Kuvin,4  the District Court of Appeal went a step further, reversing a
trial court's decision to award short-term alimony to a caregiver with
young children.' According to the court:
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the wife may
choose to remain at home as a full-time mother or must "reha-
bilitate herself" by working outside the home. In reaching our
decision, we note that in order to work outside the home Mrs.
Kuvin will be forced to spend a portion of her earnings for
child care. We are also aware that Mr. Kuvin is financially able
to support his former wife if she remains at home with their
children.47
The court mandated long-term support based on what it understood to
be the policies informing the state's alimony laws, noting:
We disagree with the husband's contention that the legisla-
ture intended to apply a single standard permitting only reha-
bilitative alimony for all spouses .... It is obvious that the
legislature has never enacted laws requiring mothers of young
children to work outside the home, either during marriage or
upon its dissolution, when a husband is able to support his fam-
ily. Mr. Kuvin approved his wife's decision to fulfill her obliga-
tions at home during the marriage, and he is able to continue to
provide for his family. We therefore see no reason to order
Mrs. Kuvin to seek outside employment.48
When the Kuvin case reached the Florida Supreme Court, however,
it held that this policy statement went too far.49 Concluding that the
initial rehabilitative award was within the trial court's discretion, the
44. Walton v. Walton, 354 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also Carrier v.
Carrier, 409 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (approving permanent alimony of $380
per month to the wife who had custody of the parties' minor children); Hurtado v. Hurtado,
407 So. 2d 627, 628-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (approving permanent alimony of $1600 per
month to wife who had custody of minor children, but noting that when the children reach
majority a modification may be in order).
45. 412 So. 2d 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), quashed, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1983).
46. Id at 902.
47. Id at 901. The initial award in Kuvin was for 3 years of rehabilitative alimony after a
12 year marriage. Id The wife was 36, and the evidence suggested she could earn $250 a week
as a legal secretary, but her preference was to remain at home indefinitely with the children,
ages 4 and 11. Id
48. Id. at 902.
49. Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 1983), quashing 412 So. 2d 900 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
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court reinstated it." With its ruling in the Kuvin case, the Florida
Supreme Court made explicit the doctrinal bottom line: custodial obliga-
tions may be recognized in the discretionary decision-making of trial
court judges, but need not be given any weight at all.
Because of the appellate courts' interpretation of the earegiver main-
tenance statutes, a trial judge inclined to ignore caregiving concerns can
safely do so, while a judge inclined to order support for caregivers can
invoke the "authority" of these decisions to support his or her ruling. At
best, the authority of the appellate cases may encourage a judge to weigh
the obligations of caregiving along with myriad other factors in deciding
whether-or how quickly-to enforce the self-reliance ideal.
These decisions might optimistically be characterized as marking
the outlines of a common law of childrearing, defining, in the context of
divorce, whether and for how long a caregiver may continue to be absent
from the labor force. Practically speaking, however, without appellate
authority of greater weight, these principles will continue to come into
play only rarely. Faced with caregivers who might become self-support-
ing, judges are increasingly giving priority "to the goal of making di-
vorced women self-sufficient over the goal of supporting the custodial
parent."'" Only in an unusual case is the custodial parent's argument for
post-divorce financial support likely to succeed. The ideal fact pattern is
one in which the noncaregiving parent's income is substantial, the par-
ties' behavior during the marriage has clearly demonstrated their own
belief in the importance of a maintaining one parent as a full- or part-
time caregiver, and at least some of the parties' children are not yet in
50. Id. at 206. The Court reasoned:
The trial court may have determined that although working as a legal secretary at
$250 a week would not permit the wife to enjoy her accustomed standard of living, a
period of rehabilitation would allow time for her to gain skills to provide for addi-
tional income or at least attempt to do so. The record reflects that the wife is a
relatively young, able, and healthy woman who has had some post-secondary educa-
tion and has demonstrated her ability to hold a job. The trial court may well have
reasoned that her eventual rehabilitation is far more likely if she begins now, rather
than fourteen years hence, when the younger child reaches his majority. After care-
ful review of the record, and mindful of the trial court's superior vantage point, we
cannot say that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial
court.... We therefore find no abuse of discretion.
Id. at 20506.
51. WErrZMAN, supra note 7, at 185-86; see also infra note 80 and accompanying text
(reporting on the decrease in the percentage of women receiving alimony between 1968 and
1977). This is demonstrated regularly in the case law, where courts approve short-term
awards even when there are very young children. See, eg., McNenney v. McNenney, 159
A.D.2d 440, 441, 553 N.Y.S.2d 667, 668 (1990) (granting one-year award to the custodial
mother of a 2 1/2 year old child on the assumption that wife would resume full-time employ-
ment at the end of the year).
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elementary school or past the early primary grades. Short of this, the
likely result is no maintenance, or a short-term rehabilitative award to
allow the caregiver to "get back to work."
52
The courts' apparent lack of concern with caregivers' maintenance
claims might be understood simply as part of a general hostility toward
the concept of alimony or maintenance under a regime of non-fault di-
vorce. Yet in cases involving older displaced homemakers, appellate
courts across the country have moved forcefully to mandate long-term
support, Two years after the Kuvin decision, for example, the Florida
Supreme Court adopted rules requiring that courts order permanent
rather than rehabilitative alimony for older wives facing divorce with no
significant employment history or prospects.53
B. Counterpoint: Support for the Older Homemaker
As divorce rates have continued to rise, larger numbers of women
have become "displaced homemakers"-forced to be economically self-
reliant after years of economic dependence.54 With the adoption of laws
that emphasized self-reliance rather than long-term post-divorce support,
52. This is the consensus based on my informal poll of a number of Colorado divorce
lawyers. In the words of the late Raymond Carey, "Judges don't get too dewey-eyed about a
mother's argument that she needs to be home with older children." Carey's view is that judges
are already less sympathetic once children reach the second or third grade. Telephone Inter-
view with Raymond Carey, Practicing Attorney (June 13, 1991).
The special circumstances of a handicapped child may be one situation in which the
UMDA custodial exception language still has effect. See, eg., In re Marriage of Tidball, 192
Mont. 1, 4-5, 625 P.2d 1147, 1149-50 (1981) (child with hearing and speech impairments); In
re Marriage of Bryan, No. 84CA1026 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). In at least one state, the custo-
dial exception is expressly limited to this circumstance. See IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11.(e)(2)
(Supp. 1991) (quoted supra note 16).
53. See also Walter v. Walter, 464 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 1985) (clarifying how courts were
to apply criteria delineated in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201-02 (Fla. 1980),
when awarding permanent alimony), quashing 442 So. 2d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). This
case is discussed in Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 576. Krauskopf views Walter as particularly
significant because Florida had been "the leading jurisdiction in use and abuse of rehabilitative
alimony." Id
54. For discussion of the difficult circumstances of displaced homemakers, see RAE AN-
DRE, HOMEMAKERS: THE FORGOTTEN WORKERS 186-206 (1981), and NANCY C. BAKER,
NEW LivEs FOR FORMER WivEs: DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS 201-27 (1980). The plight of
displaced homemakers was described with significant sympathy by the United States Supreme
Court in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353-54 (1974). For current data, see Judy Mann, The
High Risks of Homemaking, WASH. POST, June 6, 1990, at B3, and Labor Market Problems
Persist for Nation's Displaced Homemakers, BNA DAILY LAB. REP., June 1, 1990, at A3.
Although the prospect of dramatic increases in the numbers of displaced homemakers
generally was not considered at the time no-fault divorce laws were adopted, the process in
Wisconsin was different, with a significant feminist lobby blocking the initial no-fault legisla-
tion until more comprehensive economic provisions were incorporated. See JACOB, supra note
1, at 99-101; see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE
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trial court judges began to demonstrate such great enthusiasm for reha-
bilitation that even older wives with no realistic prospect of becoming
economically independent were routinely awarded only a few years of
"transitional" support."5
In many jurisdictions, appellate courts responded to this pattern by
elaborating stringent standards to govern the lower courts' discretion in
cases involving older wives. One of the earliest and best kmown of these
cases is the punchy and quotable In re Marriage of Brantner, in which
the California Court of Appeals asserted:
The new Family Law Act. . . may not be used as a handy
vehicle for the summary disposal of old and used wives. A wo-
man is not a breeding cow to be nurtured during her years of
fecundity, then conveniently and economically converted to
cheap steaks when past her prime. 6
Another early illustration of this development is found in Sinn v.
Sinn," in which the Colorado Supreme Court considered a trial court's
two-year maintenance award to a wife who had not worked full-time
outside the home during the parties' twenty-four-year marriage, who had
not completed high school, and who had major physical and emotional
problems including difficulty communicating because of damage to her
vocal cords suffered during open-heart surgery. 8 The Colorado
Supreme Court, in reversing the limited award, commented that the
lower court's apparent assumption that the wife would be self-sufficient
after two years was unrealistic in light of the evidence presented at the
hearing, and held that the order "ignores the limited job opportunities
available to an unskilled middle-aged woman who has long been removed
from the job market." 9
Opinions such as Brantner and Sinn served notice that the appellate
courts would not sustain limited awards for older wives following long-
term marriages unless specific evidence in the record. supported the
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORm 53-75 (1991) (discussing Wisconsin no-fault
divorce reform as a case study).
55. The trend is discussed in WErrzmAN, supra note 7, at 337, and Krauskopf, supra note
7, at 573-74. Both Herma Hill Kay and Robert J. Levy, Reporters of the UMDA, believe that
the decisions denying maintenance to older wives violated the intentions of the statute. Kay,
supra note 1, at 67; Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act-And Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 72-73.
56. 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 419, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (1977). This approach was affirmed
by the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 453, 573 P.2d
41, 50-52, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139, 150 (1978).
57. 696 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1985) (en bane).
58. Id. at 337.
59. Id.
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court's conclusion that the wife could reasonably be expected to be self-
supporting when the termination date arrived.' Eventually, courts in
dozens of jurisdictions moved to impose this type of limitation on reha-
bilitative maintenance awards for older wives who had long been out of
the labor force.61
Although the various alimony and maintenance laws were open-
ended enough to lend themselves to this judicial manipulation,62 it none-
theless marked a major exception to the self-reliance norms. In some
cases, courts defended the new exception on the grounds that older
housewives could not have anticipated at the start of their marriages that
they would one day be expected to be self-supporting. 63 The justice of
the new rule is treated as obvious in most of these opinions, yet it stands
as a remarkable development. In the words of Joan Krauskopf: "So
many reversals in the family law area where the customary standard of
review is abuse of discretion sends a firm and loud message that control is
being imposed by the appellate courts.""
The trend toward protection of older wives was not solely the result
60. As the Morrison court stated,
A trial court should not terminate jurisdiction to extend a futtire support order after
a lengthy marriage, unless the record clearly indicates that the supported spouse will
be able to adequately meet his or her financial needs at the time selected for termina-
tion of jurisdiction. In making its decision ...the court must rely only on the
evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. It must
not engage in speculation.
In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d at 453, 573 P.2d at 52, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 150. See
generally Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 577-79 (discussing requirement of substantial evidence in
the record). The additional requirement that there be "clear" or "substantial" evidence in the
record that the recipient of maintenance will be self-supporting is one important reason for the
ubiquitous "expert vocational evaluation" in maintenance cases. See infra note 182.
61. See Kay, supra note 1, at 72-75 & n.363; Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 577-78. Kraus-
kopf describes the trend toward limited maintenance as having been rampant until appellate
courts began to react between 1980 and 1984, id. at 573-74, but in some jurisdictions the
reaction came more swiftly. In California, the Brantner and Morrison cases were preceded by
a 1972 decision, In re Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 892-98, 101 Cal. Rptr 295, 299-
304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972), and the 1985 Colorado Supreme Court decision in Sinn followed and
approved a pair of intermediate appellate court decisions dating from 1975 and 1980.
62. For example, the factors to be considered in setting the amount and duration of a
maintenance award under the UMDA include the length of the parties' marriage, the age of
the spouse seeking maintenance, and the parties' living standard during the marriage. UMDA
§ 308(b), 9A U.L.A. 347, 348 (1987).
63. For the argument that it is not fair to change rules in the middle of the game, see, e.g.,
June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. Rnv. 953, 985-87 (1991); Herma Hill Kay, An Ap-
praisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 291, 314-19 (1987). This view-
point is also reflected in some of the older homemaker decisions. E.g., In re Marriage of
Grove, 280 Or. 341, 351-52, 571 P.2d 477, 485 (1977).
64. Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 575-76.
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of common law evolution. In a few jurisdictions in which appellate
courts continued to approve very limited maintenance awards for older
wives, legislatures were persuaded to amend maintenance statutes for the
purpose of facilitating awards to older wives.6 5 As a result, statutes in
some states now refer explicitly to the "displaced homemaker" problem,
or make special provisions for longer-term marriages.66 In others, the
maintenance threshold eligibility provision has been amended to require
explicit consideration of the parties' standard of living during the mar-
riage in making the determination of whether the displaced homemaker
should be self-supporting. 67
One recurring difficulty in contemporary divorce law has been the
problem of grounding alimony and maintenance awards in a coherent
theory. With the demise of entitlement and fault notions, courts have
sometimes struggled to explain why any partner's marital obligation of
support should continue beyond the termination of a marriage. One jus-
tification advanced in several of the older housewife cases is that the
homemaker confers benefits on her family during the marriage that
should be compensated at the time of divorce. 68 Another is that the
65. The most notorious example is Otis v. Otis, 299 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1980), which
provoked a prolonged conversation between the Minnesota legislature and supreme court re-
sulting in amendments to the maintenance statute in 1982 and again in 1985. See Kay, supra
note 1, at 79 n.382; Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 577; Levy, supra note 55, at 73-75; see also
Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. Cr. REV. 201, 220-21 (dis-
cussing the court's decision in Otis to award wife only $1500 per month for four years even
though she was 45 and had not worked for roughly 20 years).
66. Many state statutes, including those based on the UMDA, direct the court to consider
the parties' ages and the duration of their marriage, but some go further. In Delaware, mar-
riages of more than 20 years were specifically exempted from a two-year cap on maintenance.
See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(a)(3) (1981). Under the present Delaware statute, main-
tenance is limited to a maximum term equal to half the length of the marriage, "with the
exception that if a party is married for 20 years or longer, there shall be no time limit as to his
or her eligibility." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(d) (Supp. 1990). California's statute pro-
vides that a court retains jurisdiction indefinitely in maintenance cases where the marriage is of
"long duration," defined as 10 years or more. This provision allows for modification if an
initial rehabilitative award proves inadequate. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(d) (West Supp. 1992).
In Arizona, the UMDA threshold test has been altered to add as an independent basis of
maintenance eligibility the case of a spouse who "[h]ad a marriage of long duration and is of an
age which may preclude ... employment." ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-319(A)(4) (1992).
67. Minnesota amended its law along these lines in 1985, see supra note 4, and Penn-
sylvania amended its statute in 1988, see supra note 3. Similar measures recently have been
debated in Colorado. See Eric Anderson, Support Measure Weakened: 'Marital Maintenance'
Would Retain Standard of Living, DENVER PosT, Feb. 15, 1992, at B4.
68. E.g., In re Marriage of LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 38, 406 N.W.2d 736, 742 (1987)
("The record is replete with evidence of Mrs. LaRocque's contributions to Mr. LaRocque's
education and increased earning power."); see also Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 583 n.48 (listing
cases and articles); infra notes 98-125 and accompanying text (discussing compensation for
caregivers who return to the labor force).
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housewife incurs an "opportunity cost" as a result of working within the
family rather than outside it, and that cost should be considered in the
financial aspects of divorce.69 Although these theories overlap considera-
bly, some courts have been willing to accept one but not the other.7 °
In In re Marriage of Franks, an early case decided under the
UMDA, the Colorado Supreme Court justified the provision for mainte-
nance, without regard to traditional notions of 'fault, in terms of these
new theories:
One spouse may have foregone earning potential in performing
the domestic duties involved in maintaining the marital domi-
cile, to the end that the other spouse might devote his full po-
tential to earning the income of the family. It would be
inequitable upon dissolution to saddle the former with the bur-
den of his reduced earning potential and allow the latter spouse
to continue in an advantageous position which was reached
through a joint effort.71
Besides making cameo appearances in judicial opinions, these theo-
ries have gained a following in recent legal commentary. 72 But the re-
orientation of non-fault maintenance law toward greater financial
protection for older wives occurred with remarkably little effect on the
69. Cases finding that economic disadvantage or foregone opportunities justify support
awards for older homemakers include In re Marriage of K.B., 648 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983), and Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
This position is consistent with the Missouri courts' greater protection for younger caregivers.
See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text; see also In re Marriage of Williams, 220 Mont.
232, 236-40, 714 P.2d 548, 550 (1986) (fixing the wife's "career value losses" at $162,597 and
awarding this amount as maintenance); Kanta v. Kanta, 479 N.W.2d 505, 508-09 (S.D. 1992)
(reversing trial court's award of "career opportunity costs"); Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 583-
84 nn.48-50 (listing cases and articles).
70. For example, the Maine Supreme Court in Skelton v. Skelton rejected a compensatory
rationale:
Is allmony properly awarded to compensate a divorcing spouse for her "years of
service" in the past, or does it look to the future, acting as a substitute for the loss of
support enjoyed during the preceding years, awarded in as large an amount and for
as long a term as circumstances make necessary? The answer is clearly the latter.
490 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Me. 1985). At the same time, however, the court accepted an opportu-
nity cost theory: "Tlo the extent that [wife's] capacity to support herself is a relevant consid-
eration, the court is not precluded from assessing the effect that spending those fifteen years in
the role of spouse and homemaker had upon the opportunity for development of [her] market-
able employment skills." Id. at 1208.
71. In re Marriage of Franks, 189 Colo. 499, 508, 542 P.2d 845, 852 (1975), stay denied,
423 U.S. 1043 (1976).
72. For example, in 1978 Elizabeth Landes proposed an economic analysis of alimony
awards that defended the maintenance criteria in existing statutes as reasonable proxies for
these opportunity costs. Elizabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35,
49-51 (1978); see also infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (discussing opportunity cost
theories).
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underlying theory and doctrine. Although these rationales could be
readily applied to younger caregivers, they seem to receive serious judi-
cial consideration only when combined with the image of an older, de-
pendent wife.73 Rather than embracing new theoretical approaches to
maintenance, appellate courts and legislatures insisted that the reforms
to protect older housewives simply implement the true intent of the origi-
nal statutes. In those states with explicit maintenance thresholds, courts
achieved wider room for exercising discretion by expansive interpretation
of statutory phrases such as "reasonable needs" and "appropriate em-
ployment."'74 Courts taking this approach necessarily claim that they are
furthering the fundamental original purpose of the statute. But even in
states in which statutes were amended, the changes were described only
as being necessary to effectuate the purposes and intent of the original
maintenance law.7"
The result is that while courts might decorate their opinions with
discussions of opportunity cost or the benefits conferred by homemakers,
these concepts have not been allowed to threaten the new norm of self-
reliance. The exception to the new rules is concretely helpful to particu-
lar claimants, namely older homemakers, but it remains quite narrowly
circumscribed. To benefit, a spouse seeking maintenance must establish
that she fits into the exceptional class of needy, dependent, incapable wo-
men, a category that is almost by definition comprised exclusively of
older wives. For younger caregivers, the implicit presumption of an abil-
ity to be self-supporting is effectively conclusive, overwhelming all other
considerations.76
73. But see Major v. Major, 277 S.C. 318, 320, 286 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1982) (finding abuse
of discretion to deny alimony to homemaker spouse at the end of a 13-year marriage; wife's
marketable skills were meager "while husband has established a secure career"); infra notes
134-59 and accompanying text (discussing cases concerning the "diploma dilemma"). In a
recent article, Robert Levy argued that the "opportunity loss" and "investment in human
capital" analyses are best understood as part of the need-based argument for paying support to
a dependent spouse. Levy, supra note 55, at 70-71.
74. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 681 (Colo. 1987) (explaining that
wife's sacrifice to her educational goals while supporting her spouse should be considered for
maintenance, even though an educational degree is not marital property).
75. The legislative amendments in Minnesota, see supra note 4, were "not intended to
change the intent of the statute but only to correct the interpretation." Nardini v. Nardini,
414 N.W.2d 184, 196 (Minn. 1987). Similarly, changes in Oregon's statute were characterized
as "elaborations of existing legislative policy." In re Marriage of Grove, 280 Or. 341, 346 n.3,
571 P.2d 477, 482 n.3 (1977).
76. The perception of women as either "dependent" or "self-reliant" is primarily genera-
tional. See infra notes 179-88 and accompanying text. This is reflected clearly in many of the
older homemaker decisions. For example, in In re Marriage of Grove, the Oregon Supreme
Court stated:
We will not ignore the fact that, at least until recent years, women entering marriage
1993]
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Despite the general shift in divorce law away from alimony and
maintenance, both the class of older wives, or "displaced homemakers,"
and the class of primary caregivers of young children present strong
claims for spousal support following divorce. 7 Women in both of these
groups often have lowered their earning potential as a result of their
commitment to family care rather than employment. But the actual ex-
periences in divorce courts of the members of these two groups, as re-
flected in the case law and in empirical research, have been very different.
Thus, although Lenore Weitzman's data indicate an overall decline in the
amount and duration of maintenance awards in California between 1968
and 1977,78 the percentage of wives in longer-term marriages who were
awarded alimony had increased,79 while the percentage of wives with
children under six who were awarded alimony had dropped.8"
were led to believe-if not expressly by their husbands-to-be, certainly implicitly by
the entire culture within which they had come to maturity-that they need not de-
velop any special skills or abilities beyond those necessary to homemaking and child
care, because their husbands, if they married, would provide their financial support
and security.
280 Or. at 351-52, 571 P.2d at 485.
The split between "dependence" and "self-reliance" is also reflected in feminist theory.
June Carbone and Margaret Brinig discuss these two paradigms. In the "equality" model,
which they describe as characteristic of a liberal feminist position, a commitment to homemak-
ing is minimized as a "lifestyle choice," and women who are not financially self-supporting are
viewed as victims. From a cultural feminist perspective, however, caregiving is celebrated, and
the practice of viewing housewives as victims is objectionable because it implies that they are
socially inadequate or deviant in their financial dependence. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 63,
at 996 (citing O'Connell, supra note 2, at 500, 506-08).
77. This is widely acknowledged in the literature. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION
AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 93-99 (1987); WErrZMAN, supra note 7, at xiii-xiv, 149-50,
154-58, and 380-81; Kay, supra note 1, at 70-74 (citing Helen B. Shaffer, No-Fault Divorce, 2
EDITORIAL Rrs. REP. 779, 795 (Cong. Quarterly, Inc., Oct. 10, 1973)); Krauskopf, supra note
22, at 281-82. 'This position is also implicit in the work of theorists such as Ira Ellman, June
Carbone, and Margaret Brinig. See infira notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
78. WErrZMAN, supra note 7, at 169 (Table 13). Although Weitzman's work has been
criticized, see, eg., Jed D. Abraham, The Divorce Revolution Revisited: A Counter-Revolution-
ary Critique, 3 AM. J. FAM. L. 87 (Summer 1989) & Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial
Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130 (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) [hereinafter DIVORCE REFORM], other researchers have found
similar, though less dramatic, results. Studies other than Weitzman's, reviewing the same eco-
nomic issues, are discussed in Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules,
Changing Results, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra, at 75, 76 n.6. Garrison's research indicates
that the drop in maintenance awards these studies demonstrate is not the result of the shift to
nonfault-based divorce grounds, but rather the shift in the law of alimony and maintenance
toward short-term, "rehabilitative" awards and a self-reliance norm. Id. at 90-94.
79. WErrZMAN, supra note 7, at 168-71. Although the percentage of older wives who
received some maintenance increased, the likelihood of permanent awards dropped signifi-
cantly. Id at 164-65 (noting that 62% of alimony awards in 1968 were permanent, compared
with 32% in 1977).
80. Id. at 34, 185. The data indicated that in 1968, 20% of these wives received alimony,
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Weitzman also tested public opinion on the financial issues of di-
vorce by surveying lawyers, judges, and lay people regarding a number of
hypothetical divorce cases. One of her hypotheticals presented a dis-
placed homemaker scenario: the divorce of a senior executive husband
and a homemaker wife in their mid-fifties, after a twenty-seven-year mar-
riage. Another described the hypothetical divorce of a "young couple
with two young children." During their seven-year marriage, the hus-
band had been an accountant, eventually earning $1000 (net) a month,
and the wife had been a full-time housewife and mother since shortly
after receiving her college degree. The couple was said to be in their late
twenties or early thirties, with children under six. The wife wanted to
remain at home to take care of their preschool age child.8 Although
Weitzman's survey indicated strong popular support for alimony awards
in both cases, a larger percentage of the lay respondents thought alimony
should be awarded to the hypothetical older wife.82 The judges surveyed
also indicated their belief that she would be much more ik.ely to receive a
substantial award.13
Today, most divorce lawyers and judges recognize the older wife/
displaced homemaker fact pattern as a clear "maintenance case,"'84
although they find the amount and duration of any possible award diffi-
but by 1977, only 13% were awarded any spousal support. This is apparently true despite the
fact that the California divorce reform law has since its inception provided that caregiving
responsibilities should be considered in determining a spouse's support claim. See CAL. Civ.
CODE § 4801(a)(5) (West 1983).
81. The cases are described in WErrZMAN, supra note 7, at 414.
82. Of the divorced men and women Weitzman surveyed, 87% of men and 94% of wo-
men approved of alimony for an older housewife who was disabled and unable to support
herself, and 66% of men and 87% of women approved of alimony if a housewife was not
disabled but was "too old to get a good job." Ia& at 151. In popular opinion, however, the self-
reliance ideal seems to have almost equal support. When told that the wife "can go to work
and support herself," the percentages reverse, with only 15% of men and 35% of women
answering that alimony was deserved. Id
83. Of the California judges Weitzman questioned about the older homemaker fact pat-
tern, 63% thought the wife would be likely to receive permanent support "for the rest of her
life," while just over a third of the judges predicted "that the courts would put some pressure
on her to find work and share the responsibility for her own support." Id Judges and lawyers
surveyed about the young caregiver's claim predicted only short-term, transitional support:
$150 to $200 per month, for less than two years. Id at 195.
84. In my experience, this term is widely used by lawyers to reflect a sort of gestalt judg-
ment that the case is one in which an award of significant maintenance is likely. See also Levy,
supra note 55, at 76 n.116 (utilizing this term). The consensus is clearest where there is a long-
term marriage, a husband with significant earnings, and a wife who has never been employed
outside the home. The strength of the conclusion that an older homemaker should get ali-
mony is apparently growing. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text; see also CLARK,
supra note 3, at 642 (explaining that older homemakers without employment qualifications
commonly receive substantial alimony awards).
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cult to predict with any precision. 5 By contrast, the younger home-
maker does not present a "maintenance case," even though she may also
be "devoting her life to her family."
The difference in the courts' treatment of these two groups cannot
be explained in formal doctrinal terms. The special circumstances of
caregivers with young children are more frequently recognized by ex-
plicit statutory provisions, and yet there has been far less judicial support
and recognition for their claims. Although the theories offered to justify
greater protection for older wives are equally applicable to younger
caregivers, those theories have not been applied to them. Apparently,
where younger caregivers are concerned, family values are accorded
much less importance.
III. COMPENSATION FOR A CAREGIVER'S CONTRIBUTIONS
Given the modem social realities of high levels of divorce and ma-
ternal employment, courts trying to look into the parties' futures usually
will find it both reasonable and just to require a parent who has been a
caregiver to enter or return to the labor force at some point in the future.
This transition is not unique to divorced families; it is also a decision
faced in many "intact" families as children outgrow the need for full-
time caregiving. Even those decisions that treat custodial obligations se-
riously recognize that caregiving will not be permanently required, and
thus that some transition, or "rehabilitation," will be necessary. 6
When a married couple decides to invest one partner's effort in fam-
ily care, there are two significant costs. One is the short-term loss of the
caregiving parent's income during the time that she-or he-reduces or
eliminates her--or his-commitment to employment. In addition, the
caregiver's absence from the labor force may subject her to long-term
economic and career costs after she returns to full-time work. These
costs can be substantial: one study estimated that the loss in lifetime
earning potential that results from a caregiver's absences from the labor
force averages 1.5% per year of absence.8 7
85. One approach to the difficulty of applying current maintenance statutes is to search
for simplified mathematical formulas that dictate both the amount and the duration of an
award, based on a method of sharing the parties' post-divorce incomes. See Norton, supra note
6; see also Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1117-21
(1989) (proposing formula for equal sharing of post-divorce income); Sugarman, supra note 78,
at 149-53 (discussing the "equal living standards principle").
86. See supra note 28 (regarding the modification of caregiver maintenance awards as
children grow up).
87. See Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital Earn-
ings of Women, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 397 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974); see also
Mann, supra note 54, at B3 (discussing the possibilities of being forced from homemaker status
[Vol. 71
1993] ALIMONY
In a divorced family, caregiver support addresses the first type of
cost, the short-term loss of earnings. But because there are also long-
term costs, the problem is more complex than can be remedied by even a
careful determination of when or how quickly a divorced caregiver
should move into the labor force. Long-term costs of caregiving are ef-
fectively ignored in the present system. The usual response to long-term
costs is a rehabilitative maintenance award that subsidizes the costs of
retraining, but is not designed to compensate fully the long-term losses
that result from a period of caregiving.88
To the extent that long-term costs of caregiving go unacknowledged
under the present maintenance system, they fall by default upon the
caregiver. For couples that remain together, the caregiver's long-term
costs are subsidized by long-term sharing of the other partner's earnings.
It is not at all clear why, when a couple has decided during their mar-
riage that parental caregiving is important, their decision to divorce
should shift the full long-term cost of caregiving to the partner who has
cared for the children.89
This result is surely not required by the law, and it presents a serious
conflict with the purposes of family law. The divorce laws are intended
to minimize the injury to families that results from divorce.90 Moreover,
into the working world). A recent study indicates that 85% of those who interrupt careers do
so for family reasons, and whether the interruption is for one year or for as long as seven or
eight, the typical "wage gap" is 33% in the first year back. Over time, the study indicates,
"career gappers" make up some, but not all, of the wage differential. Laura Myers, Women
Who Interrupt Careers Fall Into Pay Gap, BOULDER DAiLY CAMERA, Jan. 11, 1992, at 1A &
1lA (discussing study by Laurence Levin and Joyce Jacobsen).
88. "Rehabilitative" or "limited term" alimony is premised on the theory that a spouse
who has not been employed requires a period of education or training in order to become
financially self-sufficient, and that support during that time will permit the spouse eventually
to obtain appropriate employment. Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 573, 581-83; see also CLARK,
supra note 3, at 650-51 (discussing the duration of rehabilitative alimony); Sally F. Goldfarb,
Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, in NEw STxrEGIEs, supra note 6,
at 45 (discussing rehabilitative alimony).
89. While working on this article, I heard a number of times the argument that the bread-
winner role has its opportunity costs as well, reflected in the reduced opportunity for a close
relationship with a child. Certainly, a breadwinner bears significant burdens within a tradi-
tionally structured marriage. See Jessie Bernard, The Good-Provider Role: Its Rise and Fall, in
FAMILY IN TRANSITON 122-23 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 7th ed. 1992).
At times, however, this position is extended into a suggestion that the breadwinner's intangible
costs might be balanced against the financial losses of a caregiver. While I agree that this is a
factor that both parents of a child should consider carefully in making their decisions about
the appropriate balance of work and nurture, I think it supports the argument for compensa-
tion of a caregiver's economic losses. If the goal is to encourage men to embrace their opportu-
nities to nurture, divorce rules that make caregiving costly and wage labor cost-free will very
likely have the opposite effect.
90. See UMDA § 102(4) & (5), 9A U.L.A. 158 (1987) (describing various purposes of the
Act as "mitigat[ing] the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the process
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in their financial aspects, modem divorce laws embody the principle that
homemaking and wage earning contributions to family life are to be
treated equivalently on dissolution of the marriage. 91
Under this norm, married life is sometimes analogized to a partner-
ship, and it is the basis for property division rules under both community
property systems and "equitable distribution" statutes.92 Division of as-
sets accumulated during the marriage is intended to "compensate" both
parties to a marriage for their respective contributions. This is clear in
the UMDA, which states a preference for property division awards in the
hope that adequate property division can prevent the need for ongoing
spousal support payments. 93 In contrast to property division awards,
maintenance payments have no compensatory purpose, however, either
as initially conceived in the UDI)A 94 or under community property
of legal dissolution of marriage," and "mak[ing] reasonable provision for spouse and minor
children during and after litigation").
91. See generally LEVY, supra note 41, at 164-70 (discussing property distribution at di-
vorce). Both alternative versions of the UMDA property division provision direct the court to
consider the "contribution of a spouse as a homemaker." The Comment to this section de-
scribes this as a "new concept in Anglo-American law." UMDA § 307, 9A U.L.A. 239
(1987). But see Kay, supra note 1, at 50 (suggesting that this language reflects a misunder-
standing of community property principles).
92. The partnership notion represents a radical shift from the principles built into the
common law "title" theory of marital property rights, as it requires that the link between a
wage earner and the monetary fruits of his labor be unhooked. With the advent of equitable
distribution rules, there are very few, if any, pure common law "title" states. See Elizabeth A.
Cheadle, Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Property States,
28 UCLA L. REv. 1269, 1280-81 (1981). In most former "title" jurisdictions, however, the
link between an earner and the wages and property accumulated from those wages remains
intact until a divorce petition is filed. The UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, 9A U.L.A. 97
(1987), alters this rule as well, enacting sharing rules for marital property applicable during the
marriage. At this time, the Act is in effect only in Wisconsin. WVIs. STAT. ANN. § 766.001-
.971 (West 1986); see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 180-82
(1989) ("[Economic] dependence [created by gender-structured marriage] can be avoided if
both partners have equal legal entitlement to all earnings coming into the household.").
93. UMDA § 307 directs the court to consider "all relevant factors" in dividing property,
including specifically the "contributions of a spouse as homemaker." 9A U.L.A. 238-39
(1987).
Early property division cases under the no-fault laws discussed the necessity of viewing
the uncompensated work of homemakers as a real and significant contribution to the marriage
in order to give meaning to the ideal of marriage as a partnership. See, e.g., Wilberscheid v.
Wilberscheid, 77 Wis. 2d 40, 44-45, 252 N.W.2d 76, 80-81 (1977) (rejecting Wisconsin's pre-
1970 common-law presumption that one-third of the net marital estate should be awarded to a
homemaker spouse); Bussewitz v. Bussewitz, 75 Wis. 2d 78, 85, 248 N.W.2d 417, 422 (1977)
(same).
The Commissioners' Comments to § 308 indicate that the drafters intended generous
property division to prevent the need for maintenance awards. 9A U.L.A. 348 (1987). Of
course, many divorcing families do not have sufficient marital property to accomplish either
support or compensation goals through a property division.
94. The listing in UMDA § 308 of factors relevant in determining the amount and dura-
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systems.95
Whatever clarity the original boundary between the two remedies
may have had, it has over time been increasingly difficult to maintain. 6
The goal of effecting compensation through property division can only be
accomplished if the benefits that have accumulated during the marriage
are recognized by the courts as "property." This has caused enormous
conceptual and practical difficulty where the primary accumulations of
wealth during the marriage are less tangible economic rights and benefits,
such as pension plans, academic degrees, professional licenses and good-
will, and even fame and "celebrity value." 97 Accordingly, notions of
what constitutes marital or community property have expanded over
time to include many new types of "assets" subject to valuation and equi-
table division. Additionally, in cases in which no property can be found
or created, alimony and maintenance awards may be pressed into service
to achieve compensatory goals in the place of property division remedies.
A. Compensation for a Caregiver Who Returns to the Labor Force
Compensation theories are sometimes articulated as the basis for
maintenance awards for older displaced homemakers.98 "In many states,
including a number with California- and UMDA-based statutes, spousal
contributions have been added to the list of factors relevant to setting
maintenance awards.99 For similar reasons, some states have added pro-
tion of a maintenance award does not include "contributions" of either spouse. The UMDA
language has been amended in several states to add contribution factors. See infra notes 99-100
and accompanying text.
In Professor Levy's original conception of the UMDA, alimony awards were justified only
if, among other criteria, the property awarded a spouse did "not fairly reflect her economic
and/or other contributions to the marriage." LEvY, supra note 41, at 144.
95. In California, the new law moved away from discretionary division of community
property toward a mandate that community property be equally divided without regard to
fault. See Kay, supra note 1, at 42-43. The spousal support sections of the California statute
enacted in 1969 do not refer to contribution factors. See In re Marriage of Morrisson, 20 Cal.
3d 437, 441-43, 448-49, 573 P.2d 41, 44-45, 49, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139, 142-43, 147 (1978). The
current California spousal support statute does include as factors to be considered both the
effect of "periods of unemployment" as a result of performing "domestic duties," CAL. Civ.
CODE § 4801(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992), and one spouse's contributions to the other's educa-
tion, career position, or license. Id § 4801(a)(2).
96. See generally Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support:
Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253 (1989) (discussing the relationship
between property division and alimony).
97. See infra note 138.
98. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
99. Many maintenance and alimony statutes include contribution factors. ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-319.B.6 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(1)(a) (West 1992); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-6-5(a)(6) (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (West 1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.58 (West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 IV (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN.
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visions requiring courts to consider a homemaker spouse's loss of earn-
ings or earning capacity in setting the amount and duration of a
maintenance award. 00
The compensatory ideal slowly emerging in this body of statutes
suggests that maintenance should be awarded to younger caregivers
whenever their contributions are not adequately compensated by marital
property division. A number of these provisions refer to a spouse's "im-
paired present or future earning capacity" or "lost income production
capacity,"10 1 formulations that reflect the problem of long-term costs of
caregiving. Other provisions refer directly to a spouse's contributions to
"child care," "the care and education of children," "the well-being of the
family," or "the family unit."102 Nothing in these statutes suggests that
the compensation policy applies only to older wives.
Although it may be a function of their relatively recent incorpora-
tion into these statutes, only a few of the contribution provisions have
been construed in appellate decisions. Further, the existing decisions
only hint at how the statutes might be given effect. 103 So far, however, it
§ 2A:34-23.b.(8) (West 1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(C)(1)(j) (Anderson 1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(d)(C), (F) (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701(b)(6), (12)
(1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(d)(10) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (1992) (fac-
tor number 6); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26(8), (9) (1991); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208,
§ 34 (1991) (combined property division and alimony statute considering "contributions as a
homemaker"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-365 (West 1991) (combined property division and ali-
mony statute).
In Arizona, the statute was also modified so that proof of contributions "to the educa-
tional opportunities of the other spouse" satisfies the threshold test for maintenance awards.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-319.A.3 (1991); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(c)(6)
(1991) (requiring any contribution made by either party to the education of the other party to
be considered in determining alimony award). This type of change was not universal; the
original UMDA threshold language remains on the books in Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky,
Missouri, Montana, and Washington.
100. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-319.B.7 (1991); CAL. CIv. CODE. § 4801(a)(1)(B)
(West Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11.(e)(3)(B), (C) (Bums Supp. 1992) (inter-
ruption of education, training, or employment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.552.2(d), (e) (West
1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23.b.(6) (West Supp. 1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3801(c)(1)(m) (Anderson Supp. 1990) ("lost income production capacity of either party that
resulted from that party's marital responsibilities"); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.105(1)(d)(F)
(1991).
101. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3105.18 (c)(1)(m) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
102. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(f) (West 1985 & Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 459.19 IV (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Michie 1990) (factor number 6);
see also MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 208, § 34 (Law. Co-op. 1981) ("contributions as a home-
maker"; combined property division and alimony statute); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-365 (1988)
(combined property division and alimony statute).
103. In addition to the Oregon cases discussed in the text, there are a number of examples
from Georgia and Wisconsin. E.g., Lowery v. Lowery, 262 Ga. 20, 413 S.E.2d 731 (1992)
(noting that wife's contributions included helping husband obtain medical degree and license);
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appears that the compensatory ideal is not given effect where the contri-
butions of younger caregivers are involved. The best illustration of how
these principles might be applied is a pair of recent rulings from the Ore-
gon Court of Appeals.
In In re Marriage of Helm,"~ the court required an increase in the
spousal support awarded to a forty-six year old former teacher, in order
to compensate for her contributions during a twenty-three year marriage
which had produced two children, ages twelve and twenty. 0 5 The
Helms had very similar employment qualifications: Both were teachers,
and both had commenced their teaching careers in the same year and in
the same school district. Except for their division of labor during the
marriage, both might have been expected to have comparable earnings
potential.10 6 Although Mrs. Helm possessed the same initial qualifica-
tions to teach, the court found that her extended absence from the job
market had limited her current employability, concluding: "There will
likely be a permanent gap between the parties' earning abilities."'0 7 Be-
cause of Mrs. Helm's loss of earning capacity, the appellate court found
that a five-year rehabilitative award was insufficient and therefore made
the award permanent.10 8
In most cases, of course, it is much more difficult to quantify the
opportunity costs of homemaking, or to allocate the parties' earnings dif-
ferential among its different causes.'0 9 For example, in many cases the
Courtney v. Courtney, 256 Ga. 97, 344 S.E.2d 421 (1986) (holding wife's contributions tor
husband's career sufficient to permit jury to consider husband's pension benefits in setting
alimony award); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984) (considering
wife's contributions to husband's medical degree); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318
N.W.2d 918, 923-24 (1982) (same).
Writing before In re Marriage of Helm and In re Marriage of Graf were decided, see infra
notes 104-19 and accompanying text, Margaret Brinig and June Carbone argued that the Ore-
gon Supreme Court had "in effect" applied a compensatory theory in In re Marriage of Grove,
280 Or. 341, 352-53, 571 P. 2d 477, 485 (1977). See Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The
Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. Rlv. 855, 890-93 (1988). But the Grove
decision fits the pattern of the older homemaker cases. See supra notes 54-63 and accompany-
ing text. The parties had been married for 23 years, the wife was in her mid-forties and had
been a homemaker for 15 years, and the support ordered was extremely modest, decreasing
significantly after 5 years. Grove, 280 Or. at 356-59, 571 P.2d at 487-89.
104. 107 Or. App. 556, 813 P.2d 52 (1991).
105. IiL at 558, 813 P.2d at 53.
106. I. at 558, 561. 813 P.2d at 54-55.
107. I. at 561, 813 P.2d at 55.
108. Id. Though relatively modest, the amount of permanent support ordered in the case
was sufficient, based on the husband's income at the time of trial, to give the wife a projected
income from earnings and support payments comparable to the husband's income after sup-
port payments. Id.
109. For a general treatment of proof of a homemaker's opportunity costs, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYsIs OF LAW 177-78 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing damages for loss of
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gap between a husband's and a wife's post-divorce earnings is substan-
tially the result of labor markets that value men's work more than wo-
men's.110 The Helm case is unusual in that the parties were very
similarly situated, allowing Mr. Helm's economic position to serve as a
measure of his wife's lost opportunities. In In re Marriage of Graf, " an
earlier case without such a clear measure, the same appellate court ap-
plied the same statute to a very similarly situated wife and reduced the
maintenance award. Mrs. Graf was forty-two years old, and she had
worked "only occasionally" during the marriage. At the time of the di-
vorce hearing, she was looking for a teaching position, and had custody
of the parties' two children, ages five and twelve. There was no question
that she could work, although it was also clear that the earning capacity
of her husband, as a hospital administrator, was significantly greater than
hers. 112
Recognizing the importance of using "the spousal support award
[to] compensate [the] wife for the disparity in earning capacities, 113 the
Oregon court faced a difficult task. The evidence established that Mr.
Graf was in a "substantially more advantageous economic position," due
in part to the fact that he had gotten a "head start" during the mar-
riage.' The court acknowledged that this was due in part to Mrs.
Graf's "willingness to perform the role of homemaker" during the mar-
riage.115 The court also noted, however, another cause of the disparity:
earning capacity in tort cases); Robert A. Wolf, Assessing the Value of Householder Services, 22
TRIAL 81 (Oct. 1986) (reviewing three basic approaches to estimating the value of household
services and recommending the market-cost approach as the most realistic); Frances J. Pottick,
Comment, Tort Damages for the Injured Homemaker: Opportunity Cost or Replacement Cost?,
50 U. COLO. L. REv. 59, 68-74 (1978) (arguing that courts should consider evidence of oppor-
tunity costs in valuing a homemaker's loss). This analysis tends to be made in the context of
tort claims, following injury or death of a caregiver.
110. The commentators dispute whether gender-based pay discrimination is appropriately
considered part of a wife's losses due to marriage. In theory, even issues such as a spouse's
career choice may trace primarily to actual or anticipated obligations of caregiving. See
VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 60-64 (1988). For the view
that this is a societal problem that should not be made the responsibility of ex-husbands, see
Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribu-
tion Law On Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 621, 726-27 (1991) ("Divorce law cannot
serve as a panacea for curing the feminization of poverty, but it can and should protect di-
vorced wives whose disadvantage has been reinforced by the marital relationship."); Herma
Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra
note 78, at 6, 30; Sugarman, supra note 78, at 152.
111. 97 Or. App. 425, 776 P.2d 46 (1989).
112. Id. at 427, 776 P.2d at 46.
113. Id. at 427, 776 P.2d at 47.
114. Id at 427, 776 P.2d at 46-47.
115. Id. at 427, 776 P.2d at 47.
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Mr. Graf was employed in a higher-paying field."I6 How much, then, of
the earning disparity could be traced to Mrs. Graf s work in the home?
The court reasoned: "It is not necessary that support be awarded in
an amount that will equalize the parties' incomes, nor is it just and equi-
table to allow a former spouse to look to the other for support indefi-
nitely if self-support at a reasonable level is or will be possible."' "17
Concluding that a lesser award would constitute sufficient compensation,
the court reduced both the amount and duration of the award. 118
The Oregon cases demonstrate that it is often difficult to quantify
the losses or contributions of a homemaker. To the extent the court is
even attempting this task, its approach is unusual. In many states, the
contribution factors in maintenance statutes are either ignored, or used
only to bolster the case for older displaced homemakers.' 19
In contrast to the Oregon cases is Louise v. Louise, 20 a case decided
in 1989, in which the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court rejected this approach entirely. The facts are very similar to those
of Helm: Charles and Yvonne Louise, both teachers, were married in
116. Id. at 427, 776 P.2d at 46-47.
117. Id at 428, 776 P.2d at 47. The trial court had awarded the wife $1000 per month for
two years, $800 per month for six years, and $500 per month for an additional 69 months. Id.
at 427, 776 P.2d at 46. On appeal, the award was modified to provide the initial $1000 per
month for two years, and then $700 per month for four years and $500 per month for an
additional four years. Id at 428, 776 P.2d at 47.
118. Id The Oregon statute requires that the court consider these factors: "The contribu-
tion by one spouse to the education, training and earning power of the other spouse," OR.
REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(d)(C) (1991), and
[t]he extent to which the present and future earning capacity of a party is impaired
due to the party's extended absence from the job market to perform the role of home-
maker .... In a case of a party's extended absence from the job market to perform
the role of homemaker, where it is likely that the party will never substantially re-
cover from the loss of economic position due to the extended absence, and where the
other party has, during the marriage, achieved a substantially advantageous eco-
nomic position through the joint efforts of the parties, the court may award the dis-
advantaged party support as compensation therefor, so that the standard of living for
the disadvantaged party will not be overly disproportionate to that enjoyed during
the marriage, to the extent that that is practicable.
Id § 107.105(1)(d)(F).
119. As noted above, compensatory language is regularly used in the older homemaker
maintenance cases even in jurisdictions with no statute mandating such consideration. See
supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. It is possible that the crucial difference between the
wives in the two Oregon cases traces to the older homemaker pattern. Adthough both Mrs.
Graf and Mrs. Helm were in their mid-forties, the Helm marriage had lasted 23 rather than 18
years, and the Helm children were 12 and 20 rather than 5 and 12. Mrs. Helm is a better fit
with the "older homemaker" pattern. Interestingly, although the Graf children were still
young enough to require substantial care and supervision, this factor was apparently not taken
into account.
120. 156 A.D.2d 937, 549 N.Y.S.2d 238 (App. Div. 1989).
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1962, and although Charles taught throughout the parties' twenty-three
year marriage, Yvonne stayed home for ten of those years to raise the
parties' children.121 At the time of the divorce trial, both Charles and
Yvonne were teaching, but Charles's gross salary was $40,000 a year, and
Yvonne's was $28,000. There was "uncontroverted evidence.., that, if
[Yvonne] had remained in teaching throughout the marriage, the salaries
would have been approximately the same." 122
The trial court took the earning disparity into account, noting:
[T]he parties' difference in income was traceable to the ten-year
hiatus in [Yvonne's] teaching career and that "the adjustment
in the standard of living. of these parties to achieve some parity
(after a long-term marriage) can only be achieved by an award
of maintenance that will result in comparable incomes."123
Although the New York maintenance statute confers broad discre-
tion on the trial court, the Appellate Division reversed the court's main-
tenance award to Yvonne Louise, ostensibly because the court had not
discussed the factors enumerated in the statute.1 24 Rather than remand-
ing the case for that consideration, the appellate court made its own anal-
ysis of the wife's financial situation and concluded as a matter of law that
the income inequality between Charles and Yvonne was irrelevant. Be-
cause Yvonne was able to support herself at a reasonable level, she was
not awarded any maintenance at all. 125
121. Id at 937, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
122. Id.
123. Id at 938, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 239 (citation omitted). In this case, Yvonne Louise's 10
years out of the labor force apparently resulted in a 30% drop in her earning power, substan-
tially more than the average figure of 1.5% per year quoted above. See supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
124. Louise, 156 A.D.2d at 938, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 239. The New York statute has no main-
tenance threshold, which should make it easier for a trial court's discretionary award to be
upheld on appeal. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1986).
Not all New York decisions are so begrudging. In an earlier New York case, in which the
parties' incomes were more disparate ($20,800 and $100,000 per year), the court not only
approved but increased the trial court's maintenance award from $200 to $400 per week. As
modified, the award still left the husband with an annual income roughly twice the wife's.
Delaney v. Delaney, 111 A.D.2d 111, 489 N.Y.S.2d 487 (App. Div. 1985).
125. Louise, 156 A.D.2d at 938, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 239. The court may have been acting
primarily in response to the trial court's suggestion that the parties should have comparable
post-divorce incomes; this would explain the difference between the approach taken in Louise
and the approach in Delaney. See supra note 124. Income equalization approaches to mainte-
nance have been urged in the literature, eg., O'Connell, supra note 2, at 506-08, and Singer,
supra note 85, at 1117-21, but they have not gained wide acceptance in appellate courts.
In some jurisdictions, the income-equalization idea has been adopted on a limited basis.
Compare R.E.T. v. A.L.T., 410 A.2d 166, 167 (Del. 1979) (holding income equalization appro-
priate because of parties' "true partnership in every sense of the word" during a 20-year mar-
riage) with Cathleen C.Q. v. Norman J.Q., 452 A.2d 951, 953 (Del. 1982) (holding that despite
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Legal commentators have shifted much more quickly than the
courts toward a full embrace of reimbursement theories of mainte-
nance.126 There is remarkable consensus on this point among writers
with otherwise divergent approaches, including Herma Hill Kay, Ira Ell-
man, and June Carbone and Margaret Brinig. Dean Kay, one of the
Reporters of the UMDA, supports the argument for reimbursement of
the losses incurred by a spouse who accepts the traditional roles of full-
time homemaker and mother, including losses for what she calls the "op-
portunity cost of child rearing."127 Her stance on this issue is significant
in part because she has also indicated her general opposition to policies
that would "encourage future couples entering marriage to make choices
that will be economically disabling for women, thereby perpetuating
their traditional financial dependence upon men and contributing to their
inequality with men at divorce." 128
Professor Eliman goes further, arguing that all of the more tradi-
tional justifications for spousal support payments after divorce are inva-
lid in a no-fault jurisdiction. In his view, the only legitimate reason to
require such payments is to create economic incentives that encourage
the efficient specialization and division of labor within a family.129 In
30-year marriage, equalization not required where there was no career sacrifice or "active
promotion" of spouse's career). Other jurisdictions permit income equalization awards follow-
ing long-term marriages without mandating such an approach to maintenance. See, ag., Hall
v. Hall, 445 So. 2d 304, 307 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (allowing equalization after 22-year mar-
riage and three children); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078-80 (Utah 1988) (granting
equalization after over 30 years of marriage); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (permitting equalization after 30-year marriage). In Wisconsin, income equaliza-
tion is described as the starting point for maintenance awards following long-term marriages.
See, eg., Gerth v. Gerth, 159 Wis. 2d 678, 681, 465 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
There are also decisions in a number of jurisdictions reversing awards based on this type of
approach. See Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (en banc);
Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983); Gerth v. Gerth, 159 Wis. 2d 678, 465
N.W.2d 507 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
Carbone and Brinig characterize the income equalization approaches as "partnership"
based. See Carbone & Brinig, supra note 63, at 1001-04. But they note that one drawback to
an income splitting formula is that it does little to foster self-reliance after the divorce. Id. at
1004.
126. The argument is particularly strong in cases in which a spouse has suffered measura-
ble career losses. The Louise case is remarkable in part because, as in the Helm case, the
husband's salary was a near-perfect proxy for the wife's caregiver opportunity costs.
127. Kay, supra note 63, at 314-19.
128. Kay, supra note 1, at 80; see discussion infra note 215.
129. Ellman, supra note 3, at 40-48. Ellman calls this "economically rational sharing be-
havior," and his article outlines a series of rules designed to identify whether a wife's reduced
or eliminated labor force participation is economically efficient and therefore worthy of com-
pensation.
Ellman purports to reject traditional domestic relations principles, as well as the entire
corpus of contract, partnership, and restitution law, in favor of his own solution, which seems
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many cases, one partner's assumption of traditional domestic roles is effi-
cient in this sense, and in Ellman's theory only those spouses should be
compensated for their contributions. 3 '
A third illustration comes from recent writing by June Carbone and
Margaret Brinig, which draws heavily on the law of contract remedies. 3 '
Professors Carbone and Brinig describe as "the emerging model" of
maintenance a restitution-based system, that "justifies spousal support as
compensation for the career sacrifices mothers make in the interests of
their children or their husband's career.'
132
as a result to be a remedy without a right. He criticizes efforts to borrow doctrine from other
areas on the basis that those doctrines would require a definition of what behavior is "unjust"
in the context of marriage. His own theory might be criticized because it implicitly adopts a
different definition of "justice" in the context of marriage, a definition which privileges those
who conduct their marriages consistently with the normative world view of Eliman's
microeconomic principles.
For a review of Ellman's theory, see Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital
Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rlv. 197, in which Professor Schneider argues
that Eliman's solution has two defects. One is that "it relies so heavily on economic reasoning,
while people do not view marriage entirely in terms of economic advantage, and we do not
want them to." Id at 202. The other is that Ellman's "effort to create a manageable justifica-
tion for alimony forces him to ignore too many concerns that are as much economic as those
the theory relies on." Id at 202-03.
Professor Ellman responds to these arguments in a companion piece, Ira M. Ellman,
Should The Theory of Alimony Include Nonfinancial Losses and Motivations? 1991 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 259, 261 (agreeing with the principle that "a more perfect theory would consider the
parties' nonfinancial relations"). By compensating a caregiving spouse for the losses she would
incur on divorce, Ellman intends his approach to encourage efficient choices that would other-
wise be economically risky.
130. Ellman also considers circumstances in which it is not economically efficient for a
mother to step out of the wage labor force and occupy herself with her children, for example,
where she could earn more in the labor force than it costs to provide substitute child care. He
uses the example of a parent who is an associate in a large metropolitan law firm, but who
chooses nevertheless to sacrifice a career in favor of caregiving. Even here, Professor Ellman
supports compensatory alimony awards as an incentive for caregiving, on the following theory:
Specific policy rather than broad theory justifies distinguishing this case from the
earlier ones .... The couple's decision to have children is financially irrational in the
first place; no matter what arrangement they make for their child care, they would
have been financially better off without children. But society relies for its continued
existence on couples who make just this financially irrational choice. Moreover, soci-
ety has an interest in ensuring that children, once born, are properly cared for. Pa-
rental care is valued in our culture; it is not merely a lifestyle preference but a
traditional ideal.
Ellman, supra note 3, at 71-72. This position appears to put Professor Ellman at odds with
Dean Kay, who does not favor incentives to encourage traditional economic dependencies. See
infra note 215.
131. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 103, at 890-93; Carbone & Brinig, supra note 63, at 986;
June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman,
43 VANe. L. Rnv. 1463, 1468-85 (1990).
132. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 63, at 986. Carbone and Brinig footnote this statement
with the comment that "[t]he courts have been ahead of the scholars in embracing this type of
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For the most part, this vision remains a matter of theory and not
practice. These writers acknowledge that their views of maintenance or
alimony as a vehicle for encouraging certain behaviors in marriage, or for
adjusting the parties' "economic equities" on dissolution of their mar-
riage, are fundamentally different from the conception of maintenance
reflected in most of the current statutes and the vast body'of current case
law.133 Although in most circumstances the doctrine continues to limit
spousal support remedies to those who are unable to be self-supporting at
some approximation of their married lifestyle, the compensatory ap-
proach has taken root in one particular setting where it has generated a
substantial growth of new rules and practices.
B. Counterpoint: The "Diploma Dilemma"
The argument for a compensatory approach to maintenance law
builds on a group of cases in which one partner acquires an economic
advantage during the marriage that cannot readily be analyzed or di-
vided as marital or community property. The paradigmatic example is a
graduate degree in some lucrative professional field, such as law or
medicine. In these "diploma dilemma" cases, courts and legislatures
have shifted significantly toward implementation of a compensatory
theory. 134
In these cases, one spouse can claim substantial contributions to the
other's career, typically by having worked to support her partner while
he completed his education or professional training.1 35 This scenario in-
spires significant judicial sympathy, particularly in those cases that reso-
thinking," citing two decisions from the mid-1970s, In re Marriage of Grove, 280 Or. 341, 351-
52, 571 P.2d 477, 484-85 (1977), and Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975). Carbone & Brinig, supra note 63, at 986 n.151. Both of these cases, however, involved
older housewives and illustrate the principles discussed supra at text accompanying notes 56-
71. Lash is also discussed infra at note 180; Grove is also discussed supra at notes 63, 76 and
103. See also Carbone & Brinig, supra note 63, at 961 (noting that "divorce system has largely
rejected contract and tort, expectation and reliance, in favor of restitution").
133. E.g., Elhman, supra note 3, at 52 ("This conception of alimony differs fundamentally
from prevailing law. It casts alimony as an entitlement earned through marital investment,
and as a tool to eliminate distorting financial incentives, and not as a way of relieving need.").
134. E.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 116, 492 N.E.2d 131, 132 (1986); Downs
v. Downs, 574 A.2d 156, 157 (Vt. 1990). Other courts have coined other phrases to describe
this fact pattern. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court describes these as "university
degree-divorce decree" cases. See Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 206, 343 N.W.2d 796,
799-800 (1984).
135. The circumstances reflect a modern twist on what was once celebrated as a wife who
had earned a Ph.T., for "Putting Hubby Through." See BETrY FmiED.N, THE FEMININE
MYSTIQUE 16 (1974 ed.); Kay, supra note 1, at 74. In these cases, it is still vastly more com-
mon to find a wife seeking compensation from a husband who acquired his degree or profes-
sional license with her support, but occasionally the claim is made with respect to a wife's
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nate with the overtones of fault.136 The supporting partner's argument
for compensation begins with the economic concept that the advanced
degree or professional license represents a valuable type of "human capi-
tal."13 7 The dilemma arises because, despite its obvious economic signifi-
cance, a degree or license is not generally considered to be "property"
subject to division in divorce. 131
The dilemma is sharpest when the supporting partner finds herself
in divorce court just as her spouse has arrived at the threshold of a prom-
ising career. Because the degree is not valued and "divided," the parties'
joint investment in one partner's human capital allows that spouse to
leave the marriage in a significantly improved financial position. More-
over, when a divorce occurs at the career threshold, there are rarely any
other significant marital assets to be divided to compensate the support-
career enhancement during the marriage. See, ag., Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d
250, 259-62 (S.D. 1984).
136. For example, Justice Larsen's dissenting opinion in Hodge v. Hodge began by quoting
the parties' wedding vows and telling this story:
Reciting these vows on July 15, 1967, appellant ... married a reluctant bride
.... Appellant had only recently begun his medical training when he made his
proposal of marriage, and appellee knew from her experience as a clinical instructor
in a hospital that divorce is a plague among physicians upon completion of their
education. Appellant assured members of his own family and his in-laws that a goal
of his medical education was to provide his wife and family with a decent life. Yet, in
August of 1977, with the ink still wet on his license to practice medicine in the Com-
monwealth, appellant left his wife and three children (then aged 11 months, 2, and 8)
to begin his lucrative career as a physician to live in the company of a nurse he had
met during his residency program in internal medicine. So much for the promise to
be a loving and faithful husband in plenty and in want.
513 Pa. 264, 282, 520 A.2d 15, 24 (1986) (Larsen, J., dissenting). The dilemma is recognized,
however, in both pure no-fault jurisdictions and those in which fault plays a role. See Kay,
supra note 1, at 74-77 n. 368.
137. Professor Joan Krauskopf was an early proponent of viewing human capital invest-
ments as worthy of consideration on divorce. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompensefor Financ-
ing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN.
L. REv. 379, 381-82 (1980). These issues are also reviewed in Kay, supra note 63, at 312-13.
138. Most jurisdictions have reached this conclusion, many of them citing the Colorado
Supreme Court's 1978 decision in In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75
(1978). The Colorado court revisited the issue in In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo.
1987), and that opinion cites many cases decided in other jurisdictions during the intervening
period. Id at 679. The New York Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion in
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d 712 (1985), and now treats
advanced degrees, professional licenses, and even "celebrity goodwill" as divisible marital
property. Id at 583-87, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-48, 489 N.E.2d at 715-17. No other state's
highest court has followed the New York lead, but some panels of the Michigan Court of
Appeals have taken the view that a degree may be marital property. Compare Krause v.
Krause, 177 Mich. App. 184, 441 N.W.2d 66 (1989) (holding that degree is not property) and
Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359 (1984) (same) with Postema v. Postema,
189 Mich. App. 89, 471 N.W.2d 912 (1991) (holding that law degree is property) and Wood-
worth v. Woodworth, 125 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983) (same).
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ing spouse for her contributions. 139
The "diploma dilemma" is created by the fact that the supporting
spouse is also unlikely to receive maintenance. Typically, the parties'
standard of living during this type of marriage is fairly minimal, due to
the expenses of education and the fact that one partner had minimal
earnings."4 When the marriage ends, the court cannot award conven-
tional, need-based alimony because the supporting spouse has amply
demonstrated her ability to be self-reliant by working while her partner
acquired his degree. 41
In dozens of cases addressing the "diploma dilemma," courts in dif-
ferent jurisdictions have invented new remedies, labeled with titles such
as "property division alimony,"42 "reimbursement alimony, '"143 "equita-
ble restitution,""4  or "equitable redemption alimony." '45  In some
states, reimbursement approaches directed to the diploma problem have
been incorporated in maintenance and property division statutes. 46
Unlike the shifts in case law that have begun to protect older
139. Many cases note that an unequal division of other marital assets may be used to com-
pensate the supporting spouse, at least where such assets have been accumulated. See, ag.,
Graham, 194 Colo. at 433, 574 P.2d at 78 (finding that contributions to the education of the
other spouse should be considered in dividing marital property).
140. In cases in which the parties have remained married long enough to enjoy the in-
creased earnings and lifestyle that accompany professional success, conventional maintenance
awards may be possible because of the parties' increased standard of living. But see Sweeney v.
Sweeney, 534 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Me. 1987) (holding reimbursement alimony inappropriate
where parties had enjoyed benefits of increased earnings during marriage).
141. The dilemma sharpens under statutes with a strict threshold test for maintenance eli-
gibility. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. This is noted in Mahoney v. Mahoney,
91 N.J. 488, 506 n.6, 453 A.2d 527, 536 n.6 (1982), and Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237,
241-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). But see infra note 157 (noting that courts have approved
awards to pay the supporting spouse's educational costs through "expansive" statutory
interpretations).
142. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
143. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
144. This remedy existed briefly in Utah following the Court of Appeals decision in Marti-
nez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). In a
nondegree case, a superior court in Pennsylvania described an award, intended to compensate
the wife for her assumption of $34,000 in marital debt, as "equitable reimbursement" of the
husband's share of that debt. Zullo v. Zullo, 395 Pa. Super. 113, 123, 576 A.2d 1070, 1075
(1990), aff'd, 613 A.2d 544 (Pa. 1992).
145. E.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 125 n.12, 492 N.E.2d 131, 139 n.12
(1986) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
146. California led the field in this category with enactment in 1984 of CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4800.3 (Supp. 1992), which requires that the marital community be reimbursed for "commu-
nity contributions to education or training of a party that substantially enhances the earning
capacity of the party." Ia. Indiana has also addressed the problem with a statute. See IND.
CODE § 31-1-11.5-11 (Supp. 1991).
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wives,147 movement in this area has required courts to confront the basic
theoretical position of modem maintenance statutes. The concern for
reimbursement has nothing to do with the dichotomy between depen-
dence and self-reliance that characterizes most maintenance decisions.
The courts' dilemma arises precisely because the supporting partner is
not in need.
One of the earliest cases approving special compensation for a sup-
porting spouse is Hubbard v. Hubbard,14 decided in Oklahoma in 1979.
After determining that Dr. Hubbard's medical degree and license were
not divisible as property, the court stated: "This determination does not
mean, however, that Ms. Hubbard is thereby precluded from receiving
an award in lieu of property division, for this case presents broad ques-
tions of equity and natural justice which cannot be avoided on such nar-
row grounds."149
The Oklahoma court based its solution on restitution concepts; it
held that the wife had "an equitable claim to repayment for the invest-
ment she made in [her husband's] education and training," because "to
hold otherwise would result in the unjust enrichment of Dr. Hub-
bard." 5 The court remanded for a determination of the amount of the
wife's contributions to her husband's "direct support and school and pro-
fessional training expenses, plus reasonable interest and adjustments for
inflation as and for property division alimony. '1 51
Rather than adopting restitution-based theories, some jurisdictions
have turned to the "reimbursement alimony" concept developed by the
New Jersey Supreme Court:
To provide a fair and effective means of compensating a
147. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
148. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
149. Id at 750.
150. Id
151. Id at 752. Jurisdictions adopting an unjust enrichment approach vary widely on the
types of benefits that are subject to reimbursement on divorce. In some, direct contributions
(to educational costs) are distinguished from indirect contributions (for living expenses), and
only direct contributions are held to require reimbursement. The California statute, see supra
note 146, has been construed narrowly in this manner. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d
762, 767, 691 P.2d 1020, 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356 (1984) (construing statute to permit
only compensation to the marital community for out-of-pocket expenditures for a spouse's
education). The majority's narrow reading of the statute is criticized in the concurring and
dissenting opinion, id at 770-71, 691 P.2d at 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359 (Mosk, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), and in Kay, supra note 63, at 314-15. Professor Kay argues
that the better approach would be to compensate the loss incurred by the supporting spouse.
Id at 315-16. In another group of states, however, the educated spouse may be required to
reimburse all educational and living expenses paid by the supporting spouse. E.g., DeLaRosa
v. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 501,
453 A.2d 527, 534 (1982).
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supporting spouse who has suffered a loss or reduction of sup-
port, or has incurred a lower standard of living, or has been
deprived of a better standard of living in the future, the Court
now introduces the concept of reimbursement alimony into di-
vorce proceedings .... Such reimbursement alimony should
cover all financial contributions towards the former spouse's
education, including household expenses, educational costs,
school travel expenses and any other contributions used by the
supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license. 152
Although the restitution and reimbursement cases reflect more will-
ingness to grant compensation to one marital partner, they also reflect
deep tension between the economically rooted notion of restitution and
the courts' ideal of marriage. Courts determined to compensate the sup-
porting spouse in diploma dilemma cases have come up with theories
that allow reimbursement, but they have also wrestled with restitution
and family law principles in an effort to identify what types of losses or
152. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534; see also Hill v. Hill, 91 N.J. 506, 453 A.2d
537 (1982); Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982) (companion cases). A number of
other states have followed New Jersey's lead and created a similar new equitable remedy. See,
e.g., Hoak v. Hoak, 179 W. Va. 509, 370 S.E.2d 473 (1988).
In a number of these cases, the practical effects of how a compensatory award is charac-
terized have received significant attention. The distinction between alimony and property divi-
sion has important consequences within family law and under the federal bankruptcy and tax
codes. Because of these difficulties, neither remedy is completely satisfactory in resolving the
dilemma. Some judges have urged creation of entirely new remedies, see. e.g., Stevens v. Ste-
vens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 125 n.12, 492 N.E.2d 131, 139 n.12 (1986) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting "equitable redemption alimony"), while others have suggested that "reimburse-
ment alimony" may have different legal attributes from conventional alimony. The need to
identify these consequences is clear in the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Mahoney,
which left for future cases the resolution of whether and when a "reimbursement" award may
be modified. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 503 n.5, 453 A.2d at 535 n.5; see Reiss v. Reiss, 205 N.J.
Super. 41, 47, 500 A.2d 24, 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (holding reimbursement ali-
mony not terminable on remarriage); see also Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 183,
677 P.2d 152, 160 (1984) (holding maintenance award not terminable on death or remarriage).
Another approach is to enter awards with two separate components, one that is rehabilita-
tive and the other as reimbursement. See In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa
1989). Francis is interesting because it reflects the intersection of the caretaking problem, the
diploma dilemma, and the concern for rehabilitation. The court noted that the husband pro-
posed marriage on the day he was admitted to medical school, and that the parties were mar-
ried six years, during which time they had two children and the husband completed medical
school and his two year residency. Id. at 61. Finding that the husband's increased earning
potential was a factor properly considered in awarding a combination of reimbursement and
rehabilitative alimony, the court also noted:
Diana may have a master's degree, but she has devoted the last six years of her life to
raising her own children and caring for three others at the rate of $230 per week. It
is not fair to expect that she support herself in this way indefinitely, nor is it realistic
to assume that she will become immediately marketable in some more lucrative
endeavor.
Id. at 66-67.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEWV
contributions should be reimbursed. As a result, the cases vary signifi-
cantly in their definitions of the types of marital support for which com-
pensation may be ordered. At a minimum, reimbursement remedies
cover the actual costs of a partner's education and professional training:
tuition, books, and fees.153 Some remedies extend further to include pay-
ments for the educated partner's living expenses. 154 Most courts specify
that compensation is not appropriate for homemaking rather than finan-
cial support. 155
In some jurisdictions, courts compute restitution awards or reim-
bursement alimony far more broadly, including the lost earnings of the
spouse who was educated during the marriage.1 6 In others, courts have
computed their awards based on the lost opportunities of the spouse who
worked instead of attending school. This leads in some cases to an award
intended to cover the costs of an "equal educational opportunity" for the
supporting spouse.1 57 In the most extreme cases, courts have authorized
reimbursement remedies based on the present value of the educated
spouse's increased future earnings. This method renders the "reimburse-
ment" award indistinguishable from a property division award valuing
and "dividing" the degree or license itself.1 8
These distinctions echo familiar doctrines from the law of restitu-
tion, which has traditionally denied recovery for benefits conferred
within the family, a setting in which parties act with presumably gratui-
tous intent or out of legal obligation.159 Because of the lingering influ-
153. See supra note 151 (discussing California statute).
154. Id (discussing cases addressing reimbursement of living expenses).
155. E.g., Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
156. E.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 211-15, 343 N.W.2d 796, 802-03 (1984)
(providing four alternate approaches to computing an award).
157. This result can be achieved even in states with a strict threshold test for maintenance
through expansive reading of the term "appropriate employment." See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 681-83 (Colo. 1987). This type of award has been approved in Arizona,
with the further requirement that the spouse demonstrate an agreement during the marriage
that each would have an opportunity to be supported through further education. Compare
Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (finding restitution
award appropriate based on evidence of parties' agreement), reh'g denied, rev. denied (1983)
with McDermott v. McDermott, 129 Ariz. 76, 628 P.2d 959 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (finding restitu-
tion inappropriate in light of statutory constraints), reh'g denied, rev. denied (1981).
158. E.g., Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 214-15, 343 N.W.2d at 803. Justice Callow, concurring,
disagreed that this was an appropriate method of computing an award. Id. at 221-23, 343
N.W.2d at 806-07 (Callow, J., concurring).
159. See Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of DeFacto Spouses Including Thoughts on the
Value of Homemakers'Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 109-10 (1976); Robert C. Casad, Unmar-
ried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MIcH. L.
REV. 47, 52-54 (1978); Harold C. Havighurst, Services in the Home-A Study of Contractual
Concepts in Domestic Relations, 41 YALE L.J. 386, 402 (1932); see also Carbone, supra note
131, at 1477-80; Jane Messey Draper, Annotation, Recovery For Services Rendered By Persons
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ence of this law, the diploma dilemma cases may be almost useless as
authority for a caregiver seeking recognition and compensation for her
contributions.
Restitution principles have had success in the diploma context pri-
marily because courts can identify an academic degree or a professional
license as something of clear economic value, a "benefit" akin to those
recognized in commercial settings. Because a bright line has tradition-
ally excluded family work from these principles, it is much harder to
conclude that well cared-for children are valuable in this sense, or to
recognize as a significant benefit the freedom to pursue an. education or
career without the pull of conflicting family demands.
The distinctions made in restitution law correspond with deeply
held beliefs. Popular attitudes about what really "counts" as a benefit
are roughly congruent with the definition of benefit emerging in the
maintenance law. Lenore Weitzman's surveys included a hypothetical
diploma dilemma case: wife, age twenty-nine, is a nurse who provided
primary support for the parties for ten of the eleven years of their mar-
riage while her husband, now age thirty-one, went through college, medi-
cal school, and his internship and residency years. A majority of the
survey respondents thought alimony was appropriate for a wife who had
helped her husband get ahead "because they are really partners in his
work." 1" But very few agreed that a spouse should be awarded alimony
in return for years of work as a homemaker or mother, or as compensa-
tion for the opportunities she may have missed to have her own career. 161
Both courts and public opinion seem to favor post-marital compen-
sation only for marital financial support, the type that can be provided by
a self-reliant, economically independent partner. The only enrichment
Living in Apparent Relation of Husband and Wife Without Express Agreement for Compensa-
tion, 94 A.L.R.3D 552, 559 (1979) (concerning recovery for services rendered by persons living
in apparent relation of husband and wife without express agreement for compensation); Jane
Messey Draper, Annotation, Establishment of "Family" Relationship to Raise Presumption
that Services Were Rendered Gratuitously, As Between Persons Living in Some Household But
Not Related By Blood or Affinity, 92 A.L.R.3D 726, 733 (1979) (concerning the establishment
of a "family" relationship to raise the presumption that services were rendered gratuitously as
between members of the same household).
160. See WErrZMAN, supra note 7, at 151. Fifty-four percent of the men and sixty-eight
percent of the women surveyed subscribed to this view. Id. The awards predicted by the
lawyers and judges surveyed were quite modest, however. Seventy percent of the lawyers and
judges predicted that the wife would get some support, but most thought it would be for a
short term. Their average prediction was $338 per month for three years. Id. at 166.
161. In the first category, 19% of men and 25% of women approved of alimony, and in the
second, only 4% of men and 20% of women found alimony justified. WErrzMAN, supra note
7, at 152-53.
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that seems unjust is enrichment with a tangible economic result.1 62 But
what is it that makes the personal contribution and sacrifice involved in
caregiving so different from working to put a spouse through medical
school? Why is it that popular and judicial opinion approve of compen-
sating one, but not the other?
The real dilemma in the diploma cases is the tension between tradi-
tional restitution principles and traditional views of the family. 163 This is
reflected in a running debate among the members of the appellate courts
of Pennsylvania regarding whether one spouse's general financial support
can ever be deemed to have "unjustly enriched" the other spouse, given
that the spouses have a legal obligation to support each other.16 It is
also reflected in other jurisdictions, in opinions questioning whether resti-
tution doctrines can ever properly be applied in the context of marriage,
given that fault-based principles have been abandoned in the law of
divorce. 165
162. Although some of the statutes cited supra note 99 direct consideration of intangible,
nonmonetary, or noneconomic contributions, there are no published decisions construing this
language. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 IV (Supp. 1992) ("non-economic contribution
of each spouse to the family unit"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(d)(10) (Supp. 1990) ("tan.
gible and intangible contributions"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Michie 1990) (Factor no. 6:
"monetary and nonmonetary contributions to the well-being of the family").
163. A related argument is presented at some length in Carbone, supra note 131, at 1468-
71.
164. In one case, a Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed an "equitable reimbursement"
award to a supporting wife, concluding that she had not shown she contributed any more than
was legally due, and noting that "[m]arriage is not a business enterprise which requires a strict
economic accounting for all financial aid rendered during its course." Bold v. Bold, 374 Pa.
Super. 317, 328, 542 A.2d 1374, 1379 (1988), rev'd, 524 Pa. 487, 574 A.2d 552 (1990). Wife's
award was $33,000, defined as the greater amount she had invested in the parties' marriage.
The court went on to state that "each party owes the other a duty of support .... [E]quity
will intervene only when one party has been unjustly enriched by financial contributions ren-
dered which exceed that imposed by law." Id.; see also Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super.
559, 574, 489 A.2d 782, 790 (1985) (Wieand, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that restitutionary remedy appropriate only for "sums advanced in excess of the legal
duty of support"). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bold reinstated the original award,
rejecting the strict restitutionary approach of the intermediate court: "Supporting spouses in
these cases feel entitled to reimbursement, we believe, not because they have sacrificed to sup-
port the other spouse, but because they are, to use a strong word, 'jettisoned' as soon as the
need for their sacrifice, in part a legal obligation, comes to an end." Bold, 524 Pa. at 495, 574
A.2d at 556. Justice Zappala filed a dissenting opinion, adhering to the view that only contri-
butions to direct educational expenses should be reimbursed. Id. at 499, 574 A.2d at 557-58
(Zappala, J., dissenting).
165. For example, in a pair of cases decided in Washington in 1984, the supreme court
rejected the use of unjust enrichment principles for this reason: "To require trial courts to
determine whether the student spouse had been unjustly enriched by the efforts of the support-
ing spouse would invite the introduction of evidence as to who was at fault in the termination
of the marriage before the fruits of the degree could be realized." Washburn v. Washburn, 101
Wash. 2d 168, 176, 677 P.2d 152, 157 (1984). The court nonetheless allowed compensation, in
the form of maintenance, under the "extremely flexible provisions" of the state's maintenance
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These cases articulate a deep concern that the courts should not de-
mean the institution of marriage by "commercializing" it.'66 Even as
their opinions demonstrate a struggle to expand the territory in which
contributions to a marriage may be measured and reimbursed, their lan-
guage reveals a deep discomfort with the entire project of compensation.
Many of these decisions include disclaimers, insisting that the new rem-
edy is not equivalent to treating marriage as a "business arrange-
ment,"' 67 a "strictly financial undertaking," 161 or a "closely held
statute. Id at 178, 677 P.2d at 158. In determining the amount of such an award, the trial
courts were directed to consider not only the community funds expended for direct educa-
tional costs, but also the educated spouse's lost earnings, the educational or career opportuni-
ties the supporting spouse gave up, and the future earning prospects of each spouse. Id at 179-
80, 677 P.2d at 159.
166. This is one rationale for the traditional rule that obligations between the parties to an
ongoing marriage cannot be varied by contract. E.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936
(E.D. Mich. 1940); see RMSATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CoNTRAS § 587 (1932). For a
recent illustration, see Mathiasen v. Naughton, 268 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. Ct. App.), rev. denied
and ordered not to be officially published (Cal. 1990), which denied enforcement of a prenuptial
agreement providing that the parties would contribute equally to their shared support, and
that any excess contributions of one party would be reimbursed in the event of divorce.
167. According to the New Jersey Supreme Court:
This court does not support reimbursement between former spouses in alimony
proceedings as a general principle. Marriage is not a business arrangement in which
the parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts to be settled upon divorce.
Rather as we have said, "marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking... in
many ways it is akin to a partnership." . .. But every joint undertaking has its
bounds of fairness.
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 500, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (1982) (citations omitted). This
paragraph is widely quoted in opinions that have borrowed the reimbursement alimony con-
cept. See, e.g., Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 181-82, 677 P.2d at 159-60; Hoak v. Hoak, 179 W.
Va. 509, 514, 370 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1988). As stated by the West Virginia Supreme Court:
"Marriage is not a business arrangement, and this Court would be loathe to promote any more
tallying of respective debits and credits than already occurs in the average household." Id. In
the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: "While we agree with the Superior Court that
marriage is not a business enterprise in which strict accountings are to be had for moneys spent
by one spouse for the benefit of the other, it appears to us that this case does not involve strict
accountings, but gross accountings." Bold, 524 Pa. at 495, 574 A.2d at 556. In Wisconsin, the
supreme court has objected to "treat[ing] the parties as though they were strictly business
partners, one of whom has made a calculated investment in the commodity of another's profes-
sional training, expecting a dollar for dollar return." In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d
1, 7-8, 318 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1982) (quoting DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 57,296 N.W.2d
761, 767 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)).
168. The Arizona Court of Appeals stated:
By our decision herein, we reject the view that the economic element necessarily
inherent in the marital institution (and particularly apparent in its dissolution) re-
quires us to treat marriage as a strictly financial undertaking upon the dissolution of
which each party will be fully compensated for the investment of his various contri-
butions. When the parties have been married for a number of years, the courts can-
not and will not strike a balance regarding the contributions of each to the marriage
and then translate that into a monetary award. To do so would diminish the individ-
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corporation." 169
Some commentators also reject restitution-based principles. Draw-
ing from the experience of his own marriage, Robert Levy calls the sug-
gestion that a supporting spouse is "investing" in his partner's "human
capital" offensive, because it violates the "proper moral norm" governing
marital rights and obligations. 170 And although Ira Ellman supports a
type of compensatory remedy on a different theoretical ground, he argues
that to apply the law of unjust enrichment to divorce requires considera-
tion of marital fault. 171
Although the doctrine developing around marital reimbursement or
restitutionary alimony awards demonstrates a predominant concern with
traditionally "valuable" services or benefits, the goal of recognizing con-
tributions and lost opportunities within the family does not require the
application of a commercial or economic value system. As Herma Hill
Kay points out, the restitutionary approach to compensation, which re-
quires some valuation in monetary terms, is different from traditional
community property law, which draws its justice from the norms of shar-
ing and family life and views the value of a wife's services as entirely
immaterial to her claim. 72 Many property division statutes are based on
the notion that the economic quality or quantity of each party's contribu-
ual personalities of the husband and wife to economic entities and reduce the institu-
tion of marriage to that of a closely held corporation.
Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 347, 661 P.2d 196, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
169. Id
170. Professor Levy writes:
[O]ur marriage, and the commitment it entailed, signaled an undertaking to do all
that we could, individually and together, to satisfy both our collective and our indi-
vidual ambitions.... I would no more want a return on her tuition expenditure than
my wife would be likely to demand recompense for money or time spent on my
physical care if I had suffered poor health during the course of our marriage.
Levy, supra note 55, at 64. Levy also offers an account verging on a parody of how a judge
might come up with an appropriate compensatory award. Id at 67.
Although it may be cynical, I would suggest that the "idealized, even... romantic, view
of marital rights and obligations" Levy holds is of significantly greater pecuniary benefit to the
"post-dissolution financial condition of divorced male professionals" than it is to the "non-
degreed, non-professional (currently mostly female) spouses." Id. at 63, 64.
171. Ellman, supra note 3, at 24-28; see also Sugarman, supra note 78, at 156-59 (arguing
that "unjust enrichment is the wrong way to think about divorce"). Carbone and Brinig be-
lieve that Ellman's theory is in fact restitution-based. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 63, at 998
& n.200. EUman, on the other hand, has emphasized the "reliance" nature of the losses his
theory would compensate. EUman, supra note 129, at 271-77, 287-88.
172. Kay points out that the two successive versions of the UMDA reflect these two dis-
tinct approaches, and she believes that the shift toward a restitutionary theory in the redrafted
comments to the 1973 version demonstrates a misunderstanding of traditional community
property law. Kay, supra note 1, at 49-50.
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tions is irrelevant to the division of marital property.173 HEf these sharing
principles could be brought into the reimbursement theories, the theories
would have significantly greater potential for caregivers.
Lawyers encounter difficulty in conceptualizing marriage as a finan-
cial relationship, and the difficulty is greatest in those areas of family life
defined by tangles of love and obligation: raising children, preparing
family meals, working to be a "good provider"-keeping groceries on the
table and a roof overhead. These contributions transcend everyday eco-
nomic life, and the narrow reach of restitution rules. But to set them
aside as beyond the grasp of concepts like "justice" is to abandon the
family law policy of valuing all of the contributions a husband and wife
make during their life together. The real dilemma is how to understand a
relationship in both moral and economic terms, and in the case law this
dilemma goes entirely unaddressed. 74 The doctrine isolates the degree
cases as a narrow, exceptional class, rather than acknowledging the enor-
mity of the conceptual problem they create.
IV. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF FAMILY CARE
Parts II and III of this Article have demonstrated that courts give
little weight to caregiving values in the financial aspects of contemporary
divorce. In light of the dominant paradigm of family life, this is surpris-
ing. Popular and sociological thought views the family as an institution
serving two essential functions: accommodating the care, nurture, and
socialization of children, and providing adults with a place of refuge
from the rigors of public social and economic life. 175 Both of these func-
tions place caregiving at the heart of family life.
Karl Llewellyn and others have argued that we cannot know what
marriage means in a society until we understand the causes and condi-
tions of divorce. 176 Our law of divorce suggests that contemporary mar-
173. This is common even in jurisdictions with statutes directing a court to consider each
party's respective contributions in dividing marital property. See, eg., In re Marriage of
Palanjian, 725 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (sustaining award to wife of almost half
of all marital property despite fact that wife made little contribution to marriage because of her
mental illness).
174. See Schneider, supra note 129, at 235-43 (arguing that it is diflicult and perhaps im-
possible to find a "morally neutral basis for the law of alimony"); Carl E. Schneider, Moral
Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. Rav. 1803, 1809-11
(1985) (describing a trend of "diminished moral discourse" in divorce law).
175. See Talcott Parsons, The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States, in Es-
SAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 177 (Talcott Parsons ed., rev. ed. 1954). For criticism and
analysis of Parsons's theories, see CYNTHIA FucHs EPSTEIN, DECEPTVE DISTINCTIONS:
SEX, GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 108-09 (1988) and CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN
A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED passim (1977).
176. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 pas-
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riage is not about family life, but about individual self-interest. 177
Viewed through the lens of alimony and maintenance law, the deeper
values of family life disappear from the picture. Apparently, family val-
ues are important only as far, and as long, as each individual is interested
in sharing a household. When that interest fades, all that remains is a
framework of legal rights, in which fairness is only a matter of autonomy
and self-interest.
Many writers have explored the process by which the norms of self-
interest have displaced the moral underpinnings of family life.178 In the
discussion that follows, this Article suggests that two intellectual mis-
takes have facilitated a similar transformation in the law of maintenance
and alimony. One mistake is the conclusion that family care exists only
in a "traditional" homemaker/breadwinner marriage, and that those
families have become obsolete. A second mistake is the assumption that
because family care is sustained by love, it has no legal, economic, or
political significance.
A. Generation Gaps
In both judicial thought and public opinion, the central difference
between those who seem to deserve maintenance and those who do not
lies in whether or not the self-reliance norm is applied. For younger wo-
men, self-support simply has come to be expected; for older housewives,
it is not. Financial dependence within the family is misunderstood as a
simple and transient problem, the result of a time-lag or generation gap
during which some women's behavior and life choices are out of sync
with modem norms. In this view, the problem of dependence will disap-
pear once older social expectations are replaced by more contemporary
sim (1932) [hereinafter Llewellyn I]; Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: II, 33
COLUM. L. REv. 249 passim (1933) [hereinafter Llewellyn II]; Carbone & Brinig, supra note
63, at 954.
177. Compare Justice Douglas's description of marriage in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully endur-
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects.") with Justice Brennan's reinterpretation of Griswold in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup.").
178. E.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985). In the legal literature, see, for example, Bruce C.
Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 1, and Schneider, supra note 174. Schneider draws significantly from the wider litera-
ture in the field, including works by Christopher Lasch, Philip Rieff, and Robert Bellah. Id. at
1807 n.5. 1843-45.
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values. Thus the law recognizes the completed caregiving of older wives,
but not the ongoing efforts of younger caregivers.
Judicial attitudes toward women who became homemakers before
1970 are vastly different than attitudes towards those women who made
that choice after 1980.171 Sensibly enough, judges accept the view that it
is not fair to "change the rules in the middle of the game" by subjecting
women who were married before the spread of new divorce rules to the
stringency of the law's new self-reliance policy. But the generation gap
approach to dependence allows the norms of self-reliance to displace all
other values, including family care. The courts ignore the possibility that
caregiving still creates economic dependence within the family.
Under maintenance laws that emphasize financial need due to an
inability to be self-supporting, the claim of a young caregiver, perhaps
well educated, with at most a few years' absence from the labor force, is
not particularly compelling. With relatively recent credentials and work
experience, she is unlikely to be able to cast herself in the role of the
needy and dependent spouse. The short duration of her marriage seems
to suggest that her circumstances cannot have changed very much from
her position as a single woman, and that postmarital financial support
would therefore be a windfall, undeserved and unseemly.' 80
On the other hand, the fact that the caregiver has had children dur-
ing the marriage changes her circumstances enormously, a change that
divorce aggravates rather than cures. Through the lens of divorce law,
however, her commitment to family care rather than employment ap-
pears to have been an individual lifestyle choice, one she was privileged
to make by virtue of her partner's consent. Once the marriage ends,
179. The wave of divorce reform legislation across the country began in California in 1969,
with legislation that became effective the following year, and in Iowa in 1970. See JACOB,
supra note 1, at 59, 92, 94-96. Weitzman's data provide some additional evidence that 1970
was a watershed year. Her study found that the key variable in predicting which women with
children were awarded support in 1977 was not the age of the children or the age of the wife,
but whether the wife had been married for ten years or more. WErrzMAN, supra note 7, at
185-86.
180. See, for example, Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), in which
the court reversed a limited term alimony award. The court stated:
Where the parties are still quite young and have only been married a short period of
time, a judge is understandingly reluctant to saddle the husband with the obligation
of making permanent alimony payments for the rest of his life. At this point the wife
is hardly in any different position than she was before she was married. However, in
those cases where the dissolution comes about after many years of marriage, there
are different circumstances to be considered.
Id. at 243. Although the wife in Lash was only 44, the parties had been married for 26 years,
and the court emphasized her limited opportunities compared to her husband's. AL at 242-43.
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however, that choice and its consequences are no longer seen as
significant.
As noted above, a spouse seeking maintenance often must establish
initially that she is unable to be self-supporting.18' By their terms, the
statutes allow proof of custodial obligations to satisfy this burden. But a
caregiver parent loses for another reason: there is a second threshold,
created not by statute but by the norms of self-reliance, that is far more
difficult to cross.
The burden of persuasion against the normative bias of the law is
extremely difficult to carry. The statistics on women's labor force partic-
ipation, whether considered implicitly or explicitly, are virtually suffi-
cient to defeat the maintenance claims of women under forty-five. 182. As
of 1990, fifty-eight percent of preschool children and sixty-five percent of
children ages six to thirteen had mothers who were employed or looking
for work outside the home. 183 Faced with such data, it is much harder
for a court to conclude that the "condition or circumstances" of even
young children meets the statutory test: is it appropriate that this child
continue to have a full- or part-time caregiver in the home?184
The language of the caregiver decisions, and the changes in that lan-
guage over the past fifteen years, demonstrate this shift in perception. In
1978 or 1979, courts could assert flatly that a mother's "place is in the
home with her children," "that raising four small children is a full-time
task," that a mother's choice to remain at home with children was made
to "care for them properly," or that a mother's guidance is "vitally
needed in the early and teen years" of her children's lives. 185 Within a
few years, however, their language changed unmistakably. Continuing in
the caregiver role after divorce may be acceptable if it is an "appropriate
181. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
182. Litigation of maintenance claims typically focuses heavily on proof directed to the
question of a spouse's employment prospects and earning potential. These matters are often
established by means of a rehabilitation expert's vocational evaluation, which may include
interest testing and research into particular employment opportunities in the relevant labor
markets. For an outline of proof, without the aid of expert testimony, that a wife has the
ability to support herself, see George A. Locke, Wife's Ability to Support Herself, 2 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FActs 2D 99 (1974).
183. Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the American Family, 76
MINN. L. REv. 891, 892 (1992) (citing NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, FINAL REPORT,
BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 21-22
(1991)). Of the employed mothers, almost 70% of those whose youngest child is a preschooler
and more than 74% of mothers whose youngest child is school-age work full-time. Id.; see also
ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT
HOME 2 (1989) (citing data on working women as of 1986).
184. But see supra note 41 (discussing argument that only children with special needs re-
quire a caregiver in the home).
185. See supra notes 23-25, 31, and 44 and accompanying text.
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choice... like a career choice," if it reflects "a lifestyle" the parties have
adopted, or if it is "economically feasible." Working part time may be
approved because it allows a mother to be "more of a homemaker" while
her children are young, and accommodates the "time constraints" of
child care responsibilities.'1 6
Here again, empirical findings bear out the inference from the case
law. The judges surveyed by Weitzman explained their preference that
young divorced mothers return to the labor force on several grounds:
because work was seen as healthy, and remaining dependent was not;
because of pure economic necessity; and because "the combination of
work and motherhood was viewed as normal and thus a reasonable ex-
pectation of a divorced mother."' 8 7 Recent family law legislation sug-
gests that state legislatures have also come to share this view. Child
support guidelines in some jurisdictions now virtually require that both
parents of a child will be in the labor force, often as early as the child's
second birthday.'
These legal developments track popular stereotypes of family life.
In the period since the advent of no-fault divorce laws, the "new working
mother" has made her debut in academia and the media, often in an
idealized glow."8 9 This literature has also swung to the other extreme,
186. See supra notes 27, 37, & 38 and accompanying text.
187. WErrzmAN, supra note 7, at 187.
188. For example, the Colorado guidelines require a determination of potential income for
a "voluntarily unemployed" parent, unless that parent is "physically or mentally incapacitated
or is caring for a child two years of age or younger for whom the parents owe a joint legal
responsibility." COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(7)(b)(I) (Supp. 1992). As interpreted by the
state's court of appeals, however, there may be some flexibility to this test: The court has held
that a caretaking parent who is going to school in order to return more productively to the
labor force need not be deemed "voluntarily unemployed" for purposes of the statute. In re
Marriage of Nordahl, 834 P.2d 838, 843 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
The predominant model for state child support guidelines is the "income shares" ap-
proach. This is based on data reflecting direct expenditures for child-rearing. Ironically, given
Professor Levy's original conception of support for a caretaking parent as properly included
within child support payments, see supra note 41, the formula makes no allowance for the
caregiver's support. See David L. Chambers, Commentary: Meeting the Financial Needs of
Children, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 770, 772-73 (1991); Williams, supra note 6, at 163-64 (referring
to THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN: NEW ESTIMATES OF PARENTAL Ex-
PENDITURES (1984)).
189. E.g., Anita Shreve, The Working Mother as Role Model, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1984,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 38. As described by Arlie Hochschild:
She is not the same woman in each magazine advertisement, but she is the same idea.
She has that working-mother look as she strides forward, briefcase in one hand, smil-
ing child in the other. Literally and figuratively, she is moving ahead. Her hair, if
long, tosses behind her; if it is short, it sweeps back at the sides, suggesting mobility
and progress. There is nothing shy or passive about her. She is confident, active,
"liberated." She wears a dark tailored suit, but with a silk bow or colorful frill that
says, "I'm really feminine underneath." She has made it in a man's world without
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however, pitting the character of "superwoman" in mortal combat
against another idealized character, the "traditional homemaker."1 90
The housewives portrayed in this writing border on caricature, evoking
the world of 1950s television comedies.19' Describing homemakers in
these anachronistic terms subtly reinforces the message that real caregiv-
ing is now obsolete. At the same time, this suggests that the domain of
work is entirely incompatible with taking proper care of a family. 192
Many media reports present vivid accounts of the ragged underside of
the "superwoman" phenomenon, particularly in the stories of women
who had chosen to leave their jobs after the birth of a first or second
child. 1
93
sacrificing her femininity. And she has done this on her own. By some personal
miracle, this image suggests, she has managed to combine what 150 years of industri-
alization have split apart--child and job, frill and suit, female culture and male.
HOCHsCHILD, supra note 183, at 1.
Media attention was built upon a significant body of more sociological writing. See, eg.,
CAROLINE BIRD, THE TwO-PAYCHECK MARRIAGE: How WOMEN AT WORK ARE CHANG-
ING LIFE IN AMERICA (1979); LoIs W. HOFFMAN & F. IVAN NYE, WORKING MOTHERS
(1974); LYNDA L. HoLsTRuM, THE Two-CAREER FAMILY (1972); JOSEPH H. PLECK,
WORKING WIvES/WORKING HUSBANDS (1985); RHONA & ROBERT N. RAPAPORT, DUAL-
CAREER FAMILIES (1976).
The upbeat approach to a working mother as superwoman has not disappeared from pop-
ular or academic writing. See, eg., FAYE J. CROSBY, JUGGLING: THE UNEXPECTED ADVAN-
TAGES OF BALANCING CAREER AND HOME FOR WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES (1991);
Harriet B. Braiker, Does Superwoman Have It the Worst?, WORKING WOMAN, Aug. 1988, at
65.
190. A number of articles reported as news a growing struggle between two hostile camps
comprised of housewives and career women. E.g., Carol Pogash, The War Between Women,
CHI. TRW., Oct. 8, 1989, at 1. Having declared a "war" for a period, some in the media later
announced a truce. See, eg., Barbara Mathias, The Choices Mothers Make: A Truce Between
Women Who Work and Those Who Stay at Home, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1990, at C5.
191. Regarding this cultural icon, see STEVEN MINTz & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC
REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 190-94 (1988).
192. Eg., ARLENE ROSSEN CARDOZO, SEQUENCING (1986); DEBORAH FALLOWS, A
MOTHER'S WORK (1985); Cal Thomas, It's the Children Who Payfor the Mothers Who Work,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1985, at II 5.
193. E.g., Sherry Angel, Relationships: Super-Stressed Super Moms Learn to Juggle Lives,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1991, at E3; Beverly Beyette, New Minority Mom, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1989, at El ("Stay-at-Home Mothers Once Were the Majority. Now They're Rare. But Janis
Kerker, Former Career Woman, Decided Full-Time Motherhood Made Sense"); Marilyn
Gardner, For Many Women, Success Has Its Bittersweet Side, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar.
31, 1987, at 27; Judy Klemsrud, Mothers Who Shift Back From Jobs to Homemaking, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1983, at Cl; Thomas F. O'Boyle, Fast-Track Kids Exhaust Their Parents,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1991, at BI; Michelle Osborn, Women Change Career Paths; More
Choose to Stay Home With Children, USA TODAY, May 10, 1991, at lB. Additional examples,
cited in Deborah Rhode, The "'No Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1757 n.126 (1991), include: Sandra Evans, Mothers Making
Themselves More at Home; Many Women Forgo Return to Working World Despite Pressures,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1989, at Al; David Finkel, The Last Housewife in America: A Profile of
the Endangered Species, ESQUIRE, June 1990, at 102; and Arlene Fischer, 7 Want to Stay
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These are exaggerated and polarized depictions of women's work
and family roles. Implicitly, these accounts reduce important and diffi-
cult decisions to a simple matter of a personal "lifestyle" choice.' 94 But
the emphasis on women's choices also obscures another important fact:
these are matters of family, not merely individual, significance, and the
reality for all families is that life must somehow accommodate both
caregiving and employment. 195
Certainly, patterns of women's labor force participation have shifted
dramatically during the last two decades. 196 But it does not necessarily
follow that caregiving and family life have lost their significance. The
dramatic statistics on maternal employment also reflect another social
reality: a large number of married mothers with young children are not
employed, either full or part time, and many of those who are employed
have reduced their labor force commitment to accommodate the needs of
their families. Moreover, the employment figures say nothing to ac-
Home-Where I Belong", REDBOOK, Apr. 1986, at 96. A number of these articles discussed
women who decided to abandon high-power careers even without the pull of parenthood. See
Laurie Larson, I Was a Career Junkie, WORKING WOMAN, June 1986, at 48; Stephanie Mans-
field, Hittin It Big and Kissin' It Goodbye, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1985, at Cl.
Some stories on this issue approach the question from a demographic perspective, noting
that in 1990 women's increasing labor force participation rates began to level off. See Scott
Pendleton, Rise of Women Jobholders Slows, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNrrOR, Nov. 23, 1990, at 8;
Louis Uchitelle, Women's Push into Work Force Seems to Have Reached Plateau, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1990, at 1.
194. For a rare example of more probing analysis, see Tamar Lewin, Child Care in Conflict
With a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1991, at 8 (describing struggles of a family with a seriously ill
child). There are signs that this may be the new direction in mass media reporting on family
life. A group of eight articles on family and work issues appeared in the New York Times in
October, 1992, emphasizing the complexities of these problems. See Felicity Barringer, Ameri-
cans Ambivalent About Family Leave Laws; Susan Chira, Ideal of Mom Collides with Reality of
'90s: Home-care vs. Work a Hard Decision; Maureen Downer, Pregnant Workers Becoming
Targets in Efforts to Cut Payroll; Erik Eckholm, Scientists Study Day Care's Impact on Chil-
dren; Single Mom's Top Woe? Money; Alice Kahn, Stay-home Moms on the Rise; Tamar
Lewin, Single, a Parent and Proud; Moms' Self-image Crucial to Kids, reprinted in DENVER
PosT, Oct. 11, 1992, at 31A-43A.
Joan Williams has described the ways in which the rhetoric of individual choice deflects
attention from the systematic constraints on women's choices. In particular, she argues that
the work/family conflict is used in both employment and family law to depict discrimination
and subordination as a matter of women's personal priorities. Joan Williams, Gender Wars:
Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559, 1608-12 (1991).
195. As a number of academic writers have pointed out, both the full-time homemaker and
the career woman are fairly elite groups of women, and the ability to choose either "lifestyle"
is rare. See, e.g., Myra Marx Ferree, Family and Job for Working-Class Women: Gender and
Class Systems Seen from Below, in FAMILIES AND WORK 289, 298 (Naomi Gerstel & Harriet
Engel Gross eds., 1987).
196. See supra note 183 and accompanying text; see also BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE
ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 25 (1986) (comparing statistics on labor force participa-
tion from 1970 and 1985).
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knowledge the sacrifices and contributions of those caregivers who simul-
taneously maintain a full-time commitment to the workplace.
Although the doctrines of divorce law appear on the surface to ad-
dress the claims of caregivers, courts and lawyers have not applied or
interpreted the law in this manner. The doctrine has effectively disap-
peared into a conceptual generation gap, a great divide between the ro-
manticized image of the "traditional" family on one side and the rapidly
evolving "new" family on the other. These forms of family life look very
different, and it is easy to assume that caregiving has disappeared along
with the old-fashioned nuclear family. But this conclusion is wrong; as a
matter of choice, and of necessity, caregiving is still a significant attribute
of family life.
B. The Invisibility Problem
The "generation gap" in contemporary attitudes toward caregiving
is also a manifestation of a greater conceptual problem, one with deep
roots. In legal analysis, and in the political and economic theory that
form its foundation, family care activities are irrelevant-noneconomic,
nonpolitical, and legally unimportant. 197 This theoretical gap is in part
responsible for the disappearance of caregiver support from the surface of
divorce law.
In an earlier era, although family care was not compensated, and
usually not legally recognized, it was clearly understood to be central to
the family's functioning and it was structurally supported through a vari-
ety of legal and social devices-devices which have eroded over the past
generation. 198 Caregiving is even less recognized today. Despite the lan-
guage of modem divorce statutes, caregiving is perceived not as an in-
197. This attitude is reflected in the divorce rules discussed above, and in tort, contract,
and restitution rules that treat homemaking services as implicitly less valuable than other
kinds of work. See supra notes 109, 161-62 and accompanying text; see also Gail D. Cox,
Juries Place Less Value on Homemakers, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14, 1992, at 1, 38-39 (noting that
wrongful death awards are higher for employed wives than for homemaker wives). There are
similar biases in the social sciences. For example, economists do not consider housework and
bearing and caring for children as productive activity for purposes of computing the gross
national product (GNP), despite evidence that if unpaid housework were included it would
constitute 25-40% of GNP in the industrialized countries. See OKIN, supra note 92, at 204
n.48; see also MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED: A NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS 36-
43, 187-223 (1988) (discussing how economists value women's time); Richard A. Posner, Con-
servative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 192 n.4 (1989) (giving references for estimates
of value of housework).
198. Caregiving is more readily achieved and secured where marriage is committed and
permanent, where there is sufficient income from a breadwinner to support a household, and
where family care is viewed as a socially legitimate occupation. All of these factors are in-
creasingly rare. See KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE ABOUT
WORK, CAREER, AND MOTHERHOOD 70-78, 111, 130-32, 190, 204-16 (1985); infra notes 302-
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dependent contribution to the family, but only as one half of a traditional
gender-structured marriage pattern.
This narrow recognition of caregiving is made explicit in In re Mar-
riage ofPatus,199 a property division case in which the court was asked to
evaluate the respective contributions of husband and wife. Mrs. Patus
worked full time and was also the primary caregiver for children.200 Her
dual contributions were disregarded, however, despite the fact that the
property division statute expressly directed the court to evaluate home-
making contributions. The court read the statute as if it provided that
caregiving is only relevant in a traditional homemaker/breadwinner
marriage. °1
When asked to recognize and accord value to caregiving, the courts
resist, expressing their fears of commercializing marriage. This concern
seems paradoxical: marriage is, already, a significantly economic ven-
ture. Its financial character is apparent throughout its duration, and par-
06 and accompanying text. In the world outside the family, however, even in its heyday,
caregiving was legally and socially invisible. See infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
199. In re Marriage of Patus, 175 Ind. App. 459, 372 N.E.2d 493 (1978).
200. Id. at 461, 372 N.E.2d at 495.
201. The appellate court upheld a roughly equal property division, despite evidence that
wife had made equal financial contributions, in addition to taking responsibility for most of the
homemaking work. The court described the purpose of mandating consideration of "the con-
tribution of a spouse as homemaker" as "to allow for the circumstance wherein (1) one spouse
is not employed outside the home, (2) that the unemployed spouse is solely a homemaker, and
(3) that the unemployed, homemaking spouse is the primary homemaker." Id. The Court was
unwilling to consider evidence of the parties' respective efforts, stating:
We do not believe that in situations such as the Patus home, where both partners
worked, the Legislature intended, through the "homemaker contribution" language
in [the statute], to stimulate detailed inquiry into the private activities of the home.
When each marital partner brings earnings into the marriage, and those earnings are
substantially equal, we do not believe that an exhaustive examination of who washed
dishes, who took out the trash, who painted the house, who changed the oil in the
car, who changed the diapers, who paid the bills, and who mowed the lawn is con-
structive. Of course, there may be extreme circumstances in which one partner
makes virtually no homemaking contribution, but that was not the case in the Patus
home.
Id. at 462, 372 N.E.2d at 495-96. A similar logic may have led a Wisconsin court to discount
the testimony that the wife was both the breadwinner and primary homemaker. Wilberscheid
v. Wilberscheid, 75 Wis. 2d 40,45-48, 252 N.W.2d 76, 78-81 (1977) (affirming the trial court's
decision awarding wife two-thirds of the marital property, an amount historically considered
appropriate for the breadwinner; but denying wife's appeal that her husband's contributions
were so meager that he should receive less than the one-third share traditionally awarded to a
homemaker).
Although Fineman does not discuss Patus or Wilberseheid, she raises the problem of
"cases where a spouse [has] made 'dual contributions' by both working and caring for the
home and children." FINmEMN, supra note 54, at 68. This is the typical pattern in many two-
job families. See infra notes 255-57 and 261-65 and accompanying text.
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ticularly on death or divorce.2 02 Perhaps the judges' true concerns are
not so much the risk that divorce rules will commercialize marriage it-
self, but the risk that if the law inquires into caregiving it will be forced
to expose the traditionally private aspects of family life.2"3 This clearly
goes against the grain of contemporary family law; since the advent of
no-fault divorce laws, the courts have moved in the opposite direction,
away from judicial inquiries into marital and family matters.
Despite its economic, social, and familial importance, the work of
caregiving remains invisible to lawyers and judges because the law con-
strues family care as a matter of love and obligation, not a matter of
personal choice or arm's-length bargaining. This is characteristic of atti-
tudes even within the family, where caregiving is largely invisible.2" By
its very nature, nurturance is supposed to be silent, hidden, selfless, and
self-effacing-"something different" from work.205
There is a growing literature examining the content of family care
responsibilities and reviewing the wide range of activities that comprise
caregiving work. One study, considering the work of "feeding a family,"
demonstrates that although feeding is a very complex project,20 6 if it is
done properly it goes unnoticed: It is taken for granted if meals appear
202. As a legal matter, marriage imposes support obligations on each party, see CLARK,
supra note 3, at 250-58, and it has significant implications for purposes of public benefits and
tax laws. For a summary of the legal and economic effects of death and divorce, see GLEN-
DON, supra note 1, at 227-33, 242-46. At a theoretical level, economists have begun to analyze
a wide range of marital and reproductive behavior using economic principles. The leading
figure in this field is Gary Becker, who was awarded the 1992 Nobel Prize in Economics for his
work. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981).
203. This idea has been developed in nonlegal literature. See, eg., William J. Goode, Why
Men Resist, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 131-50 (Barrie
Thorne & Marilyn Yalom eds., 1982) [hereinafter RETHINKING THE FAMILY]; Janet G. Hunt
& Larry L. Hunt, Male Resistance to Role Symmetry in Dual-Earner Households: Three Alter-
native Explanations, in FAMILIES AND WORK, supra note 195, at 192-203.
204. This is not surprising, since many issues of particular concern to women are routinely
ignored in conventional research. See generally Judith Stacey & Barrie Thorne, The Missing
Feminist Revolution in Sociology, 32 Soc. PROBS. 301 (1985) (criticizing the lack of feminist
thinking in the sociology field).
205. Caregiving work, when well done, is substantially invisible, seen not as work but as
love, instinct, or the natural order of things. See, eg., Marjorie L. DeVault, Doing Housework.-
Feeding and Family Life, in FAMILIES AND WORK, supra note 195, at 178-91; see also Nel
Noddings, Ethics from the Standpoint of Women, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL
DIFFERENCES 160, 168-69 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) ("To consider work as an economic
concept seems right, but to consider it only an economic concept misses a large part of human
experience."). For a broad look at the concepts of family care, see Paula L. Dressel & Ann
Clark, A Critical Look at Family Care, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 769 (1990) (detailing a study
designed to explore how family members understand and express care).
206. DeVault, supra note 205, at 182-88. DeVault describes in some detail the activities
that go into planning, preparing, and managing family meals, both at the level of nutrition and
in terms of family interaction and conversation. Id.
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on the table on schedule, and draws notice only when it is not done, or
done badly. Meals are valued in the family not in instrumental terms,
but as organizers of family life. Those who do the work of feeding fami-
lies view their efforts not as work but as something different, because
their contribution to family life would be spoiled if their caregiving was
seen as a matter of work rather than love.2"7 In a similar vein, other
writers have explored the work involved in mothering," 8 in maintaining
kinship systems,2 9 and in activities that preserve the social status of fam-
ily units.210 Although easily overlooked, these tasks are at the heart of
what made the traditional family a source of rewarding human relation-
ships, adequate child development, and the creation and maintenance of
functioning adults. Even in less traditional settings, these activities con-
tinue to be an important component of caregiving and a source of the
satisfaction children and adults draw from family life.
Recent years have seen a dramatic polarization of views about fam-
ily policy issues,211 and as these issues have become increasingly
politicized, the significance of caregiving is further obscured. Women's
traditional caregiving roles are either glorified and described as immi-
nently in danger, or treated as the fundamental obstacle to full gender
equality. In this debate, private choices around the organization of work
and family life take on an added burden of moral and political signifi-
cance. Those who glorify caregiving have seemed blind to its hazards,
and those who demean it have seemed blind to its value.
Across the political spectrum, it is difficult to talk about issues of
caregiving, economic dependence, and divorce. Mary Becker has de-
scribed a split she perceives between the expressed political and economic
interests of "women who expect to spend most of their lives economically
207. Id at 179-80.
208. Eg., Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, in RETHI KNG THE FAMILY, supra note
203, at 86-88, 91 (describing "the work of attentive love").
209. See, eg., CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK
COMMUNITY (1974); Micaela di Leonardo, The Female World of Cards and Holidays: Wo-
men, Families, and the Work of Kinship, 12 SIGNs 440 (1987).
210. See, eg., Hanna Papanek, Family Status Production: The 'Work and 'Non-Work' of
Women, 4 SIGNS 775, 775-81 (1979); Dorothy E. Smith, Women's Inequality and the Family,
in FAMILIES AND WoRK, supra note 195, at 23, 35-36.
211. See generally BRIGITTE BERGER & PETER L. BERGER, THE WAR OVER THE FAM-
ILY: CAPTURING THE MIDDLE GROUND (1983) (characterizing the family as an "idealogical
battleground" and proposing that policies seek a middle ground)); LETTn COTTIN POGREBIN,
FAMILY POLITICS: LOVE AND POWER ON AN INTIMATE FRONTIER 2-19 (1983) (arguing for
a broader understanding of the family); see also REBECCA E. KLATCH, WOMEN OF THE NEW
RIGHT 122-39 (1987) (discussing views of social conservative women with respect to the family
and feminism); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984)
(summarizing the relationship between various views on abortion and ideals of family life).
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dependent on men, and women who do not. ' 212 Professor Becker points
out that choosing to be economically dependent is reasonable if a woman
wants to have children. She argues, however, that a variety of factors
lead economically dependent women to suppress the possibility that their
interests may conflict with their partners' and to disregard information
suggesting that their choice of a traditional role involves continuing
risks.2"3 Further, Becker suggests that a woman whose economic inter-
ests require preserving a man's support is likely not to endorse the kind
of reforms that advance the interests of economically independent wo-
men. This is reflected in treatment of caregiving in the media; there is a
great deal of discussion of traditional female roles, but rarely any consid-
eration of the risks of divorce for a young homemaker.214
Although Professor Becker does not discuss the attitudes of eco-
nomically independent women toward caregiving and family roles, a sim-
ilar process operates here.215 Many writers have described feminist
ideals as in opposition to family life, at times unfairly.216 The possibility
212. Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
169, 186; see also GERSON, supra note 198, at 187-90.
213. Becker, supra note 212, at 183-88; see GERSON, supra note 198, at 183-85.
214. For example, none of the magazine or newspaper articles cited supra notes 189-93
raises this issue. It is acknowledged in several of the book-length contributions. See ANDRE,
supra note 54, at 13, 117 (recommending "independence insurance" as protection for a home-
maker in the event of divorce); CARDOZO, supra note 192, at 108 (recommending a contract in
advance of career interruption with provisions to protect the caregiver in the event of divorce);
FALLOWS, supra note 192, at 194 (recognizing that a divorced homemaker will face hard
economic times).
215. For feminist writers, there is a long tradition of viewing housework in highly political
terms. CHARLOTrE PERKINS STETSoN [GILMAN], WOMEN AND ECONOMICS 225-47 (1898).
For a more recent example, see Heidi Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class,
and Political Struggle: The Example of Housework, 6 SIGNS 366, 388 (1981).
For the argument that policies should not be formulated to allow women to choose eco-
nomic dependence, see Kay, supra note 1, at 80. After wrestling with the issue, Dean Kay
concluded that "we should [not] encourage future couples entering marriage to make choices
that will be economically disabling for women." Id. But see Kay, supra note 110, at 31 (sug-
gesting the need for divorce law reforms that will "safeguard those who do not maximize their
separate interests, but instead engage in unselfish, sharing behavior"). Carbone and Brinig
characterize Kay's position in her earlier writing as a "liberal feminist" approach. Carbone &
Brinig, supra note 63, at 956, 992-96. In response to Carbone and Brinig, Dean Kay has
emphasized her view that the time has not yet arrived when women's choices of traditional
roles need not be recognized and compensated, and that she "envision[s] a long and arduous
period of fundamental social change before women can fairly be held fully responsible for the
financial consequences of their choices concerning intimate relationships and childrearing."
Herma Hill Kay, Commentary: Toward a Theory ofFair Distribution, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 755,
763-65 (1991).
216. This is implicit in many books and articles that characterize an interest in caregiving
as "post-feminist." See, eg., Anita Shreve, Careers and the Lure of Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov, 21, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 38; Susan Bolotin, Voices From the Post-Feminist Genera-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 29. See generally SYLVIA ANN HEW-
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of such a split has been seriously debated in feminist circles: are the
leaders of the women's movement too often silent on the value of wo-
men's more traditional roles, roles that are deeply significant to many
women?217
Taken at face value, the silence of "traditional," economically de-
pendent women on the financial hazards of caregiving, and the silence of
"liberated," economically independent women on its value, reveal a deep
social ambivalence towards these questions.21 The polarities of public
debate on family issues make it difficult to affirm the value of caregiving
without seeming to reject or denigrate the many other roles women play,
and make it equally difficult to affirm the importance of -work and finan-
cial contribution without seeming to reject the human values of family
care.
2 19
LETT, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERiCA (1986) (asserting
that feminism has failed modem women by ignoring family policy and denigrating mother-
hood). Hewlett's criticisms have themselves been challenged. See Deborah Rosenfelt & Judith
Stacy, Review Essay: Second Thoughts on the Second Wave, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 341 (1987).
217. A number of writers have made this suggestion. See BETTY FRIEDAN, THE SECOND
STAGE passim (rev. ed. 1986); Rosenfelt & Stacy, supra note 216 passim. Rosenfelt and Stacy
agree that "few [feminists] have made the needs of working mothers a central focus of our
theory or politics." Id at 351-52; see also E.J. Dionne, Jr., Struggle for Work and Family
Fueling Women's Movement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1989, at 1 (describing the emphasis on the
work and family agenda as the "most striking change in direction in the women's movement"
in recent years).
Within feminist writing, the theoretical divide over the values of caregiving seems to have
deepened in recent years. On one side, there are "relational" or "cultural" feminists who stress
an "ethic of care." See infra note 225. On the other, there are outspoken feminist critics of
this school. E.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERi-
CAN WOMEN 312-32 (1991) (characterizing writers including Betty Friedan, Sylvia Ann Hew-
lett and Carol Gilligan as part of the "counterassault" on women's rights); see Suzanne
Gordon, Feminism and Caregiving, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1992, at 119 (supporting the fem-
inist goal of making visible women's traditional, invisible work).
218. See also Ferree, supra note 195, at 299 (observing that policy goals that would be
useful to women struggling to combine work and family are made difficult to achieve when
women "are divided from each other into housewives and working women, traditionalists and
feminists. These divisions between women may be the most damaging results of a dual-career
model that places job and family-and the women who supposedly value each-at opposite
ends of a single continuum."). Joan Williams suggests that
[t]he impoverishment of women upon divorce, and in particular its impact upon chil-
dren, is a potentially revolutionary force for gender equality. It is powerful because it
aligns demand for gender equality with the mandates of domesticity: women must
demand equality to protect their children. This alignment could help diffuse the
long-standing divide between feminist and nonfeminist women.
Williams, supra note 194, at 1607 (1991).
219. A number of writers describe this in terms of cognitive dissonance. See, eg., FUCKS,
supra note 110, at 29-31; see also GERSON, supra note 198, at 176-84, 187-90; Becker, supra
note 212, at 186.
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C. Caregiving and the Risk of Divorce
Although a full social consensus on family values will necessarily be
elusive, there are points on which it should be possible to agree.220 The
structures and practices of family care have changed significantly, and
caregiving has become increasingly risky. Parents today who compro-
mise their career or work status in favor of caregiving roles face both a
decrease in their earning power and a fifty percent chance of divorce, a
risk that is greatest in the early years of marriage when their children are
quite young.221 In the unfortunate event of divorce, the previous deci-
sion to leave the labor force may prove to have serious adverse financial
consequences for caregivers and their children.222 It is here, in the legal
and economic dissolution of marriage, that our narrow and obsolete un-
derstanding of family care is the most misguided and pernicious.
Whatever the rhetoric of change, the reality is that in our society the
costs of caregiving are still borne primarily by women.2 23  The
220. See BERGER & BERGER, supra note 211, for an argument of this sort. In view of
recent political debate, their observation on the prospect of "family values" as a subject of
governmental policy is especially interesting:
The democratic state is not and should not be the fountainhead of morality in soci-
ety, and just about the last thing we would suggest is that government at any level
engage in a propaganda campaign to promote family values - a notion as objectiona-
ble in theory as, in all likelihood, it would be ridiculous in practice.
Id. at 204-05.
221. In 1980 the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics predicted that if divorce rates
remained constant through the 1980s and 1990s, 48% of those couples who married in 1970
would eventually divorce. More than half this number divorce in the early years of marriage:
by 1977, 25% of those married in 1970 had already divorced. ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MAR-
RIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 24-25 (1981). According to Mary Ann Glendon, "almost
three-fifths of all divorces in the United States involve couples with minor children." GLEN-
DON, supra note 77, at 93 (citing 1979 population data).
Divorce rates stated in the aggregate actually understate the prospects of divorce for
younger women. Although there is some speculation that divorce rates may be stabilizing, the
peak divorce rates have been experienced by the older cohort of the "baby boom" generation.
For this group, 1985 data suggest that 55.5% have been or will eventually be divorced follow-
ing a first marriage. By contrast, for the generation born 20 years earlier, only 24% have been
divorced or are projected to divorce eventually. Arthur J. Norton & Jeanne E. Moorman,
Current Trends in Marriage and Divorce Among American Women, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
3, 12 (1987).
222. The adverse financial consequences are discussed generally in WErrZMAN, supra note
7, at 344; see also supra note 78 (discussing research similar to Weitzman's).
223. In divorced families, the vast majority of children remain in their mother's primary
custody. See generally WEMMAN, supra note 7, at 216 (asserting that legal reforms have had
little effect on the traditional presumption that children should remain with the mother). In
"intact" families, as of 1985, 49% of married mothers with children under three, and 39% of
married mothers with children under 18, were not in the labor force. BERGMANN, supra note
196, at 24-25 (1986). Among those mothers who work, as of 1980, 29% worked only part
time. Id Even in families in which both parents are employed full time, caretaking continues
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superwoman ideal has not altered the fact that married women are still
largely financially dependent on their husbands, particularly after bear-
ing children.224 It is not my intention here to enter the debate over wo-
men's difference and concepts like the "ethic of care," '225 or to argue that
caregiving is a transcendent feminine virtue. We know empirically, how-
ever, that women continue to be responsible for most caregiving work in
our society, and in the context of divorce, that difference generates sub-
stantial, unrecognized economic consequences. Can we not agree that
this is an unfair approach to family life, or, at least, to divorce?
IV. TOWARD THE REHABILITATION OF FAMILY CARE
In maintenance and alimony law, all adults are measured against a
standard of self-sufficiency, and those found lacking are required to reha-
bilitate themselves. When family law is measured against the standard of
caregiving values, it is notably lacking. It is time to rehabilitate the idea
of family care, and restore it to a working role among the policies recog-
nized in the law of divorce.
Such a rehabilitation requires two steps. First, caregiving must be
taken more seriously and identified in all its varying forms-not merely
its expression in pre-1970 nuclear families. As a second step, it will be
necessary to construct a popular and legal consensus that caregiving is an
important and valuable aspect of family life that should be supported in
the context of family law.
A. Recognizing Family Care
This section explores several of the many different approaches to
to be primarily the domain of women. See generally HOCHSCHILD, supra note 183 passim
(documenting the lives of working mothers who remain the primary caretakers of children).
224. See generally FUCHS, supra note 110, at 58-67 (showing 'that bearing children causes a
decrease in women's job earnings).
225. Within the circles of feminist legal analysis, there have been many pages and hours
devoted to the debate over women's difference and concepts like the "ethic of care." See, e.g.,
Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an
Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REv. 1, 36-47 (1990); see also Linda Alcoff, Cultural Femi-
nism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 405, 408
(1988) (discussing "cultural feminism" as represented in writings such as those of Mary Daly
and Adrienne Rich). See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DIs-
CRIMINATION AND THE LAW 32-34, 111-31, 305-21 (1989) (discussing "difference"). For dis-
cussions of cultural feminism in the feminist legal literature, see Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rnv. 581 (1990); Ann C. Scales, The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986);
and Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989). Following a
course Deborah Rhode has suggested, my objective is "neither [to] glorify nor discount differ-
ence, but [to] challenge its adverse consequences." Rhode, supra note 193, at 1789.
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caregiving that exist in families today, in order to illustrate what should,
perhaps, be obvious: that family care in its varied forms is still impor-
tant, and that caregiving still entails economic dependence and other per-
sonal risks for a caregiver. Although family care is substantially ignored
in the current maintenance and alimony law, there have been efforts to
grapple with the reality of caregiving in child custody law. In disputed
custody cases, courts often focus on the extent of each parent's daily care
activities with a child. For this reason, some courts have developed a
body of case law attempting to define the content of family care.
In the series of "primary caretaker" custody opinions issued by the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals beginning in 1978,226 the court
suggested the following list of the "caring and nurturing duties of a
parent":
(1) preparing and planning of meals;
(2) bathing, grooming and dressing;
(3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes;
(4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians;
(5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school,
i.e. transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or
boy scout meetings;
(6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day care, etc.;
(7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the
middle of the night, waking the child in the morning;
(8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet
training;
(9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and
(10) teaching elementary skills, i.e. reading, writing and
arithmetic.227
As the court noted, it will not ordinarily be difficult to determine which
parent has been the primary caretaker of a child, and it is especially clear
where one parent is a permanent, full-time homemaker. The emphasis is
on care for children, and not other types of housework.
The custody cases suggest that we might begin to value caregiving in
226. The court asks, as a threshold question in contested custody cases, which parent was
the primary caretaker of the children before the onset of domestic strife and uses the enumer-
ated factors to guide this inquiry. E.g., David M. v. Margaret M., 182 W. Va. 57, 67-72, 385
S.E.2d 912, 923-28 (1989); Garska v. McCoy, 167 W. Va. 59, 68-70, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363-64
(1981); see also J.B. v. A.B., 161 W. Va. 332, 336-40, 242 S.E.2d 248, 252-53 (1978) (stating
that the mother is rebuttably presumed to be the primary caretaker). All of these opinions
were authored by Chief Justice Richard Neely, who elaborated on his thinking in his 1984
book, THE DIVORCE DECISION: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF ENDING A
MARRIAGE.
227. Garska, 167 W. Va. at 69-70, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
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the maintenance context by considering the nature of caregiving work
and the diverse ways in which families accommodate it. Some contem-
porary families still operate on the traditional model eulogized in the
displaced homemaker cases.22 An alternative model, reflecting a com-
promise between the traditional ideal and the economic pressures of con-
temporary life, is a new species of homemaker: the temporary, full-time
homemaker-someone whose years as a housewife are a hiatus from an-
other career or work in the wage labor market. Some of the women who
attained prominence during the 1980s followed this pattern earlier in
their lives, including Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,229 and vice-presiden-
tial candidate Geraldine Ferraro.230
Another newer image of caretaking is the "Mommy Track.",
231
Although the term conjures an image of highly-paid professional women,
variations on the "mommy track" career strategy are also common
among parents who have jobs rather than "careers," 232 and who limit
their commitment to the workplace for a time in order to accommodate
the needs of their children and family.233 Because very few among the
list of tasks performed by a primary caretaker are typically performed by
228. See supra notes 54-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the displaced home-
maker maintenance cases.
229. See Joan S. Marie, Her Honor: The Rancher's Daughter, SAT. EVE. POST, Sept. 1985,
at 42. Justice O'Connor stopped working outside the home for about five years while her
children were small, and returned to "a job with flexible hours" as an assistant attorney gen-
eral in Arizona. Id. at 44-45, 46.
230. GERALDINE FERRARO, FERRARO: My STORY 44 (1985) (describing reentering the
work force in the district attorney's office after years of child-raising as not "easy, even with a
lot of [financial] back-up"). Of course, most women whose lives follow this pattern do not
have the opportunity to reenter the labor force and achieve the success these prominent women
have had. Many cannot find work of the sort they were once trained to perform.
231. This was debated extensively in the media following publication of an article by Felice
N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1989, at 65. See also FeliceN. Schwartz, The "Mommy Track" Isn't Anti-Woman, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1989, at A27 (answering criticisms that empl6ying women is more expensive
than employing men). References to the "mommy track" idea appeared before Schwartz's
article. See Judith S. Kaye, Mommy Track in Practice, NAT'L L.J., May 22, 1989, at 13;
Jennifer A. Kingson, Women in the Law Say Path is Limited By "Mommy Track", N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1988, at Al; Geneva Overholser, So Where's the Daddy Track?, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1988, at A26.
232. As one commentator has stated:
Most women do not have careers; they have jobs. Careers involve employment in
which some realistic expectation of upward occupational and financial mobility is
expected and available.... In contrast, jobs offer limited opportunities for advance-
ment, responsibility, and authority, are paid by the hour, and promise little signifi-
cant increase in financial reward for achievement or for longevity of employment.
ROSANNA HERTZ, MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: WOMEN AND MEN IN DUAL-CAREER
MARRIAGES 5 (1986).
233. See Ferree, supra note 195, at 292-301.
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an elementary school, day care center, home day care provider, or house-
keeper/nanny, the chief advantage of a parent working part time is that
it provides more time for parents to carry out important primary caregiv-
ing functions.
In families where both parents elect a career fast track or full-time
work in any job, over the mommy or daddy track, there is caregiving
work to be done that cannot be fully delegated or eliminated. Couples
with elite careers may be able afford the services of a full-time house-
keeper or nanny to take over a substantial portion of the daily child
watching and housework routines. Even in these families, however, once
children are born there are additional demands and many caregiving
roles that cannot be delegated.234 For middle and working class families,
who cannot afford the cost of a paid substitute in the home, there may be
enormous tension between the demands of caregiving and the workplace.
In these families, the pressures of a "double day" or "divided life" are
often not equally shared, although some of the families with the most
egalitarian divisions of household labor are those with two parents work-
ing split shifts.235 Even where both parents have demanding work lives,
one parent may be practically and emotionally the primary caretaker in
their child's life. A number of the custody cases acknowledge this real-
ity, cautioning that a parent who works outside the home, even one with
a demanding career, may still be a primary caretaker. "We would expect
that, as between any two parents, one will be the primary parent even if
neither conforms to the more traditional pattern of one parent working
outside the home and one parent within it."2 36
Finally, single parents who are also working full time perform both
tasks under more pressure than any other group of families or workers.
For most single parents, poverty is an enormous problem, but even be-
yond the obvious financial difficulties single parents face, there are ex-
traordinary time pressures, and no regular source of the supports that
marriage typically offers, such as the relief or sharing of household tasks
234. HERTZ, supra note 232, at 131-39. Sara Ruddick notes that, despite the wide range of
experts and assistants who participate in shaping a child's growth, a mother typically holds
herself, and is held by others, to be responsible for her child's development. Ruddick, supra
note 208, at 78.
235. As of 1982, in a substantial percentage of families with mothers employed full or part
time, the form of child care utilized was care at home by the child's father. BERGMANN, supra
note 196, at 284.
236. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 714 (Minn. 1985) (en banc). See also Brown v.
Brown, 184 W. Va. 627, 631, 403 S.E.2d 29, 33 (1991) (granting custody to mother who
worked "for a large law firm and will rely on a baby sitter to care for her children while she is
at work"); Wagoner v. Wagoner, 172 W. Va. 687, 688-89, 310 S.E.2d 204, 205-06 (1983) (find-
ing that primary caretaker was mother who worked as a nurse).
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and emotional burdens.237
In each of these family types, caregiving functions are essential to
the life of the family. In each, the practices of caregiving are shaped by a
set of fundamental parental responsibilities: preserving the child's life
and health; fostering the child's physical, emotional, and intellectual
growth; and shaping the child's behavior to produce an acceptable adult
member of the social group.2 38 And family care in any form is economi-
cally and personally risky for the caregiver. However family work is or-
ganized, caregiving has both immediate and long-term costs. Some of
these costs, such as the loss of all or part of the caregiver's potential
wages, are readily visible to the family.2 39 Others are more hidden. The
nature and extent of the risks vary from family to family, depending in
part on the nature of each family's division of caretaking and paid labor.
1. The Permanent Homemaker
The permanent, full-time homemaker in a household with a tradi-
tional breadwinner/homemaker labor division incurs the most significant
and the most hidden costs of caregiving. For a lifetime homemaker, lack
of career skills and experience in the labor force create the prospect of
very serious economic dislocation in the event of the loss of the bread-
winner's income through death, disability, unemployment, retirement, or
divorce.240 Of these risks, however, the specter of divorce is the most
dangerous for a homemaker. It is the only one of these that is not rou-
tinely insured against,241 and it is statistically quite significant during the
237. See BERGMANN, supra note 196, at 230-32 (discussing the pressures faced by single-
parent workers).
238. Ruddick, supra note 208, at 77-91. Ruddick points out that these tasks are especially
difficult when they must be carried out in circumstances defined by the oppressions of gender,
race, and class. Id at 88.
239. See generally PosNER, supra note 109, at 127-30 (analyzing the economic "theory of
household production"); Tamar Lewin, For Some Two-Paycheck Families, the Economics
Don'tAdd Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1991, § 4, at E18 (analyzing the net gain in family income
for two different hypothetical families if husband and wife both hold full-time jobs).
240. The difficult situation of a homemaker in these circumstances is sometimes described
in economic terms as a function of her failure to invest in her "human capital," or as the result
of her investment in "household" capital rather than "market" capital. See generally POSNER,
supra note 109, at 127-30, 134-37 (examining the reasons homemakers should receive a type of
"severance pay" after divorce). These economic concepts are elaborated upon in the context of
the family in BECKER, supra note 202, at 9-12, 15-21, 119-22.
241. It has become commonplace to insure families, publicly or privately, against death,
disability, unemployment, and retirement; all four areas are covered by the federal social secur-
ity law. Divorce insurance, however, has not yet arrived on the scene. But see Homer H.
Clark, Jr., Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 403, 412 (1971) (propos-
ing a scheme of divorce insurance).
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early years of marriage.24 2
Legal commentators have discussed the risk to a homemaker from
divorce. Herma Hill Kay, acknowledging that a relationship in which a
wife and children are dependent on a husband and father for support
"may be satisfying while the marriage is a functioning one," points out
that "if the marriage ends in divorce, the former spouses may discover
that their choice of a traditional relationship has disabled the woman...
and that it has created an unwanted ongoing support obligation for the
man."243 In his analysis of alimony, Ira Ellman points out that while a
traditional family labor division may be economically efficient-making a
couple better off during their marriage-it may cause problems when the
"mutual commitment to share" breaks down. If that occurs, "the spouse
who has specialized in domestic aspects of the marriage-who has in-
vested in the marriage rather than the market-suffers a disproportionate
loss." In Ellman's view, therefore, marriage "poses unavoidable risks for
the wife, risks that are different and greater than those assumed by her
husband," and risks that "are realized only on divorce." 2"
Within the ongoing family, the traditional breadwinner/homemaker
system has obvious advantages. It allows the family member who has
specialized in family care, and the children, to share in the economic
success of the family member who has specialized in market labor. An-
other advantage of a homemaker role, often cited by women who have
chosen it, is the freedom it brings from the pressures and obligations that
accompany paid work in the marketplace.245 In addition, some studies
indicate that a full-time homemaker on the average works fewer hours
per week than her breadwinning partner.246
Although in the short run a caregiver occupies an economically ad-
vantageous position, 47 there are disadvantages to working in the home
rather than the market. A homemaker's hours are unpredictable, extend
throughout the week, and often involve very boring and repetitive tasks.
Because a housewife's labor is unpaid, it is accorded less value and re-
spect both within the home and in the wider community, and the fact
that the housewife is financially at risk in the event of divorce reduces her
242. For younger couples, the odds are now worse than 50-50. See supra note 221.
243. Kay, supra note 1, at 78.
244. Ellman, supra note 3, at 49.
245. GERSON, supra note 198, at 103-10. In those sectors of the labor market readily avail-
able to women, work is especially likely to be underpaid and unrewarding. See infra note 254
and accompanying text.
246. OQIN, supra note 92, at 150-52. But see infra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
247. Some writers describe the position of a full-time homemaker as one of privilege, re-
flecting in part the fact that only relatively wealthy husbands can afford to support a full-time
housewife. HERTZ, supra note 232, at 6; Ferree, supra note 195, at 290-91.
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power within the marriage.248 In some families, the traditional "wife"
role is understood to be a subordinate position; 9 indeed, some feminist
writers argue that subordination inheres in the gender structure of mar-
riage itself.2 Housewives' lack of power and respect are reflected in the
findings of empirical research, which have historically indicated married
women are significantly less happy than married men. 51
2. Temporary Homemakers and the Mommy Track
These risks of a homemaker orientation are altered for those
caregivers who maintain a labor force attachment even while viewing
their domestic roles as of primary importance. The most common strate-
gies for achieving this are "sequencing" periods of work and caretaking
responsibility and assuming the full-time homemaker role only temporar-
ily,252 and by working part time or on a mommy track.25 3
The part-time or temporary homemaker has the advantage of em-
ployment experience and training to draw on in the event she loses access
to a breadwinner's income. There are still costs, however; her limited
labor force commitment means she is often employed in a "pink collar"
ghetto, or lower status professional or managerial position, with corre-
spondingly limited career and earning potential25 a Similarly, while con-
248. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 109 (1983); OKIN,
supra note 92, at 151-52.
249. FucHs, supra note 110, at 73 (discussing the traditional "wife" role's subordinate po-
sition in a hierarchically constructed marriage). For descriptions of ways that subordination
accompanies a "wife" role, see BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 248.
250. Eg., CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 154-88 (1988) (tracing the devel-
opment of feminist critique of the marriage contract).
251. Married women have historically ranked lowest among all adults in relative happiness
and satisfaction with their lives. When sociologist Jessie Bernard described marriage in 1972,
she observed that married men fare consistently better than never-married men in almost every
index of well-being. JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 16-27 (1973). For wo-
men, however, the opposite is true. Id. at 28-58. More recent studies suggest that the situation
of unmarried men relative to married men has improved somewhat over the past two decades,
and current data point in somewhat different directions. See Gary R. Lee et al., Marital Status
and Personal Happiness: An Analysis of Trend Data, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 839, 842 (1991)
(tracing differences in personal happiness by year between 1972 and 1989). But see also Sandra
C. Stanley et al., The Relative Deprivation of Husbands in Dual Earner Households, 7 J. FAM.
ISSUES 3, 3-5 (1986) (suggesting that men in "conventional breadwinner" roles are more satis-
fied with their work, marriages, and personal lives than men in dual earner marriages); Dana
Vannoy & William W. Philliber, Wife's Employment and Quality of Marriage, 54 J. MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. 387, 397 (1992) (noting that gender role attitudes are more important than
wife's employment in determining perceptions of marital quality).
252. E.g., CARDOZO, supra note 192, at 93-97 (describing the economic factors associated
with "sequencing").
253. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
254. See BERGMANN, supra note 196, at 87-118 (describing the reasons why women are
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trol of an income and earning ability may decrease her economic and
career risk, it may not greatly reduce the risks of subordination and per-
sonal dissatisfaction within marriage itself.
An additional cost for homemakers who are also employed is that
they can expect to work a substantially larger number of hours each
week than their primary breadwinning partners. Sociologist Arlie Hoch-
schild, summarizing a number of studies of this issue, writes that such
women work a "second shift" that amounts to an additional month's
full-time labor every year.255 The unequal division of labor within these
families raises substantial additional questions of fairness and economic
efficiency.256 It is also part of the explanation for the popularly recog-
nized difficulties of "superwomen" who have responsibility for both
homemaking and wage or career labor.25 7
kept out of "good jobs"); FUCHS, supra note 110, at 32-57 (analyzing occupational segregation
and the sex gap in wages); LOUISE KAPP HOWE, PINK COLLAR WORKERS 11-232 (1977)
(depicting work lives of beauticians, waitresses, and those in other low paid female occupa-
tions); cf Jacqueline Shaheen, Women Confront Blue Collar Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
1991, § 12N3, at 1 (discussing experiences of women in typically male trades).
255. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 183, at 3-4. This double burden is part of the reason that
women's turn toward paid labor has been accompanied by a decline rather than an improve-
ment in women's economic well-being relative to men. FUCHS, supra note 110, at 75-94.
256. Political scientist Susan Moller Okin asks if there is anything unjust about an unequal
division of marital labor. She answers her own question as follows:
First, the uneven distribution of labor within the family is strongly correlated with an
innate characteristic, which appears to make it the kind of issue with which theorists
of justice have been most concerned.... Second, though it is by no means always
absolute, the division of labor in a traditional or quasi-traditional marriage is often
quite complete and usually long-standing. It lasts in many cases at least through the
lengthy years of child-rearing, and is by no means confined to the preschool years.
Third, partly as a result of this, and of the structure and demands of paid work, the
household division of labor has a lasting impact on the lives of married women, espe-
cially those who become mothers. It affects every sphere of their lives, from the
dynamics of their marital relationship to their opportunities in the many spheres
outside the household.
OKiN, supra note 92, at 149.
For Marxist feminists, the tension between women's domestic and wage labor reflects a
larger tension within the advanced capitalist economy. As Dorothy Smith argues, capital is
"indifferent to the sex of those who do its work." Smith, supra note 210, at 49. She goes on to
note that work opportunities for women in the market are increasing, drawing women away
from family work. Smith points out that as the domestic economy loses its power to compete
with paid employment, its "traditional relationship of dependence on the market" through the
family wage paid to a single breadwinner, has itself ceased to be fully viable. Id. at 49-50.
Heidi Hartmann starts with the observation that as the percentages of women in the labor
force have increased, the percentages of women in the labor force who work part time have
also increased. Hartmann argues that this demonstrates that "[it is necessary . . . that a
substantial proportion of women's collective work hours be retained in the home if the patriar-
chal requirement that women continue to do housework and provide child care is to be ful-
filled." Hartmann, supra note 215, at 392.
257. See supra note 189.
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When compared to two-job families, one disadvantage of the
mommy track strategy may be financial. In the short run, the costs of
slowing down one career are easily measured in lost income, although
this may be balanced against savings in the costs of such items as day
care, taxes, and commuting. Couples in which both partners are oriented
to the workplace do not lightly make the decision that one of them will
leave the labor force to care for children.25 In large part, they balance a
set of financial tradeoffs against the potential for significant nonfinancial
gains to the family.259 In this setting, more than in any other caregiving
type, an analysis of the opportunity costs of family care seems to match
the calculation a couple makes. 2"
3. Two Job/Two Career Couples
For those marriages in which both partners remain fillly committed
to paid work, whether for reasons of economic pressure or personal satis-
faction,261 the decision to bear and raise children imposes different per-
sonal and career costs. Because only the most routine daily care is
typically delegable to a substitute caregiver, caregiving will continue to
affect the work lives of one or both parents, limiting to some extent their
ability to develop fully their individual market capital.262 Empirical re-
search suggests that the wife/mother is overwhelmingly more likely to
absorb the greater share of these responsibilities and the accompanying
career costs.
263
258. See generally GERSON, supra note 198, at 121-22 (describing the decision-making pro-
cess that leads some to choose to leave the workplace in favor of "domesticity").
259. E.g., Lewin, supra note 239, at 18.
260. In her review of Ira Ellman's Theory ofAlimony, June Carbone makes the point that
his measures of compensation encourage only those accommodations of caregiving that would
be necessary in a two-career family, and thus discourages a wife from "overreliance" on mar-
riage in the place of her own career development. Carbone, supra note 131, at 1471, 1482 n.82,
1491-94.
261. Compare BERGMANN, supra note 196, at 30-34 (asserting that economic "need" was
invented "as a smokescreen") with Focus, supra note 110, at 11 (noting that real wages of men
under 40 have fallen). See also Jane Riblett Wilkie, The Decline in Men's Labor Force Partici-
pation and Income and the Changing Structure of Family Economic Support, 53 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 111 (1991) (examining possible causes of increased employment among women).
262. See, eg., HERTZ, supra note 232, at 136-38, 186 (noting that at least one parent's
schedule must be flexible enough to oversee the substitute caregiver and handle emergencies).
See generally EDWARD F. ZIGLER & MARY E. LANG, CHILD CARE CHOICES: BALANCING
THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND SoCIETY 24-25 (1991) (arguing that nonparental
child care is a supplement, not a substitute, for parental child rearing).
263. In the professions, one strategy is to reduce the number of hours devoted to practice.
See David L. Chambers, Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women and Men Lawyers and the
Balance of Work and Family, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 251, 268 (1989); Linda Grant et al.,
Gender, Parenthood, and Work Hours of Physicians, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 39, 45-47
(1990). Although this might be viewed as a variation on the mommy track strategy, the aver-
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Parents who feel committed to maintaining a balance between their
work and family roles utilize a number of common strategies. Some may
stop short of the temporary homemaker/mommy track approach dis-
cussed above, but nonetheless make job choices that allow greater flexi-
bility for meeting family needs. For those with elite careers-doctors,
lawyers, business executives-it may be possible to reduce slightly the
number of hours worked, or to seek assignment to a specialty or depart-
ment with fewer requirements for on-call time or out-of-town travel.2 "
For working-class families, strategies may include a husband. and wife
working split shifts, or working in jobs in which overtime hours are not
required.26 Although the costs associated with the decision to scale
back a career may be relatively small, they are still costs.
The difficulty that working parents experience in harmonizing their
roles is one reason that women with demanding careers or jobs are in-
creasingly choosing to remain childless.266 This is particularly common
for women whose partners are noncommittal or opposed to the idea of
having children and unwilling to contribute substantially to the caregiv-
ing work children will require.267 In economic terms, this decision is a
rational one, but in personal terms, it may be a considerable sacrifice.
4. Single Parent Caregiving
The hazards of family care are greatest for single parents, who must
be both breadwinner and caregiver. Work is essential, not a matter of
choice or a matter of the financial benefit of an additional income.268
Even those single parents who have secured child support orders often
find they rarely receive the ordered payments.2 69 In addition to the risk
of poverty, single parents bear the full burden of family care tasks and
must manage both spheres without a partner to share decision-making
age reduction in hours for full-time working mothers in Chambers's survey was only a drop
from 52 to 49 hours per week. Chambers, supra, at 269. There were no differences between
the working hours of men with children and men without children. Id at 279.
264. See Chambers, supra note 263, at 268; Grant et al., supra note 263, at 45-47; see also
HERTZ, supra note 232, at 139-46 (detailing various options for integrating children into a
dual-career family).
265. Some of the disadvantages of the split shift approach are described in DIANE EHREN-
SAFr, PARENTING TOGETHER: MEN AND WOMEN SHARING THE CARE OF THEIR CHILDREN
8-9; 174, 255 (1987).
266. See GERSON, supra note 198, at 138-57; see also FUCHS, supra note 110, at 94-116
(discussing the choice to remain childless).
267. This is discussed at length in GERSON, supra note 198, at 144-47.
268. The difficult financial circumstances of single parents are described in CHERLIN, supra
note 221, at 80-84.
269. See Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and
the Public Interest, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 78, at 166, 174.
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responsibility or to give adult emotional support.2 7° Single parents after
divorce suffer from all of these difficulties and in addition from the emo-
tional and financial dislocations of a divorce, which often require many
years for children and parents to overcome.2 71
B. Valuing Family Care
Family policy and divorce law should recognize that essential
caregiving work goes on in each of these family types, both before and
after divorce. There are strong public policy reasons to support and fa-
cilitate the choice of caregiving in all types of families. The importance
of this policy lies in the particular best interests of children who receive
this care, and the larger best interests of adults and society. These inter-
ests are far less controversial than the rhetoric of family policy would
suggest.
Although this discussion is primarily directed toward the needs of
children, social and legal support for caregiving in the family also serves
the interests of adults. Adult couples without children also have house-
hold tasks to be accomplished and emotional needs to be met, and this
process may be facilitated when one partner assumes a homemaker role.
Caring for children often fulfills deep human needs for caregivers them-
selves.272 In some families, the caregiver's work includes direct support
for the breadwinning ftnction, such as in the case of a "Mom and Pop"
family business or a "two-person" professional career.273
270. See generally ROBERT S. WEISS, GOING IT ALONE: THE FAMILY LIFE AND SOCIAL
SrrUATION OF THE SINGLE PARENT 265-76 (1979) (discussing the responsibility, task, and
emotional overload of single parents and noting that "[t]he fundamental problem in the single
parent's situation is the insufficiency of immediately available support").
271. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN,
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989) (describing the effects of di-
vorce on family members over a ten-year period).
272. To look at responsibility for children only as a burden to be allocated is to miss the
primary significance of children and of parenthood in many adult lives. See Louis GENEVIE
& EVA MARGOLIES, THE MOTHERHOOD REPORT: How WOMEN FEEL ABOUT BEING
MOTHERS (1987). The pleasures of caregiving have become a common topic for newspaper
columnists. See, e.g., PHYLLIS CHESLER, WITH CHILD: A DIARY OF MOTHERHOOD (1979)
(providing a daily journal of pregnancy and first year of parenthood); BOB GREENE, GOOD
MORNING MERRY SUNSHINE (1984) (describing the first year of parenthood in daily journal
form); Anna Quindlen, Mother's Choice, Ms., Feb. 1988, at 55. The same deep pleasure in
parenthood is depicted even in those first person accounts that emphasize the hectic and pres-
sured.quality of life for parents with multiple roles. E.g., Sara Davidson, Having it All, Es-
QUIRE, June 1984, at 54, 60 ("All my time is spent on three things: baby, work, and keeping
the marriage going. I find I can handle two beautifully.... But three pushes me to the
edge.").
273. See, eg., MARTHA R. FOWLKES, BEHIND EVERY SUCCESSFUL MAN: WIVES OF
MEDICINE AND ACADEME 67-78 (1980) (describing the working relationships between physi-
cians and academics and their wives). This seems to be the point recognized in the Delaware
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No one seriously disputes the deep importance for children of strong
emotional bonds with a primary care provider, traditionally, but not nec-
essarily, the child's biological mother. 4 The standard references in de-
velopmental psychology275 explore extensively the importance for infants
and young children of a sensitive, responsive caregiver with whom the
child can develop a secure attachment, and the risk of serious develop-
mental consequences where those early bonds are not achieved and pro-
tected. In several decades of research since publication of the early
attachment studies, psychological and psychiatric data has accumulated
to support these points.276 Attachment theory came into currency in
legal circles with the publication of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's Be-
yond the Best Interests of the Child in 1973, which highlighted the need
for recognizing and protecting these bonds in the context of custody and
placement decisions. 277 Another body of developmental literature, based
on theories that focus on parental interactions with young children, also
suggests that the nature of a child's early care is a significant predictor of
antisocial behavior later in life.2
In the developmental literature, the risk of attachment failure is
viewed as a risk of extreme social pathology. As described by the psy-
chotherapist Selma Fraiberg, "[ijt is because the loved person is valued
cases allowing income equalization maintenance awards for a spouse who functioned as a "true
partner in every sense of the word." See supra note 125.
274. Historically, there has been debate over how completely responsible mothers are for
the healthy psychological development of their children. See generally Nancy Chodorow &
Susan Contratto, The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY, supra note
203, at 54-75 (discussing feminist writing on motherhood); David M. Spiegel, Mothering, Fa-
thering and Mental Illness, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY, supra note 203, at 95-110 (discuss-
ing relationship of families to mental illness). There is a growing literature on fathers as
primary caregivers. See, e.g., EHRENSAFr, supra note 265, at 57-75 (1987) (describing how the
fathers' perspectives on caregiving differ from those of the mothers); KYLE D. PRUETF, THE
NURTURING FATHER (1987) (focusing on the effects of the relationship on the father as well as
the children); Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Good Dads--Bad Dads: Two Faces of Fatherhood, in
THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY (Andrew Cherlin ed., 1988), reprinted in FAMILY IN
TRANSITION 342 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome Skolnick eds., 7th ed. 1992) (surveying history
and recent trends in fathers' involvement with their children).
275. See, eg., JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss passim (2d ed. 1982) (examining
in a three-volume series the effects on personality development of the child-mother
relationship).
276. For a review of the additions to this literature over the past decades, see Jay Belsky,
Parental and Nonparental Child Care and Children's Socioemotional Development: A Decade
in Review, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 885, 888-93 (1990).
277. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
For a more contemporary and encyclopedic analysis of these issues in the context of custody
and visitation decisions, see WILLIAM F. HODGES, INTERVENTIONS FOR CHILDREN OF DI-
VORCE: CUSTODY, AccEss AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (2d ed. 1991).
278. This is described by Belsky as "social learning theory." See Belsky, supra note 276, at
891-92.
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above all other things that the child gradually modifies his aggressive im-
pulses and finds alternative modes of expression that are sanctioned by
love."'279 Fraiberg argues that a child who has not had an adequate bond
to a caretaker during the earliest years of life might experience a lifetime
of serious difficulty both in forming other human bonds and in control-
ling aggression. She depicts "diseases of nonattachment" that, in ex-
treme cases, produce serious mental illness and the potential for chilling,
sexualized forms of violence, and suggests that less extreme versions of
the same difficulties may accompany less extreme attachment
problems.280
Substantial research has been conducted assessing the effects of ma-
ternal employment and day care on healthy early childhood develop-
ment.281 Because of the importance of protecting a child's primary
attachments, this research reflects significant concern with the effects of
day care on infants, toddlers, and preschool age children. These studies
do not suggest that young children generally benefit from day care, ex-
cept in the rare case in which children form more successful bonds in the
child care setting than in the family itself.282 The studies also do not
indicate that day care is always harmful. The evidence indicates that the
developmental risks vary greatly with other factors, and increasingly the
emphasis of researchers is on identifying those factors.283 As a result, we
are beginning to learn how best to protect the child's primary attach-
ments despite the need for day care, and what care situations offer the
best possible substitute for care in the home.
Some feminist writers find the day care research troubling, particu-
larly because it has been used to blame women who work for abandoning
their children.28 4 It is not sensible to imagine that all or even most chil-
dren who experience day care as infants will grow up incapable of form-
ing human bonds and prone to aggressive, violent behavior. But there is
some level of risk, suggested by both empirical research,285 and the hesi-
tations of child development experts to embrace enthusiastically the idea
279. SELMA FRAIBERG, EVERY CHILD'S BIRTHRIGHT: IN DEFENSE OF MOTHERING 46
(1977).
280. Id. at 45-51.
281. See generally Belsky, supra note 276, at 893-99 (summarizing the research in this area
since the 1970s).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 896-98.
284. See, eg., BERGMANN, supra note 196, at 285-86 (mocking the extrapolations from
1960s monkey research); BETrY FREIDAN, THE FEMINIE MYSTIQUE 194-96 (10th anniv. ed.
1974) (noting that many of the reported studies were misinterpreted in the press).
285. See Belsky, supra note 276, at 893-99.
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of full-time wage employment for mothers of small children.2" 6 Individ-
ual families should be free to make their own assessment of these risks.
Similarly, in designing public policies, some level of caution is
appropriate.
At the level of public policy debate, these principles have led to spe-
cific recommendations. Harvard pediatrician T. Berry Brazelton, to-
gether with U.S. Representative Patricia Schroeder, lobbied around the
country in 1988 for legislation guaranteeing one parent a minimum of
four months of parental leave whenever a child is born or adopted.2" 7
Under the current law, many families of young children cannot commit
even this period of time to giving their child an ideal start, either because
of financial pressures or the risks of loss of a job or employment benefits.
The most recent version of the family leave legislation to reach a vote in
the U.S. Congress only partially addresses this problem, requiring that
some workers be granted up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave.2"'
Other advocates argue for much longer early "bonding periods."
For example, Selma Fraiberg argued emphatically that the forms of child
care available in the marketplace are highly inadequate for the needs of a
child under three. For three to six year-olds, she argued that a half day
of care in a high-quality preschool should be the maximum acceptable
level.28 9 U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch proposed something more along
these lines as a substitute to the Senate's 1991 family leave bill, urging
employers to provide up to six years of unpaid leave for parents to bond
286. See, ,g., T. BERRY BRAZELTON, WORKING AND CARING (1985); ZIGLER & LANG,
supra note 262; Barbara Kantrowitz, The Clamor to Save the Family, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 29,
1988, at 60; see also Penelope Leach, Are We Shortchanging Our Kids?, PARENTING, Apr.
1991, at 86 (asserting that parents focus too much on material well-being and not enough on
what is best for their children); Penelope Leach, Daycare Centers Are Fine for Preschoolers, But
What About Babies?, PARENTING, June/July 1991, at 58 (arguing that infants and toddlers
should spend more time with parents). Various authors have noted the turnaround on this
issue made by Dr. Benjamin Spock, who was once firmly opposed to maternal employment.
See BERGMANN, supra note 196, at 285; GERSON, supra note 198, at 183.
287. See Kantrowitz, supra note 286, at 60 (describing the "political roadshow" featuring
Schroeder, Brazelton, and "Family Ties" television producer Gary David Goldberg), see also
ZIGLER & LANG, supra note 262, at 77-87, 217 (finding that the needs of infants and toddlers
suggest a minimum of three to four months parental leave to give child a "firm foundation").
See generally BRAZELTON, supra note 286passim (providing guidelines for balancing the de.
mands of child care and the demands of a career).
288. Clifford Krauss, Senate Passes Bill Setting Up Leaves for Family Needs, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1991, at Al. The bill was vetoed on September 22, 1992. Michael Wines, Bush Vetoes
Bill Making Employers Give Family Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1992, at Al.
289. FRAIBERG, supra note 279, at 84-88. Fraiberg's viewpoint is disparaged by Bergmann
as "rearguard agitation against purchased child care," BERGMANN, supra note 196, at 286, by
Betty Friedan as elitist, FRIEDAN, supra note 217, at 118-19, and by Chodorow and Contratto
as blaming women who work for depriving their children, Chodorow & Contratto, supra note
274, at 64-65.
[Vol. 71
ALIMONY
with new children, and imposing less demanding requirements for the
rehiring of workers returning from such a leave.2"
Beyond the concern with early childhood development, caregiving is
important for older children as well. Throughout the 1980s, popular and
academic writing described a long list of social pathologies that can re-
sult when children and teenagers spend significant periods of time with-
out the regular care and supervision of a parent.2 91 Christopher Lasch's
Haven in a Heartless World describes the damage from these trends as
going beyond their effects on individuals, arguing that as children be-
come increasingly autonomous of parental control, vital social and moral
values are lost. The data on children's well-being confirm this sense that
something has gone wrong.292
Moreover, these writers do not occupy a single position on the polit-
ical spectrum. As Barbara Bergmann, a feminist economist, writes:
One does not have to be a devotee of Old Testament attitudes
to recognize that valuable things have been lost in women's
transition to a place in the market economy. Children no
longer spend their first years in a quiet and protected environ-
ment basking in the attention of a person lovingly and entirely
devoted to their well being.293
Many writers have deplored the tendency, often described as pecu-
liarly American, to ignore and neglect children of all classes.294 Public
spending for the needs of children is relatively low in this country, dra-
matically lower than spending for older Americans, and the trend shows
290. Krauss, supra note 288, at Al.
291. E.g., NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD passim (1982); MARIE
WINN, CHILDREN WITHOUT CHILDHOOD passim (1983); see also BERGER & BERGER, supra
note 211, at 146, 151-56 (describing the importance of parents' role in child's socialization).
These issues have drawn significant attention in the popular media in recent months. See, e.g.,
Children in Crisis: The Struggle to Save America's Kids, FORTUNE, Aug. 10, 1992, at 34 (de-
voting the entire issue to children's problems).
292. LASCH, supra note 175, at 178-89. For data on children's well-being, see FUCHS,
supra note 110, at 104-16. Moreover, the demographics of declining birth rates and the failure
to invest in the health and education of children have already created labor supply problems
for many employers that are projected to grow steadily worse. See SYLVL HEWLETT, WHEN
THE BOUGH BREAKS: THE COST OF NEGLECTING OUR CHILDREN 195-232 (1991). Both
factors have already resulted in increased demand for skilled labor in some fields, where jobs
are increasingly filled by women with children, whose employers must be more willing to ac-
commodate the demands of their workers dual lives. Id.
293. BERGMANN, supra note 196, at 11.
294. See, e.g., HEwLETT, supra note 292. See generally William A. 0alston, Home Alone,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 2, 1991, at 40 (reviewing seven recent books on this theme); Sheila
B. Kamerman, Doing Better By Children: Focus on Families, 8 J.L. & PoL. 75, 87-88 (1991)
(proposing family policy agenda).
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every sign of growing worse.29 In the private sector, even with the insti-
tution in recent years of fairly draconian child support enforcement
measures, many children living with a divorced or unmarried single par-
ent do not receive any regular financial support.296 Barbara Bergmann
vividly observes that: "the two-parent method of child support probably
evolved millennia ago from the single-parent method of our primate an-
cestors. We seem to be in the process of change back to the single-parent
method. '297
Of course, even those who agree that rearing healthy adults is an
important social good disagree on the best means to achieve that goal.
Some writers and politicians have focused on measures intended to re-
turn the structural supports for domesticity in the form of the "tradi-
tional" nuclear family.298 Other writers suggest various means of
bringing caregiving into the public and market spheres, many of which
involve legislating reforms in the workplace.299
Whatever our views on the importance of children in general and in
particular,3co whatever the issues that determine appropriate public poli-
295. HEWLETr, supra note 292, at 138-67.
296. Krause, supra note 269, at 174-76.
297. BERGMANN, supra note 196, at 232. Bergmann uses another animal metaphor to ar-
gue that this would not be a good development for fathers: "It is hard to believe that the
happiness of men would best be served by the conversion of a high proportion of adult males to
rogue elephant status, living only fitfully with females and the young, of use to them only at
mating time." Id at 12.
298. Conservative support for a return to "traditional" family is reflected in a 1986 report
to the President, which argues in part for "reversing the recent trend toward automatic di-
vorce." White House Working Group on the Family, The Family: Preserving the Future 14
(1986).
299. E.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1220-47 (1989) (discussing means to transform ideology of
work and to redefine gender roles in the workplace); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family:
Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARiz. L. REv. 431, 488-99 (1990) (arguing that to achieve
any useful change regarding gender roles in the workplace, we must view the family "function-
ally" and value family work equally with wage work); see also Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job
Equality for Women. Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55, passim
(1979) (considering ways to restructure the workplace to make it more accommodating for
parents and parental responsibilities).
All of these policies would have the primary effect of benefitting those adults who choose
to have children and might, for that reason, tend to encourage the choice to have children.
FUCHS, supra note 110, at 96-104; Posner, supra note 197, at 198. Not surprisingly, these
policies are more common in countries with expressed national concerns about increasing
fertility.
300. Karl Llewellyn, describing the social functions of the family, had this to say with
respect to assuring a supply of children: "[Mjarriage offers assurance that the new supply will
arrive under circumstances which halfway guarantee its being taken care of-and this equally
though particular small squallers be none too hopeful, none too nice, and none too welcome."
Llewellyn I, supra note 176, at 1289-90.
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cies for children and families, the policy issues are much narrower in the
context of family law. Once a married couple has made the choice to
have a child, their responsibilities are established. Creating structures of
moral and financial support to encourage and permit families to make
caregiving a priority can only help parents and children caught in the
dilemma of the family generation gap.310
Our social and legal institutions have lagged behind the changes in
family caregiving. Patterns of family care in all family situations remain
strongly influenced by the traditions of the gender-based division of la-
bor, with men bearing primary responsibility for labor in the marketplace
and women absorbing the greater share of work within the family. De-
spite the dramatic changes in marriage, fertility, and women's employ-
ment that have marked the past twenty years, these social roles have
remained remarkably resilient.
The work of sociologist Kathleen Gerson, who has studied the deci-
sions of individual women to emphasize either domestic or non-domestic
roles, suggests that the choice to devote one's energy to family care is
heavily influenced by a woman's actual experience and circumstances
through a series of life stages.302 Regardless of a woman's initial orienta-
tion toward homemaking or a career, the structural context of family and
work opportunities largely determines the choices she will make.30 3
As Gerson's work describes, part of the difficulty women face is that
work and family are presently structured to be mutually exclusive. Do-
mestically oriented women attempt to define work as of secondary im-
301. There are arguments from a strict equality perspective against a system of mainte-
nance awards for caregivers on the basis that it would inappropriately "facilitate the conven-
tional practice of designating a single primary caretaker for children, rather than foster[ing]
the nonsexist practice of shared parenting for infants and children." Kay, supra note 110, at
35; see also Kay, supra note 1, at 80-89 (arguing that maintenance awards encourage tradi-
tional gender and parenting roles).
Although I believe that current divorce laws unfairly ignore the sacrifices that parents,
primarily mothers, make in the interests of their children, it is not my view that children's
needs should be defined to take priority over women's autonomy. Cf Williams, supra note
194, at 1627-29.
302. GERSON, supra note 198, at 53-59. Fifty-five percent of Gerson's sample population
were women who started adult life with an orientation toward marriage, children, and domes-
tic life, yet ten years later only one-third of this group retained a domestic orientation. Of the
45% who did not start out oriented toward domestic life, almost two-thirds veered toward
domesticity rather than their initial career goals. Id. at 59-69.
303. Gerson argues that the desire to have children is not abstract and generalized, but that
it comes in the context of a specific relationship. Women who "veer toward domesticity" do so
primarily because they become committed to traditional marriages that both undermine their
efforts at career building and allow them to implement domestic choices. Id. at 92-121. Con-
versely, for women who experience fragile and impermanent relationships, there are often ris-
ing work aspirations and ambivalence about taking on family roles. Id. at 70-91, 115-21.
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portance in their lives, thereby managing the conflict they feel between
the two realms.304 This strategy guarantees that the commitment to fam-
ily care comes at a personal financial and economic cost. "Non-domes-
tic" women, who by choice or necessity do not give domestic work
primary importance, face a different conflict: the choice between moth-
erhood or childlessness. In resolving this dilemma, the presence of a
male partner committed to participating in parenting is of central impor-
tance, as are various strategies to reduce the costs of children, such as
limiting family size.3°5
Gerson also explores ways in which the social and economic sup-
ports that previously existed for domestic roles have eroded. 3 6 These
supports once included the protection afforded, however imperfectly, by
legal rules governing the grounds and financial consequences of divorce.
As the traditional structures have disappeared, they have not been re-
placed by any new supports, in the world of work or the law of divorce,
either for traditional caregiving or mixed caretaking and work roles.
Creating new structures of support for caregiving has proven diffi-
cult. Some writers have suggested we need to attribute economic values
to services within the family and require payment for the services as ren-
dered.30 7 Yet, the strategy of "making the family more like the mar-
ket" 308 could have serious drawbacks in terms of the very activity we
wish to protect. Part of the value of the family, for adults and for chil-
dren, has been its quality of being a refuge from the larger world.
The lack of social supports for caregiving, and the factors that place
caregiving burdens primarily on women, impose a troubling choice upon
families. Few families can invest parental time equally in caregiving
work, and the project of attempting to assure equality may itself be de-
structive to family life.3 09 The choice to invest one parent's time in
304. Id at 127-132.
305. Id at 138-57 (choosing to stay childless); id. at 158-90 (combining work and
motherhood).
306. Id at 204-12.
307. Payment of wages for housework has been advocated by feminists dating back at least
to Charlotte Perkins Gilman. See GILMAN, supra note 215, at 6-22. More recently, Susan
Moller Okin made similar suggestions in her book. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
This is also a subject of apparently serious consideration by economically oriented writers like
Richard Posner. See Posner, supra note 197, at 192-95.
308. See generally Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1518-20, 1528, 1530-39 (1983) (discussing efforts to
reform family life based on market values). Olsen argues that such reforms fail because of the
destructive effect of the market/family dichotomy itself. Id at 1560-61.
309. For illustrations of some of these difficulties, see EHRENSAFr, supra note 265, at 57-
75, and GERsoN, supra note 198, at 169-76.
Although the courts and commentators have indicated their opposition to tallying the
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caregiving work still creates economic and personal risks of dependence,
risks that are greater now that they go substantially unrecognized in di-
vorce court. If a family chooses to adhere during marriage to the self-
reliance ideal that the law imposes on divorce-with every adult family
member responsible for maximizing his or her individual autonomy,
human (market) capital, and personal happiness-it may be impossible
to find an accommodation of caregiving and family values.
C. Family Care and the Reality of Divorce
Despite our often polarized and politicized views of the family, there
should be little dispute that caregiving is an essential attribute of family
life, worthy of recognition in the law of divorce. Arguments have been
made from both ends of the political spectrum that divorces should be
more difficult to obtain where there are children.31 0 Mary Ann Glendon
has recommended a less extreme measure, which would assess fewer
costs to the liberty and happiness of unhappily married adults. Rather
than restricting access to divorce, Glendon has argued that divorce rules
should place children's needs first in resolving the financial aspects of
divorce.311 Within the legal scholarship on alimony and maintenance is-
sues, there are many writers who argue for restoring respect for tradi-
tional roles in marriage or, at least, for making childrearing "less
perilous. '
3 12
Glendon's analysis does not confront the question of alimony or
maintenance laws, but her view is consistent with the argument for
caregiver support. Support payments to caregivers would have two bene-
fits: facilitating the care of children in the difficult period after divorce,
and allocating to both parents the costs of putting children first during
marriage.313 The literature in this area of family law suggests only one
parties' "respective debits and credits" on divorce, see supra note 167, it would likely be far
more harmful to the institution of marriage to apply legal rules that require a husband and
wife to maintain perfectly equal accounts throughout its duration.
310. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decision Making About Marriage and Di-
vorce, 76 VA. L. Rlv. 9, 91 (1990) (advocating stricter laws for divorce when minor children
are involved); Younger, supra note 183, at'900-11 (discussing proposal for mandatory "mar-
riage for the benefit of minor children" that would be governed by stricter divorce laws);
Christopher Lasch, Who Owes What to Whom?, HARPER'S, Feb. 1991, at 47-50 (arguing for
stricter divorce laws to promote family cohesion). But see Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Mar-
riage "For the Sake of the Children" A Feminist Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 TuL. L. REv.
1435, 1442 (1992) (summarizing her critique of Scott's proposals).
311. GLENDON, supra note 77, at 93-99; see also Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone
Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law On Divorce Outcomes, 57 BRoOK.
L. REV. 621, 726 (1991) (endorsing Glendon's "children first" principle).
312. See Carbone & Brinig, supra note 63, at 956, 987 n.155.
313. Okin argues for alimony in these circumstances. OriN, supra note 92, at 180-86.
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disadvantage to caregiver support remedies: the risk that they will foster
traditional family roles, economic dependence, and the corresponding
gender roles that many men and women find oppressive.314
Although the argument against mandating traditional family roles
may be strong, the argument against tolerating those roles is not. Di-
vorce law is not an appropriate lever for producing change in the nature
of family life. There is no social consensus about the wisdom or value of
moving toward gender-neutral marriage, in which family care and mar-
ket labor are equally allocated. Even if most Americans agreed with this
as a policy goal, it would be in the greater interests of our society to
continue to support family life in all its varied forms.315 It is particularly
unfair for the law to impose penalties on one partner, in the name of
social reform, for a way of life both have chosen. 16
Susan Moller Okin puts the argument for social tolerance in these
terms:
The pluralism of beliefs and modes of life is fundamental to our
society, and the genderless society I have just outlined would
certainly not be agreed upon by all as desirable. Thus when we
think about constructing relations between the sexes that could
be agreed upon in the original position, and are therefore just
from all points of view, we must also design institutions and
practices acceptable to those with more traditional beliefs about
314. E.g., DAVID L. KnRP ET AL., GENDER JUSTICE 182-83 (1986) (asserting that a "lib-
erty-enhancing" government should not make traditional marriage attractive by subsidizing
dependency with alimony); see also supra notes 215 & 301 (discussing writing of Herma Hill
Kay concerning encouraging dependence).
Proponents of formal or abstract equality as a solution for gender inequality tend to dis-
miss the risk that new legal rules designed to achieve equality may cause substantial hardship.
These solutions are premised on the theory that changes in law or governmental policy in fact
change people's behavior; for a critique of this premise, see Becker, supra note 65, at 235-37
("Formal equality is not capable of producing enough change in the status quo, and is likely to
impose significant costs on those women most in need of change because most unlike men.").
315. The law of family regulation is already dual, to the extent we accommodate and defer
to parental religious belief. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972) (holding
that secondary education could not be compulsory where it violated parents' religious beliefs);
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-401(6) (West 1992) (creating exception to criminal child
abuse statute for failure to provide medical treatment for a child in cases in which a parent
provides treatment by spiritual means). Religious doctrine in many faiths still places great
importance on procreation and family life. See generally Steven Bayme, The Jewish Family in
American Culture, in REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN
FAMILY, 149-59 (discussing role of Jewish family both in Jewish culture and the broader soci-
ety); Gilbert Melaender, A Christian View of the Family, in REBUILDING THE NEsT, supra, at
133-48 (David Blankenhom et al. eds., 1990) (discussing Christian perspective on nature and
role of the family).
316. This conclusion seems to echo the more recent position taken by Kay, although her
original stance was that divorce rules should be used to discourage traditional marital roles.
See supra notes 215 & 301.
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the characteristics of men and women, and the appropriate di-
vision of labor between them.317
Although Professor Okin's belief in pluralism leads her to conclude
that traditional, gender-structured marriage is a necessary institution,
she also sees it as "socially problematic" because of the asymmetrical
vulnerabilities it creates, particularly in the context of divorce.31 As she
concludes, "There can be no reason consistent with principles of justice
that some should suffer economically vastly .more than others from the
breakup of a relationship whose asymmetric division of labor was mutu-
ally agreed on." 3 19
Okin's proposal is that when a family characterized by a traditional
labor division arrives in divorce court, the courts should award alimony
and child support at a level sufficient for both post-divorce households to
enjoy the same standard of living. In her view, this support should con-
tinue "for at least as long as the traditional division of labor in the mar-
riage did and, in the case of short-term marriages that produced children,
until the youngest child enters first grade and the custodial parent has a
real chance of making his or her own living. '320
A rehabilitation of family care proceeds from three principles. First,
although the costs and benefits of caregiving are most evident in house-
holds with a "traditional" division of labor, they appear in different
forms in virtually every family. Second, the burdens and rewards of fam-
ily life are not limited in time to the duration of a marriage. Third, what
is valuable within a family is not autonomy and self-reliance, but interde-
pendence and support.
317. OKiN, supra note 92, at 180.
Victor Fuchs has also made this point, arguing that family policies must respect diverse
value systems, including those in which more traditional choices are made. In musing about
the future of the family, Fuchs suggests the possibility that the United States might divide into
two groups: "secular modem" families, comprising about 75% of the population, with an
average of one to one and a half children per family, and "orthodox religious" families, includ-
ing Catholics, Mormons, Fundamentalist Protestants, and Orthodox Jews, with an average of
three or four children per family. As he envisions it, this could be a stable and long-standing
division. FucHs, supra note 110, at 142-44.
318. Okin writes:
Under current divorce laws ... the terms of exit from marriage are disadvantageous
for almost all women in traditional or quasi-traditional marriages. Regardless of the
consensus that existed about the division of family labor, these women lose most of
the income that has supported them and the social status that attached to them be-
cause of their husband's income and employment, often at the same time as suddenly
becoming single parents, and prospective wage workers for the first time in many
years.
OKN, supra note 92, at 182.
319. Id. at 183.
320. Id.
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If we believe in children, "the family," and in marriage itself, we
have no choice but to recognize these realities of family life. Thus,
caregiver support remedies have a place in all family types, whether the
claim is made by a younger homemaker who has been financially depen-
dent on a breadwinning spouse, by a career gapper or mommy track par-
ent who has moderated his or her commitment to the work place in favor
of family needs, or even by a fully self-reliant, employed parent who has
and will continue to shoulder primary responsibility for child rearing.
Moreover, caregiver support remedies should look both to the short-term
needs of young children and the long-term consequences of family care.
And finally, because caregiving transcends economic life, these remedies
must be implemented with recognition that a couple's shared decisions
about family life lie at the heart of what is most significant about their
marriage itself.
V. CONCLUSION
Many writers have called for changes in family law so that it will
provide greater support for the qualities that foster meaningful family
life: responsibility, connection, caring.321 The present alimony and
maintenance laws, which look primarily for circumstances of financial
need due to an inability to be self-supporting, have substantially ignored
the issues of caregiving that are central to family life.
In this Article, I have argued that a deep social ambivalence about
caregiving and the rapid changes in patterns of family life have led to a
generation gap in the law of alimony and maintenance. On the near side
of the gap, family care has disappeared from sight. Despite clear statu-
tory language in many jurisdictions providing for financial protections
for caregivers, courts give priority to making spouses self-reliant over
protecting and facilitating family care. Although many contemporary
families struggle to find an accommodation of both values, the courts
only recognize or compensate the caregiving contributions of older
homemakers.
Divorce law has also seen an elaboration of new remedies, based on
principles of compensation and restitution, but these have been applied
almost exclusively to financial, nonfamilial contributions. Courts, and
321. Several of these authors are referred to throughout this article. See, e.g., GLENDON,
supra note 77; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 296
(1988) (suggesting that law of parental rights emphasizes norms of benevolence and responsi-
bility); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows: Toward a History of
Family Law, " 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 893-94 (1985) (arguing that family law history is more
than a story of progressive individualism, and that family roles and legal rights have also been
used by women to promote connection and caretaking).
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perhaps lawyers, have not readily perceived the contributions of family
care as creating a similarly compelling demand for legal or equitable
relief.
It would not be difficult for trial and appellate courts to implement
financial protections for caregivers who have made family contributions
at significant personal costs. While every marriage is not the same,
neither is every marriage unique. As Glendon has observed, within the
vast body of divorce cases there are regularly recurring factual patterns
that could be identified and recognized as requiring distinct legal treat-
ment.322 To do this requires only that appellate courts begin to recognize
caregiving, and to take seriously their traditional obligation to review
lower court rulings and elaborate appropriate standards to guide the
lower courts' discretion.
The primary obstacles are not doctrinal, but rooted in perceptions
and attitudes that have remained unacknowledged and unexpressed.
Caregiving, particularly in its modem expressions, is not easily addressed
within our legal traditions. Our most difficult task may also be the sim-
plest: to affirm that family life is still a matter of deep personal impor-
tance and valid legal concern.
322. Glendon, supra note 6, at 1167-70.
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